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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the question of how data protection law should respond 
to the challenges arising from the ever-increasing prevalence of big data. The 
investigation is conducted with the case study of online behavioural 
advertising (OBA) and within the EU data protection legal framework, 
especially the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). It is argued that 
data protection law should respond to the big data challenges by leveraging 
the regulatory options that are either already in place in the current legal 
regime or potentially available to policymakers. 
With the highly complex, powerful and opaque OBA network, in both 
technical and economic terms, the use of big data may pose fundamental 
threats to certain individualistic, collective or societal values. Despite a limited 
number of economic benefits such as free access to online services and the 
growth of the digital market, the latent risks of OBA call for an effective 
regulatory regime on big data. 
While the EU’s GDPR represents the latest and most comprehensive legal 
framework regulating the use of personal data, it has still fallen short on 
certain important aspects. The regulatory model characterised by 
individualised consent and the necessity test remains insufficient in fully 
protecting data subjects as autonomous persons, consumers and citizens in the 
context of OBA. 
There is thus a pressing need for policymakers to review their regulatory 
toolbox in the light of the potential threats. On the one hand, it is necessary to 
reconsider the possibilities to blacklist or whitelist certain data uses with 
mechanisms that are either in place in the legal framework or can be 
introduced additionally. On the other hand, it is also necessary to realise the 
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full range of policy options that can be adopted to assist individuals in making 
informed decisions in the age of big data.
 v 
Lay Summary 
This thesis addresses the question of how data protection law should respond 
to the challenges arising from the ever-increasing prevalence of big data. One 
form of personalised advertising, online behavioural advertising, is employed 
as an example of the application of big data. The research also reflects the latest 
data protection legal reform in the European Union. Big data may create both 
benefits and risks in personal, economic and political terms. While the current 
data protection legal system has been updated, it remains incapable of fully 
protecting the individualistic, collective and societal values potentially 
threatened by big data. Therefore, for policymakers to further improve the 
level of data protection, they should understand the regulatory options 
available within the current legal framework, as well as the additional 
measures that can be introduced.
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Big data: Why does it matter? 
In 2015, the leading research firm in the information technology sector, 
Gartner, decided to remove ‘big data’ from their Hype Cycle for Emerging 
Technologies,1 a graphic representation designed to help businesses identify 
commercial opportunities alongside the adoption of technologies. 2  At the 
same time, machine learning made its first appearance in the Hype Cycle.3 
Is big data a hype? Is big data just a hype? Is big data still a hype? Without 
explaining the exact meaning of big data (which we will get to in a moment), 
a quick overview of how ‘big data’ as a search term has been trending on 
Google in the last five years, compared against a few alternative terms, may 
give you a sense of the rise and fall of these technological trends. Since 2016, it 
seems that a number of new trends — such as machine learning, blockchain 
and Internet of Things (IoT) — have overtaken big data as the more popular 
search terms on Google.4 If big data is just another bubble that is set to burst,5 
it would not make much sense to treat it as a unique phenomenon and 
                                                 
1 Alex Woodie, ‘Why Gartner Dropped Big Data Off the Hype Curve’ Datanami (26 August 
2015) <https://www.datanami.com/2015/08/26/why-gartner-dropped-big-data-off-the-hype-
curve/> accessed 6 June 2018. 
2 Gartner, ‘Gartner Hype Cycle’ <http://www.gartner.com/technology/research/
methodologies/hype-cycle.jsp> accessed 13 March 2018. 
3 Woodie (n 1). 
4 Google, ‘Big Data, Machine Learning, Blockchain, IoT - Explore - Google Trends’ <https://
trends.google.co.uk/trends/explore?date=today%205-y&geo=US&q=Big%20Data,Machine%
20Learning,Blockchain,IoT> accessed 6 June 2018. 
5 Mike Wheatley, ‘Gartner Warns Big Data’s Bubble May Burst as Enterprises Cut 
Investment’ SiliconANGLE (4 October 2016) <https://siliconangle.com/blog/2016/10/04/
gartner-warns-big-datas-bubble-may-burst-as-enterprises-plot-investments-elsewhere/> 
accessed 6 June 2018. 
Introduction 2 
undertake a comprehensive study on it — not at least from a long-term 
policymaking point of view. 
Yet, as will be shown throughout this study, the effects of big data are so 
profound that it has become part of many aspects of our daily life, and will 
probably continue to change even more aspects. While the exact phrase of ‘big 
data’ may eventually fade from the spotlight of public attention, the influence 
may, nevertheless, remain. The reason why big data is still something worth 
discussing in 2018, and something that should be taken seriously, may be that 
big data has been turning from something people talk about to something 
people experience. This explains why big data was dropped from the Hype 
Cycle. The decision, according to the analyst, did not mean that big data was 
no longer relevant, but rather that big data had ‘become prevalent in our lives 
across many hype cycles.’6 As big data is evolving and integrating with other 
emerging technologies,7 its impacts on all parts of life will only become even 
more significant. 
One of the latest impacts of big data that have captured public attention is 
the Facebook—Cambridge Analytica revelations. It was reported in late-2015 
that user data collected from social media had been used by Cambridge 
Analytica for political campaigning during the US election.8 This, however, 
                                                 
6 Woodie (n 1). 
7 For the interactions between big data and such technologies as cloud computing, the 
internet of things, artificial intelligence and machine learning, see Divyakant Agrawal, 
Sudipto Das and Amr El Abbadi, ‘Big Data and Cloud Computing: Current State and Future 
Opportunities’ (Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Extending Database 
Technology, Uppsala, 21-24 March 2011); Daniel E. O’Leary, ‘“Big Data”, the “Internet of 
Things” and the “Internet of Signs”’ (2013) 20(1) Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance 
and Management 53; Daniel E. O’Leary, ‘Artificial Intelligence and Big Data’ (2013) 28(2) 
IEEE Intelligent Systems 96; Justin Grimmer, ‘We Are All Social Scientists Now: How Big 
Data, Machine Learning, and Causal Inference Work Together’ (2015) 48(1) PS: Political 
Science & Politics 80.  
8 Harry Davies, ‘Ted Cruz Using Firm That Harvested Data on Millions of Unwitting 
Facebook Users’ The Guardian (11 December 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
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did not raise a lot of public eyebrows, and still not so when another report in 
early-2017 further revealed the connection between Cambridge Analytica and 
the Leave campaign in the Brexit referendum. 9  Only when further media 
coverage followed in March 201810 did these practices eventually come under 
the spotlight.11 Irrespective of the actual efficiency of their political micro-
targeting,12 the fact that a large volume of behavioural data is readily available 
for sophisticated analytics shows, at least partly, that we are already in an age 
of big data. 
                                                 
2015/dec/11/senator-ted-cruz-president-campaign-facebook-user-data> accessed 10 June 
2018. 
9 Hannes Grassegger and Mikael Krogerus, ‘The Data That Turned the World Upside Down’ 
Vice (28 January 2017) <https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mg9vvn/how-our-likes-
helped-trump-win> accessed 20 November 2017. 
10 Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore and Carole Cadwalladr, ‘How Trump 
Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions’ The New York Times (17 March 2018) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.
html> accessed 10 June 2018; Carole Cadwalladr and Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘Revealed: 50 
Million Facebook Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in Major Data Breach’ The 
Guardian (17 March 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-
analytica-facebook-influence-us-election> accessed 10 June 2018. 
11 Again, this is evidenced by Google Trends: The search term ‘Cambridge Analytica’ saw its 
first surge in March 2018. See Google, ‘Cambridge Analytica - Explore - Google Trends’ 
<https://trends.google.co.uk/trends/explore?q=Cambridge%20Analytica> accessed 10 June 
2018. 
12 For different views on this, see Olivia Goldhill, ‘The Psychology Behind Cambridge 
Analytica Is Massively Overhyped’ Quartz (29 March 2018) <https://qz.com/1240331/
cambridge-analytica-psychology-the-science-isnt-that-good-at-manipulation/> accessed 10 
June 2018; Jonathan Allen and Jason Abbruzzese, ‘Cambridge Analytica’s Effectiveness 
Called Into Question Despite Alleged Facebook Data Harvesting’ NBC (20 March 2018) 
<https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/cambridge-analytica-s-effectiveness-
called-question-despite-alleged-facebook-data-n858256> accessed 10 June 2018; Jane 
Wakefield, ‘Cambridge Analytica: Can Targeted Online Ads Really Change a Voter’s 
Behaviour?’ BBC (30 March 2018) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-43489408> 
accessed 10 June 2018; Privacy International, ‘Cambridge Analytica Explained: Data and 
Elections’ Medium (13 April 2017) <https://medium.com/privacy-international/cambridge-
analytica-explained-data-and-elections-6d4e06549491> accessed 10 June 2018; Matthew 
Hindman, ‘How Cambridge Analytica’s Facebook Targeting Model Really Worked – 
According to the Person Who Build It’ Independent (13 April 2018) <https://www.
independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/how-cambridge-analytica-s-facebook-
targeting-model-really-worked-according-to-the-person-who-built-a8289901.html> accessed 
10 June 2018. 
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Disclosures of governmental and commercial uses of personal data in 
recent years — such as the Snowden revelations — have played a key role in 
enhancing public awareness of the potential risks arising from the practices 
enabled by big data. 13  Yet, the short-term and long-term effects of the 
unfettered uses of big data, particularly when it comes to personal data, are 
yet to be fully exposed. The threats of the widespread application of big data 
concerning individuals, different groups of people and the entire society are 
still subject to further theoretical and empirical investigation. Well-grounded 
findings on these matters are of significant importance and urgency as they 
constitute the precondition for timely, informed regulatory approaches to big 
data. Without a coherent theory about the big data risks, it would be 
impossible to answer such questions as whether and how big data can and 
should be regulated. 
Data protection law: A helpful approach? 
When it comes to regulation, law is one of the most common regulatory 
instruments, although there are of course alternative policy tools available to 
regulators.14 The utilisation of information — not only personal data — is often 
subject to the control of law, in fact across various sectors of law, such as 
privacy and defamation law, intellectual property law, state secrecy and 
freedom of information law, telecommunications and cybersecurity law, 
competition and consumer protection law, etc. 
Among these potential legal approaches to the challenges of big data, data 
protection law stands out as a key branch of law that holds particular promise 
                                                 
13 Ellen Daniel, ‘Five Years On, What Has Changed Since the Edward Snowden Scandal?’ 
Verdict <https://www.verdict.co.uk/snowden-scandal-five-years-gdpr/> accessed 21 June 
2018. 
14 See Lawrence Lessig, ‘The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach’ (1999) 113 
Harvard Law Review 501. 
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for a number of reasons. First, the way data protection law functions is mainly 
through regulating the use of (personal) data directly. As will be revealed 
throughout this study (especially Chapters 4 through 6), by imposing a set of 
restrictions on the processing of personal data, data protection law has in effect 
created a systematic regime by which it can be determined whether certain 
operations on data are permitted. Second, certain principles embedded in data 
protection law may have significant implications — facilitative or restrictive 
— for the development of big data. On the one hand, the principle of free flow 
of personal data, for instance, is considered a crucial condition for the 
flourishing of big data.15 On the other, the principles of data minimisation and 
purpose limitation (both will be analysed in Chapter 4) are sometimes 
considered contrary to the idea of big data.16 The interactions between these 
principles and big data are therefore enormously important for understanding 
how law, in general, regulates big data. Third, data protection law is oriented 
by an open-ended collection of objectives and values that would allow 
reflection upon a range of interests that are either mutually-supportive or in 
conflict. The inclusiveness of data protection law is evident from the wording 
of the legislation. In the EU, for example, the current data protection 
framework — the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)17 — pledges to 
protect ‘fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular 
                                                 
15 Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ (2015) Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM(2015) 192 final, 14. 
16 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Yann Padova, ‘Regime Change? Enabling Big Data 
Through Europe’s New Data Protection Regulation’ (2016) XVII The Columbia Science & 
Technology Law Review 315, 325-330; Tal Z. Zarsky, ‘Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of 
Big Data’ (2016) 47 Seton Hall Law Review 995. 
17 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1 (‘GDPR’). 
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their right to the protection of personal data’18 by setting out ‘rules relating to 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data’.19 The pluralism of the values covered by data protection law,20 as long 
as they are related to the use of personal data, provides a helpful forum to 
accommodate different strands of discussions surrounding big data in a 
policy-informing context. 
It is for these reasons that data protection law is chosen as the regulatory 
approach to big data for this study. That is not to say, however, that data 
protection law can address all issues resulting from big data. As the 
subsequent chapters unfold, it will become clearer that data protection law (or 
even more generally, law) has its limitations manifest on quite a few levels. 
Yet, despite these limitations, data protection law represents no less of a 
necessary and helpful pathway to making sense of the ideas and practices of 
legal solutions to the challenges of big data. This is the case even more, if an 
inclusive view of data protection is taken beyond some traditional, limited 
understanding of such concepts as, say, ‘privacy’. It will help reveal a data 
protection paradigm almost as multi-faceted as the big data issues they are 
supposed to address, at least in part. 
The legal picture of the data protection regime in many jurisdictions, 
however, remains in a state of uncertainty to a considerable extent. Having 
recently come into effect in May 2018, the EU’s GDPR, for example, marks the 
outcome of a comprehensive reform of data protection law, with a large 
number of improvements to, and clarifications of, the existing regime codified 
into the new legislation. Still, as will be shown in the doctrinal analysis in 
Chapter 4, there is a degree of uncertainty about how the new law should be 
                                                 
18 ibid art 1(2) (emphasis added). 
19 ibid art 1(1). 
20 ibid Recital 4. 
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interpreted or enforced in certain specific contexts. While the GDPR has 
largely retained the regulatory model created by its predecessor, the Data 
Protection Directive (DPD)21, the sheer number of new provisions makes the 
model much more delicate. The ambiguities therefore come from both the old 
regime, where certain controversial legal issues remain unresolved, and also 
the new safeguards that give rise to additional challenges. 
Moreover, and from a more critical point of view, another sense of 
uncertainty stems from the lack of a theoretical framework to evaluate the 
effectiveness of a data protection regime, especially in the face of big data. 
Such an absence results largely from, as highlighted above, the insufficient 
conceptualisation of the short-, medium- and long-term, individualistic, 
collective, and societal effects of big data with regard to the use of personal 
data. In order to have a full understanding of data protection as a legal 
approach to big data, the inquiry should therefore not stop at what the law is, 
but should also further ask what the law can and should be. Considering the 
profound implications of big data for private, communal and public life, the 
thorough examination of a data protection regime in the light of the big data 
risks will be of paramount importance. 
Scope and expected contribution 
Against the backdrop that big data has become an inevitable part of everyone’s 
life with significant benefits and risks that are not always discernible, and that 
data protection law may be a useful regulatory approach to big data albeit 
perhaps still evolving, the following research question is of considerable value 
both theoretically and practically: How should data protection law respond to the 
                                                 
21 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31 (‘DPD’). 
Introduction 8 
challenges arising from the ever-increasing prevalence of big data? Of course, any 
attempt to address this whole challenging issue within one single study would 
prove overly ambitious and unrealistic. Indeed, both big data and data 
protection law are such broad topics that it would be impossible for one 
research project to cover both in full. Therefore, notwithstanding the extensive 
coverage that the research question might suggest above, the course of this 
study is narrowed down to specific social and legal contexts. 
For big data, the case study of online behavioural advertising (OBA) is 
chosen as a representative of applied use of big data in the private sector. To 
put it simply, OBA is one form of online advertising that personalises the 
content of the adverts based on the user’s behavioural patterns across websites. 
For example, after reading a post about a specific health issue on a website, an 
Internet user might later see an ad about a related healthcare product on a 
different website, as the advertising system concludes that, based on the user’s 
browsing history, they might be interested in this product. The 
implementation of OBA is much more complicated in reality, as will be 
revealed in the next chapter, but the overarching idea is not difficult to 
understand: To optimise the performance of online advertising by making it 
tailored to the inferred interests of Internet users. The study of OBA provides 
a helpful perspective for the purpose of this study mainly for two reasons. For 
one thing, OBA represents a good case in point in that, as will be shown in the 
next chapter, it bears all of the features of a typical definition of big data. For 
another, the functioning of an OBA system demands high consumption of 
behavioural details, which allows data protection law to kick in as such details 
are arguably personal data. Both points will be further explained in detail 
(respectively in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4). It should also be noted that while 
OBA is largely considered a use case of big data in the private sector, the 
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concerns are not limited to private interests. It will be demonstrated 
throughout this study that even private uses of big data will have profound 
economic and political implications. This makes OBA an even better case 
study as it helps further reveal the multi-dimensional effects of big data 
without having to deal with the controversial and complex trade-offs in the 
cases of, for example, crime prevention or medical research. 
On the legal side of the research question, the scope of data protection law 
is also limited to a specific context, or more precisely, a jurisdiction. The EU’s 
GDPR is considered one of the most — if not the most — comprehensive data 
protection regime in the world.22 The influence of EU data protection law 
outside Europe23 is another reason why the GDPR can serve as a prototypical 
legal framework that could inform the ongoing debates around the world. 
Also, as mentioned above, the recent entry into force of the GDPR means that 
it is currently the most up-to-date outcome of policymaking on data protection 
issues, which presumably represents the latest equilibrium, if not compromise, 
of the interests of multiple stakeholders. Having said that, the choice of the 
GDPR as the main legal framework does not mean that it is taken for granted 
as the ‘model’ law for other jurisdictions. Rather, following the doctrinal 
analyses of the GDPR, the rest of the study will turn to an evaluative 
examination of this current regime. 
With the more specifically-defined scope, the overarching research 
question can be rephrased as: How should data protection law, represented 
by the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, respond to the challenges 
                                                 
22 Zarsky (n 16) 995; European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Data Protection’ <https://edps.
europa.eu/data-protection/data-protection_en> accessed 10 June 2018; Graham Greenleaf, 
‘Data Protection in a Globalised Network’ in Ian Brown (ed), Research Handbook on 
Governance of the Internet (Edward Elgar 2013). 
23 See Graham Greenleaf, Asian Data Privacy Laws: Trade and Human Rights Perspectives 
(Oxford University Press 2014) 30-33; Alex B. Makulilo (ed), African Data Privacy Laws 
(Springer 2016) 18-19. 
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arising from the ever-increasing prevalence of big data in the context of online 
behavioural advertising? The study is expected to fill in a number of gaps in 
the literature in both theoretical and practical terms: a) it offers a further 
techno-economic account for the functioning of a typical form of big data; b) it 
undertakes a critical survey of the common justifications of the use of big data; 
c) it further theorises the potential risks of big data in a more systematic 
manner; d) it outlines the latest data protection legal framework with a use 
case of big data; e) it puts forward a set of criteria for the assessment of  
whether a data protection regime may sufficiently address the big data issues; 
f) it explores the regulatory possibilities to improve the current data protection 
framework with respect to big data. These original contributions will be seen 
even more clearly when the research question is divided into six sub-questions 
in a structured inquiry as illustrated below. 
Structure and methodology 
In order to fully answer the main research question defined above, the 
investigation will be conducted within a six-part structure, with each part 
addressing a sub-question that will contribute to the resolution of the 
overarching issue. The interdisciplinarity of this research means that a 
diversity of methodologies will be involved, and will vary notably from one 
chapter to another. It should be stressed from the outset that while this study 
has a strong empirical or socio-legal dimension, it does not involve first-hand 
collection of empirical evidence. Accordingly, some common research 
methods in social sciences, such as surveys, interviews or experiments, are not 
employed here. Yet, it does not follow that the enquiry is limited to traditional 
legal research method — the so-called ‘black-letter’ approach with the 
exclusive or at least major focus on interpreting the law with reference to legal 
sources like statutes or case-law. Instead, as will be seen throughout the study, 
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findings in empirical research are cited extensively (and of course, critically) 
to ensure the arguments are well-founded. References to non-scholarly 
sources (the ‘grey literature’) also form an important part of the research, 
including reports published by policymakers, regulators, businesses, trade 
groups and civil society organisations, as well as technical documents by 
platform developers and standards bodies. The topics and methodologies in 
the six main chapters are outlined in a roadmap as follows: 
How has big data changed the digital realities? Chapter 1 sketches out an 
overall picture of the techno- and ecosystem of OBA as an instance of big data. 
It will begin by explaining the general concept of big data and the relevance of 
OBA as a case in point. A technological overview will be provided to show 
how a typical OBA system works in the tracking, profiling and targeting data 
lifecycle. This will be followed by further coverage of the value chain in the 
industry, explaining how certain critical players have gained enormous 
powers by growing in size, breadth and impact. The very specific technical or 
financial details about the OBA sector are not always accessible, but with the 
aid of existing academic works, as well as publicly-available information such 
as technical guidelines, financial statements and market reports, a lot can be 
revealed about the logics and impacts of the OBA sector. 
How may big data potentially benefit individuals, the economy and the society? 
Based on the findings in the previous chapter, Chapter 2 critically examines 
the prevalent arguments in favour of the current practices commonly shared 
by OBA marketers. These arguments are usually made within a narrative of 
the potential benefits regarding the well-being of individuals, the growth of e-
commerce, and the progression of the society, usually making reference to 
theoretical accounts as well as empirical evidence. The aim of this chapter is to 
review the reliability, relevance and transferability of these arguments in a 
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policy-informing context. Since the case for OBA, or big data in general, has 
been made both theoretically and empirically, by both researchers and 
stakeholders, the assessment of those findings will inevitably have to resort to 
a literature of an equally hybrid nature. 
What are the latent risks of big data to individuals and the society? On the flip 
side of the discussions about the big data trade-offs, Chapter 3 conducts a 
thorough literature review on the theories of the perceived risks of big data. 
From an individualistic end of the spectrum to a societal one, a series of values 
will be revisited, ranging from privacy to informational self-determination, 
dignity, liberty, equality, power balance, and democracy. Again, the potential 
threats to these values will be exposed and further theorised with the case 
study of OBA. A metaphoric approach will be explored at the end of the 
chapter, with a view to a coherent conceptual framework to make sense of the 
genuine interests at stake. 
How is data protection law regulating big data activities? Chapter 4 turns to the 
doctrinal analysis of the data protection legal framework in the context of OBA. 
As mentioned above, some key parts of the GDPR will be examined as a 
typical data protection regime. Following a brief historical and structural 
overview of the EU’s data protection regulatory model, detailed analyses will 
be carried out on the applicability of the GDPR, the legal grounds for data 
processing, the data protection principles and the specific rules relevant to 
OBA. It will then be illustrated how the GDPR has inherited and strengthened 
the regulatory model of the DPD. Since online tracking serves as an important 
component of OBA and is subject to the regulation by the ePrivacy Directive,24 
                                                 
24 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (As amended 
by Directive 2009/136/EC) [2002] OJ L201/37 (‘ePrivacy Directive’). 
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a specific section will also cover the relevant part of that legislation. 
Throughout the chapter, the explanatory documents prepared by the EU 
legislative bodies, the case-law handed down by the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU), the opinions and guidelines issued by the Article 29 Working Party 
(now the European Data Protection Board, EDPB), and the interpretation 
adopted by legal researchers will be cited as the main sources. 
Can the current data protection law sufficiently address the risks of big data? With 
a relatively clear sense of the legal framework, Chapter 5 takes a more critical 
approach to evaluating the effectiveness of the GDPR in protecting personal, 
collective and public interests. In this chapter, individuals are viewed not just 
as autonomous persons, but also as consumers and citizens, whose 
autonomous, commercial and political interests may be compromised with the 
use of big data for OBA purposes. By associating different categories of 
interests with the diverse social roles individuals are playing, and assessing 
the law with regard to the level of protection afforded for these roles, it will 
become more straightforward to identify the areas where data protection law 
has fallen short of the expectations. 
How can data protection law be improved to respond better to the big data 
challenges? The final chapter aims to bring together the findings in all previous 
chapters and shed further light on the possible way forward for the adaptation 
of the current data protection regime to the challenges of big data. A paradigm 
complementary to the existing one will be proposed in the hope of equipping 
regulators with better regulatory possibilities where the benefits and risks of 
big data can be better taken into account and the deficiencies of the GDPR can 
be at least partly remedied.
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Chapter 1 How Big Is Big Data? 
The Techno-economic Landscape of Big 
Data in the Context of Online Behavioural 
Advertising 
Big data is something old yet new. A biography of the idea of big data may 
begin with reference to 1944 when the escalation of library size came into 
notice.1 Of course, the terminology of ‘big data’ had not been coined by that 
time, but the idea of what we call knowledge and information explosion today 
had been anticipated. The year of 2011 marks the beginning of the term’s 
emergence in mainstream media. Quantifying public attention to big data by 
means of Google Trends statistics2 would reveal how big data as a search term 
began to take the Web by storm from 2011, soaring all the way to its first peak 
in 2014 then remaining high-up to date. A parallel phenomenon has been 
taking place in academia as well. The number of publication indexed by 
Google Scholar mentioning ‘big data’ within 2010 was a mere 2,880, and 4,380 
in 2011, then almost tripled to 11,900 in 2012, and then climbing all the way to 
63,400 in 2017.3 These figures are not necessarily the perfect indication of the 
public impact of big data, in particular considering how new technologies 
often experience the ‘Hype Cycle’ — a model developed by Gartner to 
illustrate the inflated expectations of emerging technologies. 4  The reality 
                                                 
1 Gil Press, ‘A Very Short History of Big Data’ Forbes (9 May 2013) <https://www.forbes.com/
sites/gilpress/2013/05/09/a-very-short-history-of-big-data/> accessed 13 March 2018. 
2 Google, ‘big data - Explore - Google Trends’ <https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?
date=all&q=big%20data> accessed 22 February 2017. 
3 Google, ‘Google Scholar’ <https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?q=%22big+data%22&as_ylo=
2017&as_yhi=2017> accessed 13 March 2018. 
4 Gartner, ‘Gartner Hype Cycle’ <http://www.gartner.com/technology/research/
methodologies/hype-cycle.jsp> accessed 13 March 2018. 
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might well be that the substance of ‘big data’ is overstated, simply because 
everyone seems to keep hearing and talking about it. 
Yet, in the meantime, big data finds its way spreading to almost every 
sector. A wide range of industries are figuring out how much they can benefit 
from the potentials of big data, or at least trying to appear associated with big 
data so as to create an innovative image. This shows that the notion of big data 
might sometimes have been overused simply as a catchword. If the essential 
idea of big data had been foreseen in the 1940s, what it offers could turn out 
to be old wine in a new bottle, or a catch-all concept without much original 
substance. So why does ‘big data’ matter, in particular in non-technical terms? 
This chapter will address the following question: In what sense is big data ‘big’? 
The enquiry will begin with a general understanding of big data, and then turn 
to a specific sector, namely online behavioural advertising (OBA). To illustrate 
how influential the industry of OBA — as a typical instance of big data — 
actually is, the investigation will be conducted both from a technological 
(Section 1.2) and an economic perspective (Section 1.3). A concluding section 
will summarise the state of affairs with particular emphasis on the mutually-
supportive relations between the two dimensions, which forms a factual basis 
for the discussion about the potential benefits as well as risks of big data in the 
next chapters. 
1.1 Big data and OBA: The big picture and the close-up 
lens 
1.1.1 The rise of big data 
As mentioned above, the concept of big data entered the public eye in around 
2011 and then became a global trend in a matter of months. However, the 
taking shape of big data’s key features is often accredited to a 2001 META 
Group (now Gartner) report, in which the analyst warns of the limits of 
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conventional data management and calls for industrial efforts to turn the 
challenges into opportunities. 5  Three crucial points are underlined in the 
report: the volume, velocity and variety of data (‘the 3 V’s’). These are not 
necessarily the defining characteristics of ‘big data’ — indeed, the term ‘big 
data’ did not appear in that report. One may easily point towards dozens of 
distinct versions of the big data concept,6 but the emphasis on the 3 V’s is 
relevant in most versions. The exponential development in all three 
dimensions of data use leads not just to a change in quantity, but a change in 
nature that is different from any previous phenomena in human history. 
The first V, volume of data, as the most straightforward aspect, has 
remarkably increased over the past few years. It is estimated that in 1992, 
global internet traffic was 100GB per day, and that number remained the same 
in 2002, but per second this time.7 In 2015, the figure was approximately 20,235 
GB per second, and projected to triple to 61,386 in 2020.8 That means by 2020, 
‘the gigabyte equivalent of all movies ever made will cross the global Internet 
every 2 minutes.’9 Massive amounts of data is being generated, transferred, 
stored, shared, analysed and reused literally every millisecond. The large scale 
of data use can make a significant difference when it comes to extracting 
valuable information. It is one thing to have an idea of how a sample group of 
                                                 
5 Doug Laney, 3D Data Management: Controlling Data Volume, Velocity and Variety (2001) <http:
//blogs.gartner.com/doug-laney/files/2012/01/ad949-3D-Data-Management-Controlling-
Data-Volume-Velocity-and-Variety.pdf> accessed 20 February 2015. 
6 A summary of 12 of such definitions can be found at Gil Press, ‘12 Big Data Definitions: 
What’s Yours?’ Forbes (3 September 2014) <http://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2014/09/03/
12-big-data-definitions-whats-yours> accessed 22 February 2017. An interview with 43 
industry leaders with regard to their understanding of the concept of big data can be found 
at Jennifer Dutcher, ‘What Is Big Data?’ (2014) <https://datascience.berkeley.edu/what-is-big-
data> accessed 22 February 2017. 
7 Cisco, The Zettabyte Era: Trends and Analysis (2016) <http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/
solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/vni-hyperconnectivity-
wp.pdf> accessed 11 August 2016. 
8 ibid. 
9 ibid. 
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individuals behave over particular periods, and it is another thing to possess 
the data of how all the individuals behave all the time. In fact, one of the most 
revolutionary philosophies of big data is N=all, signifying the aim to maximise 
data size, and eventually eliminating the very idea of sampling. Big data does 
not even have to be perfectly full or well-structured to be powerful; once it 
reaches a size big enough, useful patterns or correlations will surface. For 
instance, connecting clinical and cost data on a large scale helped prove the 
adverse effects of an approved drug in the US, which had taken years with 
small-scale studies when more than 27,000 heart attacks and deaths could have 
been avoided.10 If combined with its application in other areas, big data is 
estimated to be able to create a value of $300 billion a year to the US healthcare 
system.11 
Also important is the speedy feature, or velocity, of big data. With the help 
of big data, which is driven by the augmented processing power in collating, 
analysing and linking data at speed, it is now possible to extract valuable 
information from the massive data traffic in an almost instantaneous manner 
and put it into use in real time. Each link of the chain of data use — from raw 
data collection to final decision-making — takes time, and as data processing 
becomes increasingly intense, all the delays might add up significantly. Speed 
can be the lifeline for certain industries. Insurance companies, for example, 
may gain a decisive competitive edge by offering insurance quotes 
responsively.12 How long a company keeps its potential customers waiting can 
make a huge difference. Marketing is another battlefield where timing is 
                                                 
10 McKinsey & Company, Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and 
Productivity (2011) 41 <http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-
insights/big-data-the-next-frontier-for-innovation> accessed 13 February 2017. 
11 ibid 49-51. 
12 PwC, Insurance 2020: Turning Change into Opportunity (2012) <http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/
insurance/pdf/insurance-2020-turning-change-into-opportunity.pdf> accessed 22 February 
2017. 
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crucial. At a time of a fast-paced lifestyles and constant change, any delay in 
detecting what comes under the spotlight could mean the loss of lucrative 
opportunities. A trending topic on the web may last only for a few hours, but 
if a start-up can seize the chance by, say, presenting its brand to interested 
individuals as the related keywords hit the headline — something Facebook 
has helped brands to achieve13 — the benefits could be considerable. Once the 
delay of data processing is minimised to a particular point, big data will 
unlock a good number of business models that would be impossible if not 
implemented on a real-time basis. 
Big data is also characterised by the variety of data. The increasing variety 
of data means that data is collected, verified, cross-referenced and synthesised 
from a much wider range of sources. The Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents 
and Children (ALSPAC, also known as Children of the 90s) represents a case 
in point. Starting in 1991 with over 14,000 pregnant women as participants, the 
project has been collecting and updating healthcare data for a generation.14 
Now they are taking one step further by linking their records to a wider range 
of administrative data from educational records to criminal convictions.15 It 
would be natural to assume that, the more detailed and inclusive these profiles 
are, the more likely unexpected and precise findings can be discovered. 
Recently, based on ALSPAC data, nutritionists have confirmed the 
                                                 
13 Garett Sloane, ‘Facebook Lends Trending Hand to Brands’ Adweek (17 January 2014) <http:/
/www.adweek.com/digital/facebook-lends-trending-hand-brands-155060> accessed 22 
February 2017. 
14 University of Bristol, ‘Researchers’ <http://www.bristol.ac.uk/alspac/researchers> accessed 
13 March 2018. 
15 University of Bristol, ‘Linkage to Routine Health and Social Records’ <http://www.bristol.
ac.uk/alspac/researchers/our-data/linkage/> accessed 13 March 2018. 
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correlations between academic achievement and breastfeeding,16 something 
probably unanticipated at the time of launch of the project. 
Datasets are now becoming increasingly inclusive, feeding on data from 
both public and private sectors, and both online and offline data points. The 
diversity of data sources is, to a greater extent, facilitated by technological as 
well as institutional developments. On the one hand, new technologies have 
enabled new channels for data collection (from PCs to mobile devices, from 
smart TVs to wearable gadgets), powerful infrastructure of data storage, and 
efficient mechanisms of data interoperability (such as protocols designed to 
standardise data exchange between data holders). On the other hand, 
governmental and commercial initiatives are also incentivising cross-domain 
data sharing. For instance, the UK is now pushing forward a standardisation 
project for sharing banking data, which would ‘allow different software 
applications to communicate with each other and exchange data directly, 
without the need for human input each time.’ 17  Acquisition of data from 
various holders can be also achieved by mergers and restructuring of 
businesses, just like how Google acquired video streaming site YouTube and 
blogging service Blogger, and expanded its kingdom to email service Gmail, 
online file storage Google Drive, mobile operating system Android and so on. 
The growing variety of data will therefore be unlike anything else we have 
                                                 
16 University of Bristol, ‘Insomnia More Common in Teens Whose Mums Dad Postnatal 
Depression’ (2016) <http://www.bristol.ac.uk/alspac/news/2016/depression-and-insomnia.
html> accessed 13 March 2018. 
17 Open Data Institute, Data Sharing and Open Data for Banks: A Report for HM Treasury and 
Cabinet Office (2014) 15 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/382273/141202_API_Report_FINAL.PDF> accessed 13 March 2018. 
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experienced: It is not just combining a number of datasets or cross-referencing 
various files; it is aimed at connecting everything.18 
Of course, as mentioned above, the 3 V’s is but one way to define ‘big data’. 
In fact, many commentators have interpreted big data in alternative ways, 
some of which are quite sceptical of the concept itself. For example, Ohlhorst 
brings in a fourth V in his version of big data — veracity — to flag up the 
danger of massive amounts of data ‘lead[ing] to statistical errors and 
misinterpretation of the collected information.’19 Indeed, some scholars have 
warned over the overestimation of the completeness of big data and the 
underestimation of the importance of traditionally collected data.20 Besides the 
flaws of the dataset itself, the ways the collected data is processed are also 
prone to fallacies. It is suggested that big data algorithms might suffer from 
human,21 systematic22 and social biases23. Moreover, some critics have shown 
concerns about big data conclusions being used out of context,24 in particular 
considering the mix-up of correlation and causation.25 Further risks of big data 
                                                 
18 Dave Evans, The Internet of Everything: How More Relevant and Valuable Connections Will 
Change the World (2012) <http://www.lehigh.edu/~inengrit/dropbox/eac1113/Cisco_Internet-
of-Everything.pdf> accessed 22 February 2017. 
19 Frank Ohlhorst, Big Data Analytics: Turning Big Data into Big Money (John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc. 2013) 3. 
20 David Lazer and others, ‘The Parable of Google Flu: Traps in Big Data Analysis’ (2014) 343 
Science 1203, 1205. 
21 Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and 
Information (Harvard University Press 2015) 35. 
22 Danah Boyd and Kate Crawford, ‘Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a 
Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon’ (2012) 15(5) Information, 
Communication & Society 662, 666-668. 
23 See ch 3, s 3.C, which highlights the potential threats of big data strengthening existing 
biases against stigmatised groups and creating new biases against worse-off groups in the 
society. 
24 Boyd and Crawford (n 22) 670-671. 
25 Ira S. Rubinstein, ‘Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?’ (2013) 3(2) 
International Data Privacy Law 74, 76; Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz, ‘Big Data and Due 
Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms’ (2014) 55 Boston 
College Law Review 93, 108. 
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will be developed in more detail in Chapter 3 with OBA as case study of big 
data. Before that, we need to explain why OBA actually serves as a good 
representation of big data. 
1.1.2 Application to the Internet: OBA as a new trend 
While it becomes clear that big data is all about being big in volume, velocity 
and variety, how big it really is remains quite ambiguous at this point. It is of 
course important not to lose sight of the bigger picture with respect to how big 
data is changing the digital reality in many aspects. Indeed, the examples 
given in the previous section may provide a rough idea of the ways big data 
is breaking the conventional boundaries of data use in scattered areas. Yet, in 
order to make sense of the power of big data, what is also needed is a typical 
case study that can capture the significance in all the three dimensions 
individually, as well as the combined effects when they are brought together. 
With these considerations in mind, the industry of online behavioural 
advertising (OBA) has been chosen as the use case for this study. 
The instance of OBA bears all three essential hallmarks of big data: big 
volume, velocity and variety. In terms of the size of data related to online 
activity tracking, there is unlikely to be any precise figure indicating the 
overall size of data being collected. However, considering how much data is 
being collected from a single Internet user, there would be little doubt that 
OBA deserves the big data title. Google alone, for example, saves all the voice 
searches (not just the recognised speech, but the entire audio file), search 
keywords, and geolocations of every user unless they opt out or request 
deletion. 26  One who supposes they are not using Google services might 
                                                 
26 Becca Caddy, ‘Google Tracks Everything You Do. Here’s How to Delete It’ Wired (14 
August 2017) <http://www.wired.co.uk/article/google-history-search-tracking-data-how-to-
delete> accessed 13 March 2018. 
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probably be still being tracked by Google-related products, such as Google 
Analytics.27 It is estimated that tens of millions of websites are using Google 
Analytics, 28  which records users’ visits and interactions on these sites for 
analytical and (partly) advertising purposes.29 As will be shown below in the 
following sections, one single visit of a webpage may trigger multiple 
connections that carries a wide scope of information. 
When it comes to the speed of data use, OBA also represents a case in point. 
Unlike what an Internet user might assume, the adverts on a webpage do not 
come up at the same time the page is loaded. In fact, as will be explained in 
Section 1.2, after the webpage finishes loading, dozens of additional 
communications will immediately take place between several actors within 
the advertising network so as to determine, say, what might interest the user, 
what the webpage is about, what product to present to the user, and what 
content on the advert. The speed at which such analyses and communications 
have been performed is so optimised that a user can hardly notice the delay. 
Lastly, the big variety feature is also manifest in the case of OBA in that 
data collection is conducted across websites (whether news or travel website), 
across devices (whether PC or smartphone), across services (whether Google 
Maps or YouTube), across channels (whether provided by the users 
themselves or by a data agent) and across formats (whether structured data 
like visit records or unstructured data like email content). All the information 
from these sources will end up being fed into the generation of both individual 
profiles and general demographic models. As such, OBA matches all the major 
                                                 
27 Google, ‘How Google Uses Data When You Use Our Partners’ Sites or Apps’ <https://
www.google.com/policies/privacy/partners/> accessed 13 March 2018. 
28 Matt McGee, ‘As Google Analytics Turns 10, We Ask: How Many Websites Use It?’ 
Marketing Land (12 November 2015) <https://marketingland.com/as-google-analytics-turns-
10-we-ask-how-many-websites-use-it-151892> accessed 13 March 2018. 
29 Google, ‘Policy Requirements for Google Analytics Advertising Features’ (2016) <https://
support.google.com/analytics/answer/2700409> accessed 13 March 2018. 
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defining features and thus may serve as a useful approach to understanding 
big data. 
The study of OBA may provide beneficial insights into big data also 
because it does not only mirror the technically revolutionary aspect of big data, 
but the socio-economic drives as well. It is already pointed out above that big 
data results not just from technological developments. Governmental and 
non-governmental inputs also have a significant role in the rise of big data. In 
the case of OBA, the massive scale of data collection is largely enabled by the 
fact that a group of mega-players in the industry have secured sufficient 
powers to implement big data. These powers include the infrastructural 
resources, market penetration and standard-setting capability that are 
necessary for the widespread application of their big data agenda. To such an 
extent, OBA — and big data — should not be viewed only as a technological 
artefact, but rather a social engineering process that significantly influences 
individual behaviour and the distribution of social wealth and cultural capital. 
In the following two sections of this chapter, the landscape of the OBA 
industry, as an instance of big data, will be outlined from both a technical and 
an economic perspective. Section 1.2 will address the technical aspect of the 
day-to-day practices of a typical OBA system, explaining how data is 
generated, transferred and consumed between involved parties and 
eventually turned into revenues. Section 1.3 will then turn to a macro level, 
illustrating how key players have built up big data empires by virtue of market 
domination, business expansion and industrial influence. 
1.2 The known and the unknown: Technological model of 
OBA behind the scenes of the Internet 
The striking success that the leaders in the OBA industry have won owes much 
to the availability of new technologies. At the end of the day, any ground-
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breaking business models would be subject to technical constraints. A fully 
informed image of the industrial power entails the understanding of how 
Internet technologies have both restricted and enabled OBA attempts, and 
how the former has become circumvented and reshaped by the latter. This 
section will serve as a very brief overview of the technical structure in plain 
language as far as possible. The technical and business models differ 
drastically from one ad network system to another, but most of the popular 
ones share a similar three-stage process: tracking, profiling and targeting.30 
The illustration in this section relies on multiple sources: publicly available 
documents released by OBA network providers, technical documents 
(including released source codes) of the programme framework, patent 
records and secondary references. It is true that not all the technical details are 
visible to an external observer, in particular with the generic information 
designed for ordinary users. However, thanks to the standardisation of 
information exchange between the actors in an OBA network, a lot of 
information may still be distilled from such protocols (the ‘interfaces’ or 
‘APIs’). For instance, in the tracking stage, it is technically possible to monitor 
the data communications between the browser and remote servers. As regards 
targeting, given the necessity to automate the data connection between the 
OBA network provider and the advertisers (or their agents), the underlying 
portals must be clearly and openly stated to the latter, not necessarily in 
natural language, but at least in the form of codes. This opens up a window 
for us to look into the operative details. The profiling phase might be less 
                                                 
30 Zuiderveen Borgesius divides the general practices into five phases: data collection, data 
storage, data analysis, data disclosure and targeting. See Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, 
Improving Privacy Protection in the Area of Behavioural Targeting (Kluwer Law International 
2015) ch 2. The Article 29 Working Party explains the functioning of an OBA system with 
three main parts: distribution (ad delivery) system, tracking technologies and profile 
building. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 2/2010 on online 
behavioural advertising’ (2010) 00909/10/EN WP 171, 4-7. 
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transparent, as most of it is performed within the servers internally. The 
difficulties of achieving insights into the internal operation is exacerbated by 
the fact that most, if not all, OBA profilers consider their algorithms as trade 
secrets and therefore would hardly make them available to the public. Having 
said that, for the purpose of this research, there is no need to review the 
profiling mechanisms in full detail. An overall idea of how Internet users are 
being observed and ranked will suffice. Putting together information from 
indirect sources, such as patent files or secondary sources, a lot can still be 
reasonably revealed about the logics of such technologies. 
1.2.1 Tracking 
The most important precondition for an OBA system to operate is that users’ 
online behaviour is trackable. However, this feature should not be taken for 
granted, considering the technical constraints at the infant stage of the Internet. 
The HTTP Protocol, which underpins the functioning of the vast majority of 
web browsing today, has been designed to be ‘stateless’.31 That means the 
original technical standards did not enable a server to maintain a dialogue 
with a specific user. When a website receives a webpage request (probably as 
result of a click on a link or an entry in the address bar), it cannot distinguish 
whether this is sent by a new user or a returning one that it served before. 
Under this condition, the ‘log-in’ or ‘shopping cart’ features were impossible.32 
A registered user who has submitted their username and password on a first 
request will become completely unrecognisable to the server on their next 
movement on that website. The server simply cannot tell a user (who has just 
                                                 
31 D. Kristol and L. Montulli, HTTP State Management Mechanism (2000) <https://www.ietf.
org/rfc/rfc2965.txt> accessed 13 March 2018. 
32 Federal Trade Commission, ‘Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: A 
Proposed Framework for Businesses and Policymakers (Preliminary FTC Staff Report)’ 
(2010), 13. 
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given the correct login credentials) apart from others, since the architecture 
does not enable the server to identify the user. 
To overcome this disadvantage, a patch was proposed in 1994 and adopted 
by mainstream web browser producers later.33 The solution involves a short 
message sent from the server along with the content of a webpage and stored 
in the user’s web browser. The idea is that when a new user visits a website, 
the server will designate a unique ID to this user and attach it to the main text 
of the webpage in a way invisible to the user (‘HTTP header’).34 The browser 
then remembers that ID, and sends it back along with any subsequent requests 
to the same website. 35  Next time the server handles a request, it can 
authenticate the user by recognising that ID. This technique is named ‘cookies’. 
With cookies, the activities of Internet users are trackable and recordable. The 
lifespan of a cookie varies depending on the expiry date specified by the server. 
It can be as short as expiring immediately the browser is closed (‘session 
cookie’) or as long as almost forever (‘persistent cookie’).36 Once the cookie 
expires or is cleared by the user, usually the server will lose track of that user 
as it can no longer recognise the same user on their next visit.37 
                                                 
33 Steven C. Bennett, ‘Regulating Online Behavioral Advertising’ (2011) 44 The John Marshall 
Law Review 899, 900. 
34 Kristol and Montulli (n 31) 4-5. 
35 ibid 8-9. 
36 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption’ 
(2012) 00879/12/EN WP 194, 4. An EU study finds that some cookies are set with a duration 
period of nearly 8000 years. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Cookie sweep 
combined analysis’ (2015) 14/EN WP 229, 2. 
37 Combined with ‘flash-cookies’ or other forms of device fingerprints, however, erased 
cookies can be ‘respawned’. See Ashkan Soltani and others, ‘Flash Cookies and Privacy’ 
(2009) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1446862> accessed 7 January 2017; Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising’ (n 30) 6-7; N. 
van Eijk and others, ‘Online Tracking: Questioning the Power of Informed Consent’ (2012) 
14(5) Info 57, 14-15; Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, ‘To Track or “Do Not Track”: 
Advancing Transparency and Individual Control in Online Behavioural Advertising’ (2012) 
13(1) Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 281, 293-294. 
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For safety reasons, the cookies placed by a website are only accessible to 
the same website, or more precisely, only to webpages that share the same 
domain name with the one that sets the cookies. That means the tracking on 
one website is supposed to be completely separate from that on another 
website. However, a workaround had been developed to bypass such 
safeguards. The key to the circumvention of this restriction is to make 
references from the webpage of one site to another. For instance, when a user 
visits food.com/pasta.htm, that page may contain a hidden reference to a file of 
its advertising partner, say, ads.com/tracking.htm. When the browser tries to 
load the tracking.htm file, ads.com will have the opportunity to set a cookie on 
the user’s device. If later the same user visits another website, say 
movies.com/comedies.htm, and movies.com also happens to work with ads.com by 
also including a hidden reference to ads.com/tracking.htm, then ads.com will be 
able to read the cookie that it has previously set. This way, ads.com may 
recognise the user and learn that they have viewed both food.com/pasta.htm and 
movies.com/comedies.htm. This type of cookie is called a ‘third-party cookie’ and 
is widely used for advertising or analytical purposes.38 
It should be noted, however, that the cookies set respectively by food.com 
and ads.com, although done almost simultaneously in one loading of the 
webpage, are usually entirely separate and inaccessible to each other. Also, the 
embedded reference to ads.com can only be allowed on a page-by-page basis. 
That means, if the reference is made on one page, say, food.com/pasta.htm but 
not another food.com/pizza.htm, the user’s visit to the latter will be undetectable 
and thus ads.com will not be able to tell that the user has also viewed a page of 
pizza. That means, not all the activities of a user on food.com are visible to 
                                                 
38 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural 
advertising’ (n 30) 6. 
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ads.com; food.com may decide to exclude the tracking from sensitive pages, such 
as food.com/reset_password.htm. Despite these restrictions, there is still a massive 
amount of information that can be extracted from the browsing history39. Some 
data is very revealing, such as the URLs of pages that the user has viewed, 
how the user interacts with the elements on the page, the IP address of the user 
and so forth;40 others can be even more intrusive, including even the cursor 
trajectory outside the web browser.41 
By means of third-party cookies, cross-site tracking of Internet users is 
possible. As a user surfs from one site to another, their interactions with all 
these websites are all kept under tracking so long as they share the same OBA 
network or, as the case might be, subscribe to different networks that share 
data. What might make the situation even more disturbing is that major OBA 
operators also provide a multitude of services, which facilitate tracking to an 
even greater extent. Google, for instance, runs searching (Google Search), 
email (Gmail) and video (YouTube) services, and a user’s activities on these 
affiliated sites may in theory — and actually in practice for some of these 
services — be placed under a same tracking mechanism. The combination of 
searching with the keyword ‘fishing point’, viewing of an article featuring 
fishing skills and subscribing to a fishing-lover mailing list can be a very strong 
indicator of potential interest in a fishing kit, which can be fed into the 
profiling stage. Moreover, as new forms of tracking techniques — such as 
                                                 
39 Zachary Weinberg and others, ‘I Still Know What You Visited Last Summer: Leaking 
Browsing History via User Interaction and Side Channel Attacks’ (2011 IEEE Symposium on 
Security and Privacy, Berkeley, 22-25 May 2011). 
40 Google, ‘Privacy Policy’ (2017) <https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.
co.uk/en/uk/intl/en_uk/policies/privacy/google_privacy_policy_en_uk.pdf> accessed 26 
September 2017. 
41 Jon Gold, ‘IE Exploit Can Track Mouse Cursor Movements - Even When You’re Not in IE’ 
Techworld (13 December 2012) <http://www.techworld.com/news/security/adobe-releases-
security-updates-for-flash-player-coldfusion-3416178/> accessed 27 June 2017. 
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‘device fingerprinting’ that combines hardware or software specifications to 
identify a unique device 42 — are emerging as a complement to, or substitute 
of, cookies, tracking becomes even more ubiquitous. For example, Google has 
introduced the ‘Advertising ID’ feature to its mobile platform Android, so 
tracking can be also done within Google Play apps (where cookie does not 
work well).43 Some trackers also use cookie-like functionalities provided by 
web browser plugins, such as Flash Player, to create the so-called ‘Flash 
cookies’, which fall outside of the browser’s cookie control.44 
1.2.2 Profiling 
Businesses’ endeavours to keep track of Internet users’ online motions are not 
invested out of mere voyeurism. They are rather driven by commercial 
incentives. Maybe they are not particularly interested in the users’ private life, 
but they are certainly hungry for information about what might interest their 
potential customers. That is why major ad network providers like Google and 
Facebook are ‘interest-based’,45 focusing on discovering an individual user’s 
consumption interests. To achieve greater precision of their predictions, they 
maintain a full list of all relevant business categories and manage the 
information of the users to see which of these categories are likely to match 
their interests.46 Such a process involving the organisation of the data collected 
from users is termed ‘profiling’ in this study. 
                                                 
42 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 9/2014 on the application of 
Directive 2002/58/EC to device fingerprinting’ (2014) 14/EN WP 224. 
43 Google, ‘Advertising ID’ <https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/
answer/6048248> accessed 13 March 2018. 
44 Tene and Polonetsky (n 37) 292-294. 
45 Google, ‘About Personalised advertising’ <https://support.google.com/adsense/answer/
113771> accessed 13 March 2018; Facebook, ‘What Is Online Interest-based Advertising from 
Facebook, and How Can I Control Whether I See Online Interest-based Ads?’ <https://www.
facebook.com/help/164968693837950> accessed 13 March 2018. 
46 Google, ‘Topics Used for Personalised Ads’ <https://support.google.com/ads/answer/
2842480> accessed 13 March 2018; Google, ‘How Does Facebook Decide Which Ads to Show 
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For the marketing industry, the most important key to the effective 
profiling of users is ‘the seamless integration of consumer data across offline 
and online touch points.’ 47  In their eyes, the whole point of building up 
massive profiles of their users lies in the need to digest such data and strategise 
their marketing approaches accordingly. From that point of view, fragmented 
data about users, no matter how big the volume can be, is entirely useless 
unless they can be aggregated in a way that can inform decision-making. The 
user identities are the nexus that connects the dots inside the ocean of online 
behavioural data. For the purpose of online marketing, it is not necessary to 
know the users’ real names,48 but it is necessary to figure out which activities 
are committed by the same user, and what inferences can be drawn from such 
activities. 
How marketers make sense of the data they have collected is usually 
opaque to users or even their business partners. The algorithms behind the 
process of putting together massive analysis of data from various channels at 
speed are the key to optimising profiling performance, and thus the most 
important assets of a data-driven company. Also, the profilers may claim that 
the logics of these algorithms are too complicated for average people to 
understand,49 which could be true given how fast machine-learning systems 
can grow. However, these arguments — namely trade secrets and complexity 
— do not fully justify the lack of transparency. As will be shown in Chapter 3, 
                                                 
Me and How Can I Control the Ads I See?’ <https://www.facebook.com/help/
562973647153813> accessed 13 March 2018. 
47 Craig Dempster and John Lee, The Rise of the Platform Marketer: Performance Marketing with 
Google, Facebook, and Twitter, Plus the Latest High-Growth Digital Advertising Platforms (John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2015) 42. 
48 This however does not mean that they do not or cannot link a user’s profile to their real 
name or other identities. See Omer Tene, ‘What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search 
Engines’ [2008](4) Utah Law Review 1433, 1448-1449. 
49 Danielle Keats Citron and Frank Pasquale, ‘The Scored Society: Due Process for 
Automated Predictions’ (2014) 89 Washington Law Review 1, 5; Pasquale (n 21) 15. 
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black-boxing data processing would pose serious threats to individual and 
public interests. In the offline world, a manufacturer is simply not allowed to 
refuse to provide information on its products that is vital to consumers on the 
ground that it would go against business interests or cause extra costs — 
which holds good for OBA as well. Despite such opacity, however, it is still 
possible to extract valuable information from publicly available materials on 
how the system works. For the purpose of this study, it will suffice to have a 
general conception of the way a typical interest-based OBA profiling system 
operates. This would probably not be precise enough for experts or the general 
public to carry out a thorough audit on the accountability of such systems, but 
that would be a different context. 
A Google patent file has documented a probable technical solution for the 
profiling of Internet users.50 In this solution, two core modules support the 
building of user profiles: User Interest and User Demographics.51 The User 
Interest Module calculates and updates a given user’s interest profile by 
accounting for every action recorded from the user. For example, the viewing 
of a sports-related webpage would result in an additional point to the ‘sports’ 
and ‘entertainment’ categories of the viewer’s profile. The relevance of an 
action by the user to these categories is measured in a weighted manner. That 
means when deciding how much the action would affect the strength of an 
interest category, the type of the action (e.g. viewing, clicking, buying, etc.), 
the relevance of the page (e.g. more sports-related and less entertainment-
related), the frequency of such actions in the given period and other factors 
                                                 
50 Xuefu Wang and others, ‘United States Patent: Generating User Profiles’ (2013) <https://
patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/87/fb/2c/bf0a5e5a68f605/US8352319.pdf> accessed 13 
March 2018. 
51 ibid fig 1. 
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will be taken into account.52 Over time, the module is able to predict how likely 
a particular user is interested in each of the categories. 
The User Demographics module aims to figure out the demographic 
features of a given user. According to the patent document, such information 
includes ‘geographic location, age, gender, income range, household income 
range, size of household, maximum educational attainment, children in the 
household, etc.’ 53  These indicators are determined not just from the 
information given by the users, but also their online behaviour as well. This is 
achieved in a way similar to how the User Interest module works. Each of the 
user’s activities will contribute to the inference that the user belongs to a 
particular demographic bracket.54 Working together, the two modules may 
establish quite an accurate profile for every user. It should be noted that just 
because Google has been awarded this patent does not mean that this 
characterises exactly their solution currently in use. Also, there would hardly 
be any information about the weighting of individual elements as such details 
would certainly be kept as trade secrets. However, this model matches the less 
detailed information provided on their official website, 55  as well as other 
secondary sources. 56  Thus, it is reasonable to believe that this has largely 
represented the functioning of Google’s system. 
                                                 
52 ibid 5-6. 
53 ibid 8. 
54 ibid 8-9. 
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It has been highlighted in the discussion of tracking how ad network 
providers make use of ‘third-party’ cookies to carry out cross-site tracking. 
One particular technical restriction is that cookies that are set by one website 
(food.com) are not accessible to one another (ads.com). With this barrier, 
although both the ad publishers (food.com and movies.com) and ad network 
providers (ads.com) may keep separate records of the same user, they cannot 
merge these profiles into one, as the IDs are not compatible in these systems. 
However, this rule of separation is circumvented with just a few more 
technical tricks. For instance, when food.com/pasta.htm is making a reference to 
ads.com to allow the latter to set up its own cookies, it may refer to a URL of 
ads.com/tracking.htm?foodie_id=13579. The additional parameter 
‘foodie_id=13579’ confirms to ads.com that this user (say, User No. 24680 in 
ads.com’s database) is actually the same person as User No. 13579 in food.com’s 
database. By doing this, ads.com can retrieve more data (such as demographic 
data) about that user from food.com with their ID 13579. Such a practice is 
known as ‘cookie matching’.57 
The use of cookie matching has profound implications for the entire online 
profiling ecosystem, not just in a technical sense, but in a financial sense as 
well. It creates the possibility of profiling on multiple levels and selling of 
cookies in an intertwined network. A wider group of profilers other than 
advertisers, ad publishers and ad network providers are brought into play. 
Suppose a user is viewing a recipe on food.com, who is a partner of a data 
provider58 data.com. By means of cookie matching, data.com gains access to the 
                                                 
57 Joseph Turow, The Daily You: How the New Advertising Industry is Defining Your Identity and 
Your World (Yale University Press 2012) 80-81; Mike Smith, Targeted: How Technology Is 
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58 For an exemplary list of data providers, see Ramsey McGrory, ‘The Data Providers: One 
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user’s cookies as well as further information from food.com, and in return, 
food.com gets paid.59 By the same token, data.com allows a data aggregator60 
aggregate.com to collect such information, of course, with a charge. Advertising 
agent agent.com happens to be a customer of aggregate.com so it buys the access 
to this user’s profile. This way, at least four profiles have been created — and 
sold — for at least four times,61 respectively by food.com, data.com, aggregate.com 
and agent.com. 
Perhaps the even more disturbing fact is that cookie matching enables 
these profilers to identify the same user in other profilers’ databases. Let us 
assume, for instance, a data provider (data.com) has expertise in, say, lifestyle 
websites (including food.com) while another provider (data2.com) is focused 
more on the entertainment sector (such as movies.com). If they are both 
aggregate.com’s data sources, then the latter would be able to recognise the 
same user from both data.com and data2.com’s profiles, and thus create a fuller 
profile that covers this user’s dietary as well as recreational preferences. The 
reality can be even more complex with a greater number of actors in the 
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22 February 2017. 
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‘Sharing Buttons’ on their webpages, the sites technically allow ShareThis to inject their 
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network. 62  Sometimes the information does not flow only in a one-way 
manner. These profiles might well feed on each other, creating one or more 
all-encompassing user profiles. It follows that a large part of one’s online 
activities across the Internet are highly likely to end up contributing to 
numerous profiles — or one, complex, giant, all-encompassing, omnipotent 
‘database-in-the-sky’63. Some of them can be very revealing since a majority of 
the sites can be somehow connected to one profile by a common ad network 
provider, ad agent, data aggregator, or data provider. By breaking down the 
technical barriers of omnipresent tracking, the industry has virtually created 
an overarching cloud of profiling. 
One more implication of cookie matching is that it facilitates tracking, 
because it allows one cookie setter to ‘share’ its recognition of a particular user 
to its business partners. That means, clearing the cookies of one website does 
not stop that website from recognising the same user in the future, since that 
website may learn from another website that this is a particular returning user 
that they once tracked. This leads to the creation of what are known as ‘zombie 
cookies’64 and makes tracking and profiling more powerful, and harder to 
avoid. 
1.2.3 Targeting 
Now with a complete profile of a user’s interests, it seems something simple 
to decide what ads should be delivered to a certain user. However, this is in 
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fact much more complicated than it might sound. It is of course imperative to 
determine which kinds of advertisement a given user might show interest in, 
but there is much more involved than simply picking one of the advertisers in 
the most interesting category. The oversimplified understanding of the 
targeting phase of OBA comes partly from the terminology of ‘targeting’ itself. 
The term ‘targeting’ might leave the impression that advertisements are 
categorised and then assigned to different groups of users that are locked into 
relevant interest categories based on their online profiles. This indeed used to 
be the business model at the very beginning of the history of OBA,65 but it is 
no longer the case. Now the practice of targeting advertising should not be 
understood as a process of merely ‘pushing’ ads to viewers anymore, but one 
of ‘pairing’ viewers with advertisers on a real-time basis. 
This is sometimes facilitated by a real-time bidding system. 66  The 
underlying idea of this system is that the opportunities to present 
advertisements to Internet users should not be sold as a package.67 Instead, it 
is believed that each opportunity should be priced and sold separately, and 
instantaneously. This system works as follows: When a user is loading a 
webpage, an advertising slot is to be created on that page. The right to display 
an ad in this slot is called an ‘impression’.68 Impressions are open for sale in a 
way similar to an auction. To start the auction, the ad network provider 
broadcasts a message to all potential advertisers and invites them to 
participate in the bidding. Once the given time for bids runs out, the ad 
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network provider selects a winner based on the price they offered.69 It then 
notifies the successful bidder and requests the content to be shown in the 
advertising space. This process is completed on an entirely automated basis, 
and within a matter of milliseconds.70 
One might probably wonder how the advertisers would decide whether 
an impression is worth bidding and how much they should offer. To ensure 
the bidding is rational, some information is sent around with the auction 
announcement. According to Google’s technical document, such information 
may include the user’s advertising ID, webpage URL, part of the IP address, 
browser version, postal code, geolocation, gender, age bracket, detected 
language, interest categories and their weights, device specifications and so 
on. 71  More importantly, cookie matching is also enabled in the process, 72 
allowing advertisers to link the user to a profile in their own database. Based 
on all these details, advertisers can make an informed bidding decision. 
Apparently, the real-time bidding process, as a means of targeting, 
amplifies the circulation of user data, and thus makes profiling even more 
ubiquitous. No statistical data is available on the number of bidders 
participating in the scheme, but considering the large part of online 
advertising Google is hosting,73 the scale of information distributed every time 
a user loads a webpage would be conceivably enormous. Not all advertisers 
have the capability to take part in the bidding on their own, so many of them 
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turn to bidding agencies.74 It is true that with these agencies, the number of 
recipients of real-time data would be smaller. At the same time, however, it 
makes the profiling of these agencies more powerful as they bid on behalf of 
many websites and can therefore track more users across these sites. From that 
point of view, the conceptual relationship between tracking, profiling and 
targeting is not linear, but rather mutually supportive. 
With an overview of online targeting in mind, it would be safe to conclude 
that the operation of the OBA industry resembles the business model of letting 
agencies (or dating websites) to some extent. A person works as an 
intermediary between the two sides of a potential transaction (or romantic 
relationship), usually holding the details of one side. Those who are interested 
from the other side may see the primary information of a potential match, but 
will have to pay for the chance to talk. All these similarities make the OBA 
industry more like an intermediary, except that the match is made at speed, 
and nearly always without the awareness of the ad viewers whose data is 
processed. 
All three phases of the widely applied model of OBA, namely tracking, 
profiling and targeting, mirror the defining features of big data: high volume, 
variety and velocity. At the micro-level, an individual is now subject to the 
massive collection of behavioural and demographic data. Such data is 
generated from and circulated to a wide range of data points, sometimes even 
the offline ones.75 The identification, representation and personalisation are all 
conducted on a quasi-simultaneous basis. At the macro-level, almost all 
Internet users are exposed to OBA, creating huge amounts of data being 
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processed. Ad network providers, advertisers, publishers, ad exchanges, data 
brokers and bidding agencies are all contributing to the collection, transfer and 
utilisation of such data. Intense analytics and decision-making based on the 
data are achieved at a tremendous speed. As a result, everyone becomes part 
of a world-wide, enormous yet invisible network woven by all these actors. 
These statements will be further confirmed below from an economic angle. 
1.3 Not just size matters: How powerful is the OBA 
industry? 
1.3.1 Size — The dominant oligarchy 
With a certainly over-simplified sense of how the routine communications of 
personal data are operating behind the screen, the discussion will now turn to 
the bigger picture. To begin with, a selection of financial figures are provided 
here. In the European advertising market, TV commercials had been the 
largest sector for a long time — until recently. According to a recent IAB 
Europe AdEx Benchmark Report, online advertising overtook the European 
TV market for the first time in 2015, with a market value of €36.4bn following 
an annual growth of 13%,76 whereas in 1999, online advertising made up a 
mere 0.5% of the entire European marketing sector.77 The robust growth of 
online advertising is also evident on a global scale. While TV advertising 
remained the largest category in the global advertising market at the time of 
writing, it is projected that digital advertising will take the lead in 2018 in 
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terms of spend.78 Depending on how impressions (the right to present ads to 
individual users) are bought and sold, the online advertising market can be 
further segmented into programmatic and non-programmatic (or mass 
buying). It is becoming the mainstream to conclude media transactions based 
on real-time bidding or similar technologies. A growing number of ad spots 
are now being traded with individualised, completely automatic mechanisms 
based on analyses of Internet user data. The vast majority of digital advertisers 
(92%), agencies (89%) and publishers (88%) in Europe have adopted 
programmatic advertising for display campaigns, 79 with more than half of 
their total spend now invested on programmatic advertising.80 
Within a market of this size, a number of key players have been 
significantly dominant. A MAGNA report estimates that the annual revenues 
of the global digital advertising sector amounts to $209bn in 2017. 81  This 
includes a portion of (only) around 40% that goes to ad publishers (content 
providers), and the rest to the intermediaries like ad network providers and 
advertising agencies.82 A large part of the overall revenues has been taken by 
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the few oligarchs. Google’s 2017 revenues from advertising services account 
for $95.38bn (which makes up 87% of the group’s entire revenues).83 Similarly, 
Facebook extracts most of its revenues from advertising, with $39.94bn 
(making up 98% of the total revenues) in the same year.84 That means, Google 
and Facebook alone have grasped 65% of the whole online advertising 
industry’s revenues.85 Of course, it is open to dispute whether it is appropriate 
to compare self-reported figures with industrial estimates, but this would by 
and large give a sense of how a small number of behemoths are dominating 
the sector.  
What makes the duopoly of Google and Facebook even more unsettling is 
the heterogeneous market structure and the unique value chain in the OBA 
sector. In the previous section, a business model has been outlined which 
involves a list of stakeholders: advertisers, ad publishers, ad network 
providers (ad exchanges), data providers, data aggregators and agencies. This 
is far from the level of complexity in the actual advertising market: First, the 
types of actors in the ad network are much more diverse than the depiction 
above; second, the consumption of marketing budget — as well as data — is 
not as linear as the example might make it seem. Including a much wider range 
of parties involved, Figure 1.1 below sketches out a (still very simplified) 
landscape of the OBA ecosystem. In the preceding section, some of these actors’ 
roles have been briefly introduced with the made-up website names. Most of 
the categories shown in the diagram below can be roughly considered to be 
covered by the wider definitions of those actors: Exchanges are like ad 
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networks (ads.com); retargeting services and data suppliers are data providers 
(data.com); DMPs (data management platforms), tag management systems and 
AMPs (audience management platforms) are like data aggregators 
(aggregate.com); and agency trading desks and DSPs/SSPs (demand/supply-
side platforms) are like advertising agents (agent.com). It is not intended to 
explain the roles of all these participants here, and many of them are not 
necessarily engaged in every single piece of advert displayed to a user. Suffice 
it to know at this point that most of them are part of the sophisticated decision-
making process that brings an advertiser to an ad viewer. It is also noteworthy 
that in the OBA market, data selling is not just about ‘handing over’ the user 
data to the buyer; it is more about allowing the buyer to set and read cookies 
directly on the user device (by means of cookie matching). That is exactly why 
when a user visits Esquire’s homepage, a total of 18 advertising-related services 
would be informed:86 The right to place cookies on the terminal device is sold 
to a different service, who keeps a record and resells the right to one of its 
interested customers, who again sells the right to someone else. Layers of 
transactions of the right all take place in a few thousandths of a second. 
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Figure 1.1 Display LUMAscape87 
The heterogeneity of the players in the market, combined with the business 
model of selling the ‘right to place cookies’, means that the competitors in this 
market are not only competing against, but also enabling, each other. A new 
player’s entry into the market may probably dilute the market share of an 
existing player, but the latter may end up gaining access to more Internet users 
through the complex network that ‘sells’ cookies from one player to another. 
It follows that, in a big data world, as long as a business has sufficient 
technological capacity and access to the data network, it can reach an audience 
much bigger than what its market share might suggest. 
The power of a company to seize online behavioural data grows 
disproportionately as its size does. A research project spanning 18 months has 
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just provided the latest empirical evidence to support this hypothesis. The 
researchers developed a web crawler to collect information about 3.2 million 
cookies employed by the most popular 100K websites. It is found that, among 
all the services that have access to third-party cookies, the most powerful ones 
(<1%) have actually covered 75% of the websites across the Web.88 Another 
finding is that, for all the third-party cookies (which significantly outnumber 
first-party cookies), doubleclick.net — a domain name owned by Google for 
its OBA business — tops the chart by having cookies on 42.1% of all websites.89 
In other words, Google has access to information about an average Internet 
users’ activities on more than 40% of the websites that they might visit. 
Another latest study focused on the mobile app sector provides an even more 
striking figure: 88.44% of the Play Store apps contain trackers from Google 
subsidiaries.90 While probably not each of these websites or apps has a direct 
partnership with Google, what it takes for the latter to benefit from the 
former’s connection with its users is simply a remote relationship within the 
ad network where one of the publisher’s partners — be it agencies, data 
providers, platform providers or whatsoever — or their partners takes part in 
the network. 
1.3.2 Breadth — The multiple arms of the businesses 
Sitting in the centre of the advertising network that brings data, money and 
sub-networks, Google is already controlling a massive amount of resources, 
but its expansion in the sector has yielded even greater powers. In the online 
advertising industry, Google plays a role that is much more than a mere 
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platform provider. Indeed, Google has never stopped expanding its business 
to further corners of the ecosystem. The starting point of looking into how far-
reaching Google actually is rests in the fact that its business model is built on 
analysing user metrics and behaviour and selling such insights to advertisers.91 
It is also helpful to recall that the ultimate fuel fed into the enormous 
advertising engine is data, which enables marketing firms to optimise the 
delivery of adverts. With these two points in mind, some seemingly non-
advertising-related products of Google would reveal their potentials in 
creating lucrative opportunities for the advertising giant. 
Think of Google Maps, which stores the locations a user searched for, 
reviewed, saved and shared.92 It is not difficult to imagine how profitable it 
would be for Google to have even just a not-so-accurate sense of the locations 
a user is looking for. An even more precise tracker would be Google Maps on 
a smartphone, which tracks not just where a user is heading, but also where 
exactly the user is. Now the mobile phone operating system, Android, might 
have already crossed your mind. Again, the overwhelming dominance in the 
smartphone market certainly opens the door to the extraction of further values 
from as much user data as they can collect. These include Gmail, YouTube, 
Chrome, Google Home, Self-Driving Car and so on. Whether those products 
that have already won global popularity or those that are still under 
development, almost every time Google reaches a new niche, it opens up a 
further ground for it to invest in, and then harvest, data for its marketing 
business. 
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Apart from developing new products or services, Google is also ready to 
exercise its capital power: buying along the value chain. Here, it is worth 
revisiting how Google has grown to its current size with a very brief timeline. 
As is well-known, Google started as an Internet search engine service in 1996.93 
Four years later, in 2000, Google started to move into the online advertising 
industry by launching AdWords, a service that allowed advertisers to 
purchase text-only ad slots on Google’s search result pages based on relevant 
search terms.94 At that point, Google acted only as an ad publisher. In 2002, 
Google introduced an auction feature into AdWords, by which advertisers 
may ‘bid’ on certain keywords and then winner’s ads would be shown along 
search results for those specific terms.95 This way, Google had in effect turned 
itself into also a platform, a demand-side platform (DSP), although the only 
inventory (ad space) supplier remained itself. In June 2003, Google rolled out 
a new service named AdSense, 96  shortly after the acquisition of Applied 
Semantics, a company with technologies to ‘enable[] web publishers to 
understand the key themes on web pages to deliver highly relevant and 
targeted advertisements.’97 By then, Google had become both a DSP (with 
AdWords) and an SSP (supply-side platform, with AdSense). In the same year 
and the following, Google purchased a number of services that seemed 
unrelated to its advertising business, including Blogger, Picasa and Google 
Earth. 98  In 2005, Google acquired Urchin, whose technologies formed the 
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foundation of Google Analytics, perhaps one of the most influential products 
of Google.99 It was later improved after the acquisition of blog analytics tool 
Measure Map.100 
Google Analytics turned out to be such a popular tool for website operators 
to monitor their traffic that over 64% of the top 20 million most popular 
websites have now deployed the service.101 This is particularly useful for ad 
publishers as it offers certain features that are specially designed for websites 
running ads.102 However, for those websites that do not include ads or opt out 
from such advertising features, Google Analytics would nevertheless collect 
user data and might use such data for advertising purposes. 103  The 
introduction of Google Analytics has therefore significantly empowered 
Google in the online marketing sector as it gains greater capacity to measure 
advertising performance as well as to obtain online user data. In 2006, Google 
made another ambitious move of acquiring YouTube.104 Since then, Google has 
become not only a prevailing publisher of video content,105 but also a powerful 
video ad publisher, as well as a giant collector of entertainment behavioural 
data. To further expand its advertising kingdom, Google acquired 
DoubleClick in 2008. DoubleClick was well-known for its outstanding 
expertise in real-time ad-serving for publishers,106 which was an indispensable 
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asset for Google to start running its own Ad Exchange in 2009.107 This was 
helped by its acquisition of real-time bidding agency Invite Media in 2010,108 
enabling Google to further improve the performance of the real-time bidding 
system and further share the market revenues. In the same year, AdMob, a 
mobile advertising company, was acquired as part of Google’s broader mobile 
strategy. 109  All of these takeovers show how Google has attempted to 
maximise its influence over many sectors, within or outside the advertising 
industry, by buying out potential competitors. This has remarkably bolstered 
Google’s power not just economically, but also in terms of data use: In 2012, 
Google decided to merge user data across services — including YouTube, 
Gmail, Google Maps, Google+ and Android — so user activities on these 
services can be better integrated for targeted advertising purposes.110 
To be fair, Google is not the only one who buys along the value chain. Other 
powerful players in the area have also made important moves towards a new, 
wider landscape with, of course, greater amounts of data: Facebook towards 
Atlas’s ad server technology, LinkedIn towards Bizo’s business audience 
marketing technology, AOL towards marketing optimization platform 
Convertro and Twitter towards mobile exchange MoPub.111 Now it is almost 
impossible to find a pure platform provider in the advertising ecosystem. In 
order to the improve the performance of a network, data is indispensable, and 
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the easiest way to obtain valuable and renewable data is obviously to buy an 
undertaking that has a trove of valuable data or the experience in collecting 
and refining data. 
1.3.3 Impact — The effectiveness of online marketing 
The increasing market share of programmatic trading within the online media 
sector as well as the relentless investment on new technologies facilitating its 
operation is the best proof of the commercial success of OBA. One might 
naturally wonder about the extent to which OBA can help marketers turn their 
costs on the state-of-the-art infrastructures and layers of intermediaries into 
measurable profits. Or is it just yet another dot-com bubble? Although there is 
empirical evidence suggesting that OBA can boost productivity, the exact 
degree of effectiveness remains inconclusive. In 2008, a research team led by 
Microsoft Research Asia conducted an experiment-based study, which 
showed that behavioural targeting can improve the click-through rate (CTR) 
of all the covered ads by as much as 670%, if the optimal algorithm being tested 
is applied.112 The methodology in that study was criticised by researchers from 
Yahoo! and Stanford University, who pointed out the potential existence of 
selection bias in the research, that is, the suspicion that the group of targeted 
users has a higher CTR not because of the relevance of the advertised product, 
but that those users are more likely to click through any generic ads. 113 
However, even with such effects accounted for in their calculation, the team 
still saw a rise of 79% in CTR. 114  Advanced technologies adopted by 
                                                 
112 Jun Yan and others, ‘How Much Can Behavioral Targeting Help Online Advertising?’ 
(Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on World Wide Web, Madrid, 20-24 April 
2009). 
113 Ayman Farahat and Michael Bailey, ‘How Effective is Targeted Advertising?’ 
(Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on World Wide Web, Lyon, 16-20 April 
2012). 
114 ibid 119. 
How Big Is Big Data? 51 
advertisers, publishers, network providers and other supporting entities, such 
as real-time bidding, have made the improvement even more significant. 
According to Google’s ‘internal data’, in a comparison of campaign 
performance between traditional and real-time bidding mechanisms on 
Google Ad Exchange in 2011, real-time bidding managed to save 19% on costs 
and raise CTRs from 0.09% to 0.15%.115 It should be noted that these figures 
come largely from research projects with affiliation to major OBA network 
providers like Google and Microsoft, who are probably the only ones who 
have the first-hand data. That said, from a practical perspective, the popularity 
of OBA in the online marketing sector may serve as an indicator of its better 
performance, albeit possibly more or less exaggerated. According to Turn, a 
marketing platform for advertisers, advertisers who have adopted real-time 
bidding are seeing up to 135% improvement on CTRs and 150% on conversion 
rates (percentage of users who eventually make the purchase). 116  An 
experienced marketer claims that efficient online marketing informed by data-
driven insights may boost addressable impressions by more than 400% and 
cut average costs per conversion by 30 to 40% for the better performance.117 
The efficiency of OBA results largely from its ability to predict the ‘right’ 
group of ad viewers that are more likely to click through and make a purchase. 
Such predictions rely much on the intense tracking, profiling and targeting 
practices based on behavioural data, and it is not hard to imagine that the 
bigger the data pool is, the more useful the insights would be. This is exactly 
where big data connects the technological world with the commercial one: In 
the context of OBA, big data means big business, and big insights mean big 
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profits. As one commentator puts, ‘Google is better because it’s bigger, and it’s 
bigger because it’s better.’118 The online advertising industry is a scale business 
that favours big entities, 119  because a firm’s ability to process data grows 
exponentially as its size does, and the effectiveness of online marketing grows 
exponentially as data size does. The more Google knows about individual 
Internet users, the more effective their advertising services can be. 120  The 
internal drive characterised by the cycle of more efficient targeting, greater 
conversion and more effective remarketing leads to a richer customer 
portfolio.121 
For this reason, the dominant position of Google in the market can hardly 
be challenged. When faced with the accusations of monopoly in certain 
markets, Google’s standard response has always been that barriers to entry 
into the Internet market are low, and that any start-ups may copy the success 
of Google, just like how it took down Yahoo! and other competitive players.122 
This argument might be valid in around 2000, but does not seem so today 
anymore, not at least in the area of online advertising. Possession of the most 
critical resources in the industry, access to individual demographic and 
behavioural data, will only be more concentrated to those who are already rich 
in those assets. New services targeting a particular niche market might 
nonetheless be able to emerge, but to make it a big success, it has to rely on, 
and eventually be part of, a larger network that has been woven by the big 
players. To such an extent, while size is not the only decisive factor when it 
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comes to the evaluation of market power in the OBA sector, it does matter, and 
it does help certain dominant businesses grow faster at other dimensions. 
Now that we have seen the market power in terms of the size, breadth and 
impact of the dominant players in the OBA ecosystem, what does all that mean 
to individual Internet users? To bring the pieces together and make sense of 
the bigger picture throughout this section, we need to recall the landscape that 
has been sketched out, with the help of Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2 An OBA ecosystem 
This (very simplified) diagram shows that Google actually operates services 
across most of the links within the OBA value chain. Each player in this 
ecosystem has connected to one or more upstream or downstream players, 
and they exchange user behavioural data (by giving data directly, informing 
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of their partnership. There are of course other players who are not connected 
or only remotely connected to this network, but they would only take up a 
small portion of the entire industry. More importantly, despite the claim that 
entry barriers in this sector are relatively low,123 for a start-up to survive and 
grow in this data-driven industry, they will have to be part of this network to 
seek either suppliers or customers, or probably both, or else they will become 
marginalised. This would have some unsettling implications from a 
competition or consumer protection point of view. If the entire ecosystem has 
eventually become one network, the mere increase of competitors will only 
strengthen the power of the already powerful, at least in terms of data power. 
New entrants will bring in new ways to collect, refine, share or analyse online 
data, which will end up feeding into the system and benefit the existing 
players. As such, market share would not be a good indicator of power in this 
realm. Also, the myth that more choices in the market can promote consumer 
welfare124 would apply at best only partially here. For example, an online 
video viewer in the set-up of Figure 1.2 might decide to switch from YouTube 
to a non-Google service G, who subscribes to Q as its SSP. Platform Q sells G’s 
inventory (advertising spaces) to network providers A and B, neither run by 
Google but B happens to be one of AdWords’ networks. By means of cookie 
matching, Google will still be able to place a cookie on the viewer’s computer, 
even though they have moved from YouTube to the only-remotely-connected-
to-Google service G. Granted that online users do have the choices of a range 
                                                 
123 Miguel Helft, ‘Google Makes a Case That It Isn’t So Big’ The New York Times (28 June 2009) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/29/technology/companies/29google.html> accessed 13 
March 2018. 
124 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission’s 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary 
conduct by dominant undertakings’ (2009) OJ C 45/7, para 19. 
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of services, they would remain with no choice in respect of the giant 
advertising network behind those services. 
1.4 Summary: That is not the Google I know (anymore) 
Back in the 1960s, data storage was so limited and costly that computers were 
designed to use only two digits to indicate the year — which led to what was 
known as the ‘Millennium Bug’ later in the 1990s.125 Today, this is not the case 
anymore. Data processing, including storage, transfer and analysis, has 
become so enormously affordable that the costs of keeping as much data as 
possible are negligible, compared to the potential value that might derive from 
the data. As economic constraints cease to stand in the way of the effective use 
of data, massive digitalisation of almost everything has become the norm.126 
The ability to handle large amounts of data from a broad scope of information 
feeds at tremendous speed has changed not just technological configurations, 
but also the societal ones. The application of big data to OBA shows perfectly 
how the data super-powers have made the most of this trend to maximise their 
influences, and profits. From jostling for sectoral dominance to reaching 
outwards across the ecosystem, and then securing market impact, key players 
in the industry have never spared any effort to make themselves more 
ubiquitous. Technical solutions to such an end have also evolved beyond the 
understanding of average Internet users and sometimes even regulators. They 
might have an idea of the existence of OBA practices, but most of them might 
probably feel surprised had they learned about the behind-the-scenes details 
of how these systems actually work. 
                                                 
125 Feng Li, Howard Williams and Martin Bogle, ‘The “Millennium Bug”: Its Origin, Potential 
Impact and Possible Solutions’ (1999) 19(1) International Journal of Information 
Management 3. 
126 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age (Princeton 
University Press 2009) 52. 
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This chapter is intended to offer a closer but different perspective to 
understand the reality of the OBA industry. An OBA network typically has a 
tremendously complex architecture, in both technical and organisational 
terms. As massive data travels from individuals to different types of 
intermediaries, and between a multitude of them, the marketing values 
emerge, and become carved up among these players. The system is indeed 
smart, yet in a sense different from the way many would see it. It is not 
necessarily designed to read a user’s mind; rather, its aim is probably only to 
maximise the output of commercial campaigns with minimised costs, and then 
split the revenues among those actors. That statement holds true for Google: 
It is probably neither morally good nor evil. At the end of the day, it is just a 
profit-seeking advertising company.127 Along with the routine, invisible cycle 
of tracking, profiling and targeting that every single Internet user would 
experience hundreds or even thousands of times a day, big business interests 
keep growing in size, breadth and impact. Yet, as will be shown in the 
subsequent chapters, these mundane activities have in fact caused a great deal 
of economic, social, legal and political consequences. 
To have a fuller understanding of the big data phenomenon, the next two 
chapters will further investigate the broader implications of big data in 
contexts beyond the techno-economic landscape. The findings in this chapter 
will provide a useful basis for making sense of both the potential benefits and 
the risks of OBA as an instance of big data. The arguments advanced in the 
ongoing debates surrounding various dimensions of OBA — whether for or 
against its intensive use of data — will be examined in a critical manner. The 
legitimate interests as well as the positive values mainly claimed by the 
                                                 
127 In its latest financial report, Google (or more precisely, Alphabet) identifies itself as an 
incorporation that ‘generate[s] revenues by delivering online advertising that consumers 
find relevant and that advertisers find cost-effective’. See Alphabet Inc. (n 83) 3. 
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marketing industry will be discussed in Chapter 2, whereas the possible harms 
— whether individualistic, collective or societal, and whether immediate or 
intangible — arising from the use of data for OBA purposes will be theorised 
in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 2 Big Promises That Big Data Holds: 
Legitimate Interests and Societal Benefits 
in the Context of Online Behavioural 
Advertising 
The triumph of big data in many sectors, as least in business terms, does not 
come with no reason. In fact, big data is considered by many as a revolutionary 
phenomenon that holds a wide range of promises. There should be little 
disputing that big data has changed and will continue to change the life in a 
highly digitalised world. Much less visible, however, is the potentially world-
shattering reconfiguration of the powers and interests involved in the shifted 
paradigm of materialising the values of data. It is therefore worth a thorough 
inquiry into how a variety of stakeholders will be impacted by the rise of big 
data, and whether such impacts are justifiable. 
Based on the developments examined in the previous chapter, a number of 
major claims over the legitimacy of OBA practices can be looked at more 
closely now. The arguments can be examined loosely under three strands of 
discussions, respectively from an individualistic, economic and societal 
perspective. 
2.1 Good for individuals? Relevant ads and free content 
2.1.1 Personalised advertising and user preferences 
(a) Contradictory empirical evidence 
A point constantly made by the marketing industry is that OBA brings Internet 
users more personalised, tailored and interesting advertisement, and hence 
improves their online experiences. To prove this point, they have sponsored a 
number of surveys asking users about their perceptions of online advertising 
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practices. In 2013, for instance, the Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA) 
commissioned Zogby Analytics to carry out a survey with a sample of 1,000 
US respondents.1 In this survey, a participant was first asked a number of 
questions regarding the importance of free online content, their preferences of 
free or paid content, and the utility of online ads.2 The sixth question reads as 
follows: ‘Would you rather see Internet ads for random/generic products and 
services, or ads for products and services that reflect your interests?’3 16.1% of 
the surveyed said they would prefer the former option, 40.5% the latter and 
27.6% both.4 Based on this seemingly significant margin, a trade organisation 
claims that American Internet users are ‘largely comfortable with the value-
for-value exchange that interest-based advertising represents.’ 5  A different 
piece of supporting evidence came from a 2009 survey sponsored by TRUSTe 
and independently conducted by TNS.6 The study found that 71.7% of the 
1,008 respondents strongly or somewhat agree that ‘online advertising [is] 
intrusive and annoying when the products and services being advertised are 
not relevant to [their] wants and needs.’7 A similar study was carried out by 
Westin in the same year, which found out that, assuming four stringent 
                                                 
1 Zogby Analytics, Interactive Survey of US Adults (2013) <http://www.aboutads.info/resource/
image/Poll/Zogby_DAA_Poll.pdf> accessed 16 March 2017. 
2 ibid 1-5. 
3 ibid 6. 
4 ibid. 
5 Network Advertising Initiative, ‘US Internet Users Understand and Value Interest-Based 
Advertising, According to DAA Survey’ (2013) <http://www.networkadvertising.org/blog/
us-internet-users-understand-and-value-interest-based-advertising-according-daa-survey> 
accessed 19 March 2017. 
6 TNS, 2009 Study: Consumer Attitudes About Behavioral Targeting (2009) <https://dsimg.ubm-
us.net/envelope/104162/339732/1249993418527_TRUSTe_TNS_2009_BT_Study_Summary.
pdf> accessed 20 March 2017. 
7 ibid 5. 
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privacy policies are adopted, most respondents (except for the 63+ age group) 
would feel ‘comfortable’ with behavioural targeting and tailoring.8 
These statistical figures quoted in industry-led studies are however subject 
to quite heavy criticisms. In 2009, for example, Turow et al conducted a series 
of telephone interviews with a nationally representative sample of 1,000 US 
adults.9 This study was carried out to verify previous research findings that 
are allegedly in favour of the industry, including the TRUSTe-TNS one, as well 
as the one led by Westin.10 The report questions the methodology employed in 
both surveys for a number of reasons.11 First, both surveys are run in the form 
of online questionnaires and on a voluntary basis, which might lead to the 
under- or even non-representation of those who have had privacy concerns 
and thus have not participated; second, the questions in the surveys are 
believed to be too general, having intermingled the two issues of ads being 
tailored and ads being tailored based on a particular tracking device; third, the 
nature of information used in online advertising is not clearly defined in the 
questionnaire. 12  Against these drawbacks, the Turow-led study has 
incorporated a number of improvements, including the use of random digit 
dial to reach interviewees and more specified questions.13  They found that 
‘fully 66% of the respondents do not want advertisements tailored for them’.14 
This was later confirmed by a separate telephone survey conducted by Pew 
                                                 
8 Cited from Joseph Turow and others, ‘Contrary to What Marketers Say, Americans Reject 
Tailored Advertising and Three Activities That Enable It’ (2009) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1478214> accessed 20 February 2015. This study has not been published in any scholarly 
journal and is now only available in secondary sources. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle and Jennifer 
M. Urban, ‘Alan Westin’s Privacy Homo Economicus’ (2014) 49 Wake Forest Law Review 261, 
264-265. 
9 Turow and others (n 8). 
10 ibid 9-11. 
11 ibid 10-11. 
12 ibid. 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid 14. 
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Research Center in 2010 on a larger sample of 1,729 adult Internet users: 68% 
responded ‘I'm NOT okay with it because I don't like having my online 
behavior tracked and analyzed’.15 
Yet, the findings above are also faced with counter-criticisms. A study by 
Sableman et al in 2013 challenged the transferability of the findings by Turow 
et al to the context of policymaking. 16  The weaknesses of the study, as 
Sableman et al argued, rest in the inclusion of non-users of the Internet, and 
the reliance on merely hypothetical questions. 17  It was suggested that a 
meaningful investigation should be based on real-life scenarios. Hence, in this 
survey on 150 students from a university, Sableman and co-authors designed 
a two-part process. They first asked respondents how they felt about five 
scenarios where the setups were different in terms of being online/offline, 
personalised/non-personalised and news/social media/retailer sites. 18  For 
example, a participant might be asked to imagine they are an avid 
photographer, and then to rate how they would feel about seeing ads of 
camera-related products on CNN.com.19 In the second part, the respondents 
were asked the same questions regarding their ‘privacy’ attitudes as in 
previous studies, including Turow et al’s.20 They found in the first part that 53% 
of the surveyed users felt positive about online tailored ads. When it comes to 
the result of the second part, the numbers fell back to a level comparable to 
                                                 
15 Kristen Purcell, Joanna Brenner and Lee Rainie, Search Engine Use 2012 (2012) 23 <http://
www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Search_Engine_Use_2012.
pdf> accessed 1 December 2016. 
16 Mark Sableman, Heather Shoenberger and Esther Thorson, ‘Consumer Attitudes Toward 
Relevant Online Behavioral Advertising: Crucial Evidence in the Data Privacy Debates’ 
(2013) 2013(1) Media Law Resource Center Bulletin 93. 
17 ibid 101-102. 
18 ibid 104-105. 
19 ibid. 
20 ibid. 
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previous studies. 21  It was therefore suggested that Internet users might 
respond differently to scenario-statements and belief-statements, and that 
consumers’ ‘needs and preferences must be correctly understood and 
balanced.’22 This study, however, has clearly not overcome the common pitfall 
in previous research projects that have mixed up the idea of ‘personalisation’ 
with that of ‘tracking’. In fact, they have even included an offline scenario in 
the survey as ‘a foil to prevent the respondents from guessing the 
manipulation’. 23  The author seems to suggest that, when given too much 
information about the privacy implications of OBA, respondents are more 
likely to become irrationally over-sensitive. 
(b) Defects of existing findings 
These seemingly contradictory conclusions drawn from different studies have 
proved a rather obvious fact that the self-reported attitudes of Internet users 
towards OBA practices depend heavily on the exact wording of the questions. 
When such terms as ‘tailored’, ‘personalised’, ‘relevant’ or ‘interests’ are used 
to represent OBA, the users tend to feel more positively about it, whereas the 
attitudes tend to be much more negative when questions are rephrased with 
terms like ‘tracking’, ‘targeted’, ‘monitor’, ‘privacy’ and so on. This however 
should not come as much of a surprise as the phenomenon of ‘privacy paradox’ 
has been well-documented in the literature: When it comes to privacy concerns, 
user behaviour and statements are often dramatically inconsistent.24 Here, two 
                                                 
21 ibid 105-107. 
22 ibid 107-108. 
23 ibid 107. 
24 See, for example, Naveen Farag Awad and M. S. Krishnan, ‘The Personalization Privacy 
Paradox: An Empirical Evaluation of Information Transparency and the Willingness to Be 
Profiled Online for Personalization’ (2006) 30(1) MIS Quarterly 13; Patricia A Norberg, 
Daniel R Horne and David A Horne, ‘The Privacy Paradox: Personal Information Disclosure 
Intentions versus Behaviors’ (2007) 41(1) The Journal of Consumer Affairs 100; H. Brian 
Holland, ‘Privacy Paradox 2.0’ (2010) 19 Widener Law Journal 893. 
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problems will severely impact the credibility of empirical studies in this area, 
one concerning methodology and the other relevance. 
The methodological problem concerns whether the questionnaires are 
designed in a professional, objective and neutral way, which should be tested 
against the standards of social statistics. It is of paramount importance that 
researchers have asked the right question. Factors that might impact the 
impartiality of their findings may include, for instance, what are the typical 
knowledge level with which the users’ preferences should be gauged? Should 
it be an ‘average user’ with only a reasonable level of knowledge about OBA? 
Or should it be an ‘informed user’ who is familiar with the technical details as 
well as the arguments from both sides? Also, what information should be 
given to a respondent before they take the survey? Some researchers believe 
that respondents are supposed to be better-informed of the technical details 
prior to the questions;25 others, like Sableman et al, on the contrary, maintain 
that the real-life reactions of Internet users are what matters, and excessive 
information would only be manipulative. From a methodological point of 
view, a robust, policy-oriented investigation should provide impartial 
information about both the risks and the benefits of OBA beforehand. This is 
because the role of a policymaker is to facilitate individuals to act in 
accordance with their informed choice, and also if such a sensible choice 
proves impractical on an individual level, to make such a choice on behalf of 
them as a collective. Unfortunately, it seems that none of the studies presented 
above has sufficiently highlighted the main arguments put forward by both 
sides. 
                                                 
25 See, for example, Edith G. Smit, Guda Van Noort and Hilde A.M. Voorveld, 
‘Understanding Online Behavioural Advertising: User Knowledge, Privacy Concerns and 
Online Coping Behaviour in Europe’ (2014) 32 Computers in Human Behavior 15. 
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The problem of relevance — perhaps the even more fundamental one — 
concerns the extent to which it is appropriate to apply such empirical 
conclusion to inform policymaking. The real question here could be the 
relevance of Internet users’ attitudes. In other words, how much should the 
findings about the general perceptions of OBA within a territory be taken into 
account when making decisions about a regulatory framework at all? All this 
comes down to one underlying question: Is it justifiable to adopt a policy on 
how the OBA industry may make use of personal data based on the fact that 
the majority of the society prefer tailored ads or not? If online marketers truly 
believe that the majority of the population would prefer ads relevant to them, 
they should leave the decision to individuals. As long as it is technically and 
economically feasible, the choice of those who do not wish to be served with 
personalised ads should be respected, even if they make up only a marginal 
part of the population. If it is true that most Internet users would prefer 
tailored ads, then online marketers should not be worried about giving users 
the choice. If they are, it is more likely that most users simply do not actually 
prefer tailored advertising, or at least do not care. The fact that many users do 
not opt out targeted advertising may simply be a consequence of inertia or 
ignorance, not that they actually like it. Either way, the mere claim that a high 
percentage of Internet users indeed want tailored advertising would not 
sufficiently justify the assumption that everyone does. 
2.1.2 Free content and services financed by advertising revenues 
Apart from presenting users with relevant ads, trade groups on behalf the 
OBA sector often also make another argument that individual consumers 
benefit much from today’s online advertising, because a large part of online 
services and content are financially supported by an advertising-based 
business model. To make this claim sound better-founded, again, a 
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considerable number of studies have been launched in their quest for 
substantial evidence. Such initiatives have largely focused on two supporting 
statements that, subjectively, Internet users would rather trade their 
information than pay in monetary forms for online content, and that, 
objectively, they become better off in economic terms. 
(a) Consumer preferences 
The first prong of the quest would inevitably involve surveys again, as the aim 
is to investigate the personal preference of individual users. Not surprisingly, 
when confronted with the two options of being tracked, profiled and targeted, 
and being charged, a significantly larger portion of people are found ready to 
go for the first option without much hesitation. The 2013 Zogby Analytics 
survey referred to in the previous section, for example, also included questions 
asking respondents to pick a side when they could not have it all. One question 
reads as follows: ‘Which of the following would you prefer: an Internet where 
there are no ads, but you would pay for most content like blogs, entertainment 
sites, video contact and social media, or today’s Internet model in which there 
are ads, but most content is free?’26 75% of the surveyed opted for the latter, 
and only 9.3% for the former.27 A similar survey was conducted in 2016, also 
funded by the DAA, including the same question and same result by an even 
bigger landslide of 85.2% in favour of ad-supported free content.28 The relative 
difference in the outcomes might have resulted from the way the 2016 
questionnaire was designed. Before answering the questions, the participants 
were asked to evaluate how much they think one would have to pay each 
                                                 
26 Zogby Analytics (n 1) 2. 
27 ibid. 
28 Zogby Analytics, Public Opinion Survey on Value of the Ad-supported Internet (2016) 5 <http://
digital.daaoperations.org/sites/digital.daaoperations.org/files/DAA_files/
ZogbyAnalyticsConsumerValueStudy2016.pdf> accessed 16 March 2017. 
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month respectively for a total of 17 categories of online services. 29  These 
services range from search engines (with an average estimate of $4.46) to video 
streaming providers ($7.83).30 With the potential costs added up in mind, the 
respondents may presumably have become more sensitive to pecuniary 
incentives. 
However, as with the surveys conducted to quantify user perceptions of 
tailored ads, these studies of consumer benefits are also methodologically 
flawed in several aspects. First of all, the information given to the surveyed is 
noticeably incomplete, particularly skewed towards the potential benefits of 
online advertising. It is debatable whether asking the respondents to evaluate 
the prices of such services should be regarded as ‘manipulative’ or 
‘informative’. In any event, asking only about the price but not the cost is 
certainly partial, as the focus would be put unevenly on only one end of the 
equation. As Hoofnagle and Whittington have illustrated, the 
disproportionate emphasis on the price rather than the cost in an online setting 
may put consumers in a vulnerable position.31 Again, the lack of empirical 
studies that aim to present impartial information for both sides has left a 
regrettable gap in the literature. The second flaw of these studies is the unclear 
distinction between different forms of online advertising. For Internet users, 
the ‘cost’ of non-tailored advertising is in theory lower than that of OBA based 
on multiple tracking, profiling and targeting devices. Therefore, it is 
conceivable that some respondent might have reacted differently had it been 
made clear what kind of online advertising is concerned and what techniques 
are involved. Third, the options offered in the questionnaires are very limited 
                                                 
29 ibid 1-4. 
30 ibid. 
31 Chris Jay Hoofnagle and Jan Whittington, ‘Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s 
Most Popular Price’ (2014) 61 UCLA Law Review 606. 
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in that only two scenarios have been envisaged: a world where advertising 
replaces the charges for most online services, and a world where all these 
services are fully funded by user subscription. What the surveys do not make 
the respondents realise is that there might be a world where individual users 
may choose to accept ads or to opt for an ad-free version for a fee on a service-
by-service basis. Given the technical feasibility of such a third option, the 
deprivation of such a possibility can only be considered unreasonable and may 
have caused many of those who would have opted for the third approach to 
end up opting for the one with ads. Besides all these methodological defects, 
of course the relevance criticism outlined in the previous section might well 
be applicable to this context, too. The fact that the majority of Internet users do 
prefer paying for services in the form of personal data cannot justify the 
deprivation of choice from those who prefer paying by cash.32 In fact, a new 
business model is emerging to provide ad-free services to users who are 
willing to pay a fair amount of subscription fee.33 
(b) Consumer benefits 
Apart from the argument that ad-supported free content is the preferred 
option, the marketing sector is also trying to prove that Internet users are 
actually better off with OBA, whether they like it or not. It is a common focus 
of industry reports to quantify the benefits brought about by the online 
advertising ecosystem. In 2010, McKinsey & Company undertook an 
independent assessment commissioned by IAB Europe to evaluate the 
                                                 
32 That said, allowing individuals users to make their own decisions might lead to a divide 
between ‘data haves’ and ‘data have-nots’, and might run counter to the ‘collective good’ 
nature of privacy, but measures to minimise these risks are not part of this section. 
33 Mimi An, Why People Block Ads: And What It Means for Marketers and Advertisers (2016) 17-20 
<https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/53/assets/hubspot.com/research/reports/
Why_People_Block_Ads.pdf.zip> accessed 16 March 2017. However, it should be noted not 
all of these services have made clear whether they simply stop displaying ads to subscribers, 
or also stop tracking subscribers as well. 
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consumer surplus of online services funded by advertising.34 Based on the 
willing-to-pay level, it is estimated that an average household benefits as 
much as €38 per month from online advertising.35 A similar, yet lower figure 
concerning the UK was cited in a 2015 Advertising Association report, in 
which the value created by ad-funded search, email and social media services 
amounts roughly to £90 per person per year.36 Despite the gaps between the 
exact numbers evaluated in different studies, it is nearly indisputable that all 
individual Internet users have more or less benefited from free services and 
content online, which are largely financed by the online advertising business. 
If it is true that OBA can actually boost the performance of advertising, then 
Internet users may — at least arguably — gain a greater part of consumer 
surplus in terms of the amount and quality of these free goods. From that point 
of view, the industry’s argument that the public have now better access to 
digital commodities does have at least some merits. 
Having said that, it would be a separate issue whether the actual benefits 
have been exaggerated, and whether individual users have been fairly 
compensated. A shared limitation that weakens the credibility of both studies 
consists in the reliance on the user evaluation, not the actual value, of online 
services. The figures calculated on a willing-to-pay basis may have been 
overestimated, in particular when the participants are unaware of the actual 
economic value of their data. Some service providers disclose their average 
revenue per user (ARPU), which should be a more accurate indicator of the 
value of an average user’s data. Facebook is a good case in point in that, unlike 
                                                 
34 IAB Europe, Consumers Driving the Digital Uptake: The Economic Value of Online Advertising-
Based Services for Consumers (2010) <http://www.iabeurope.eu/files/7113/7000/0832/
white_paper_consumers_driving_the_digital_uptake.pdf> accessed 20 February 2015. 
35 ibid 15. 
36 Advertising Association, Advertising Pays 3: The Value of Advertising to the UK’s Culture, 
Media and Sport (2015) 37 <http://www.adassoc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/
Advertising-Pays-3.pdf> accessed 20 February 2015. 
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Google, its service is narrow in scope (only social media) and the ARPU is 
clearly listed in their annual report. In 2014, Facebook’s annual ARPU in 
Europe is $11.60 (approximately £8.90),37 which is significantly lower than the 
figure of £28 for the same year as cited by the Advertising Association report.38 
There is thus clear evidence that Internet users tend to overestimate the 
amount of money they would have to pay were they charged for online 
services. It is very likely that, if given those exact numbers rather than asked 
to figure them out, a portion of those participants would switch to paid-for, 
ad-free services. 
2.2 Good for commerce? Industrial interests and digital 
economy 
2.2.1 OBA as an emerging industry 
As demonstrated in Chapter 1, online advertising has overtaken or is 
overtaking television advertising as the most popular marketing channel in 
terms of budget in many countries. At the same time, OBA is becoming the 
mainstream in digital marketing with a strong growth. Compared with other 
forms of advertising, OBA is indeed a very young business, but it has been 
developing so fast that today, the industrial interests it represents are no 
longer negligible. There should be little doubt that the business model of the 
advertising industry, characterised by the advertiser-intermediary-publisher 
value chain, is in general legitimate. Indeed, even the GDPR has explicitly 
                                                 
37 Facebook Inc., Form 10-K (2016) 37 <https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/
annual_reports/2015-Annual-Report.pdf> accessed 22 February 2017. The latest figure for the 
year of 2016 is $19.42 (See Facebook Inc., Facebook Annual Report 2016 (2017) 36 <https://s21.
q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/annual_reports/FB_AR_2016_FINAL.pdf> 
accessed 1 August 2017). Please note that the user base used for calculation here includes 
only monthly active users (MAU). If those who are less active are also accounted for, the 
ARPU outcome would be even lesser. 
38 Advertising Association (n 36) 37. 
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recognised direct marketing as a potential legitimate interest. 39  Since OBA 
forms an important part of direct marketing, it is reasonable to believe that its 
normal business deserves a certain degree of protection. Conceivably the OBA 
sector might strive for such protection from at least two aspects: first, it should 
not be subject to unreasonable regulatory constraints; second, it should be 
supported in the international competition on a level playing field. 
(a) Deregulation 
During the legislative process, the GDPR is sometimes criticised by the online 
advertising sector for imposing too strict a regime on the use of data. To them, 
the stricter rules introduced by the GDPR are doomed to stifle the promising 
future prospect for the industry. Soon after the European Commission 
published their very first draft of the GDPR proposal in 2012, trade groups in 
the marketing sector began to react critically. Trade organisations jointly 
signed an open letter to the UK government to express their concerns.40 The 
proposal, they believed, would ‘not just risk chilling the evolution of business 
models’ but ‘also place significant burdens on existing businesses’, which 
jeopardises ‘a policy and business environment that ensures low barriers to 
market entry, enables them to “scale up”, and allows them to challenge 
established businesses.’41 They were later joined by a European coalition of 
industry bodies, who urged the European Parliament to make sure this is 
                                                 
39 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1 (‘GDPR’), Recital 47. 
40 Sarah Shearman, ‘Europe’s “chilling” Data Reforms Will Deter a UK Facebook or Twitter’ 
Campaign (2 May 2012) <http://www.campaignlive.co.uk/article/europes-chilling-data-
reforms-will-deter-uk-facebook-twitter/1129829> accessed 24 March 2017. 
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‘balanced with a need to allow for new business models and innovation.’42 As 
the updated legal text proceeded through the legislative process, these bodies’ 
statements turned even more strongly-worded, criticising the draft GDPR as a 
‘blunt-instrument approach’43, ‘setback’44 and ‘wrong turn’45. 
To the industry, the stringent legal framework would be unhelpful as the 
duties it imposes would eventually fall mostly on small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, throttling the possible growth of start-ups based on innovative use 
of data. Indeed, a more relaxed regulatory environment would mean fewer 
restrictions on how companies may monetise the data they hold. Before 
DoubleClick came into public attention and later under regulatory scrutiny in 
the US, it found a way to look into the massive online data and then pipeline 
the right advertisements to the right place. By successfully executing the idea 
of digging into data, it turned from a $50,000-turnover company with 12 
employees to a multinational enterprise with 3,200 people and $500 million in 
revenues — in only four years.46 Of course, from the industry’s point of view, 
self-regulation or deregulation would be ideal as that means businesses in that 
sector may do as much as they want to maximise their profit. From a 
policymaking perspective, however, that does not stand on its own as a valid 
point. Just because reducing compliance costs may offer an industry the 
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opportunity to thrive does not automatically dismiss the necessity of 
regulation. It needs to be proved that the absence of regulatory measures 
would not lead to substantial risks to the economy, society, environment, and 
so on. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case considering all the 
threats potentially arising from the unfettered expansion of the OBA empire, 
as will be identified in next chapter. 
(b) International competitiveness 
The limitation-on-growth argument sometimes goes beyond the context of 
developing within an internal market, to a slightly different point that a too 
strict regulatory regime would undermine the competitiveness of the industry 
with a global view. For example, European Data Coalition, a lobbying group 
consisting of 21 European companies, warned in 2015 that the GDPR would 
‘cripple the EU outsourcing market and result in decreased levels of controller 
specialisation (as they will have to rely on in-house IT services) and ultimately 
a loss of competitiveness.’ 47  An industrial leader expressly objected to the 
increasing regulation on the digital sector in Europe, calling it ‘red tape’ that 
would leave the EU ‘lagging behind the US and in danger of being overtaken 
by China.’48 
These claims also gain some support from the evidence collected by the EU 
policymakers. In 2012, a report had been prepared for the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, in order to assess 
the regulatory impact on the EU’s competiveness based on the then draft 
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GDPR.49 Among the four sectors being assessed in the study (the other three 
being big data, cloud computing and privacy friendly technologies), 
behavioural advertising is considered as the sector whose competitiveness 
would be most heavily impacted.50 The report picks up on a number of ways 
the draft GDPR might put EU advertising businesses at a disadvantage against 
their US competitors, including, for example, the provisions regarding consent: 
‘[…] US based, globally operating, web based platform companies with 
massive user bases such as Google, Facebook, Amazon and eBay will be in 
a much better position to obtain consent. With strong B2C relationships, 
social reinforcement and critical mass acceptance, more frequent 
transactions covered by a single act of consent and important economies of 
scale they are more likely to achieve high consent rates than smaller 
companies and innovative start-ups, let alone predominantly B2B EU 
companies, who lack the end-user relationship required to achieve consent. 
The consent requirement may foster a more fragmented and closed EU 
internet where advanced targeting is dominated by US based platforms, 
instead of the open Digital Single Market envisaged in the Digital Agenda 
for Europe.’51 
To sum up, what the OBA-related stakeholders argue against the EU data 
protection regime is that a lot of lucrative opportunities would shift to the 
other side of the Atlantic simply because the regulation there is more flexible 
and thus compliance costs are lower. However, several counter-arguments can 
also be made here. First, in cases where the investor targets the European 
market, any operation on EU consumer data would be equally subject to the 
EU’s data protection legal framework, no matter where the business is 
incorporated. This has been made quite clear in the CJEU’s judgment on the 
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high-profile case Google Spain52, where the Court decided that Google, as a US-
based data controller, was nevertheless liable to the duties under EU law. This 
is codified in a clearer way into the GDPR, which applies equally to data 
controllers established outside the EU, so long as the data processing in 
question relates to the offering of goods or services to EU data subjects.53 That 
means, European and American competitors are in effect governed by the 
same set of rules when it comes to conducting business that targets the EU 
market. 
Second, a high standard of data protection within an economy may help 
develop a healthy, reputable and high added-value industry. It is indeed very 
likely that in the short term, foreign clients may choose businesses in other 
jurisdictions to process non-EU personal data, so as to avoid the application of 
the GDPR. In the long run, however, this might turn into an advantage for the 
European industry as it gains reputation and experience in handling customer 
data with a world-leading standard. As an increasing number of consumers 
are becoming aware of the importance of online privacy, they are more likely 
to choose services that conform to stricter data protection rules.54 This would 
create an incentive for international corporations to source data processing 
services from jurisdictions where personal data is believed to be properly 
safeguarded. Of course, this is at best only a possibility that is open to dispute. 
Still, this can stand as a counter-argument to the pessimistic belief that ‘bad 
money drives out good’ in the global digital market, which is not empirically 
verified, either.55 
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2.2.2 The wider digital market driven by data 
The economic benefits of OBA, as the marketing sector often argues, are not 
limited to the industry itself but also extendible to a broader context of the 
digital economy. It is argued that online advertising forms an essential part of 
the driving force behind the growth of the digital market. An IAB-
commissioned study conducted in 2012, for example, aimed to quantify the 
overall economic value generated by the advertising-supported Internet 
ecosystem.56 The researchers employed three approaches to the evaluation of 
the Internet in the US: the boosted employment, the added output value and 
the time spent by users on the Internet. It is estimated that the ‘employment 
due to the advertising-supported Internet ecosystem is 2.0 million direct jobs 
and 3.1 million indirect jobs, for a total employment of 5.1 million people.’57 
Besides, the Internet ecosystem is projected to have contributed $308 billion of 
direct value (ad-funded services, retail services and Internet access services) 
and $554 billion of indirect value.58 They also converted the time of using the 
Internet into monetary value, which accounts for $760 billion, based on 
statistical data about Americans’ usage of the Internet and average hourly 
wage.59 
A similar assessment was carried out for the UK in 2013, commissioned by 
the Advertising Association to accounting firm Deloitte.60 The study covered 
all categories of advertising in the UK, and as a general conclusion, it is 
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estimated that ‘[o]n average, £1 of advertising spend generates £6 for the 
economy.’61 Given the high percentage of expenditures on online advertising 
(35.2% in 2013 62  and 47% in 2016 63 ), applying that calculation to online 
advertising would roughly mean an economic contribution of £37.8 billion in 
2013 and £59.7 billion in 2016. Some parts of the report have been written 
specifically with regard to online advertising. In terms of employment, for 
instance, it was estimated that digital advertising had created 9,317 jobs 
directly and 15,280 jobs indirectly. 64  The sheer benefit resulting from ad-
funded search/referral services was valued at £2 billion and the increase on 
high street sales at £3.7 billion.65 
It is however highly likely that the figures inferred in these studies do not 
reflect the precise value created by the online advertising sector. The suspicion 
comes not just from the motivation of these projects, which are mostly 
sponsored by organisations representing industrial interests, but also from the 
questionable methodology. For example, when calculating the employment 
boost of the online advertising sector, the IAB report attributes a total of the 2 
million American jobs directly to the ‘advertising-supported Internet 
ecosystem’ without any evidence of the percentage of the Internet ecosystem 
that is actually funded by the advertising.66 On top of that, a multiplier of 1.54 
is applied to the calculation of indirect jobs created, again, without giving a 
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clear explanation.67 More importantly, it has not considered what if a large part 
of the Internet ecosystem turns to an alternative business model, or adopts 
alternative forms of online advertising. Assuming the entire ecosystem would 
not survive without advertising, or without personalised advertising, is ill-
founded. Hence, the economic benefits of the OBA industry, as well as the 
costs caused by regulatory efforts, are actually highly challengeable. That said, 
this is not to deny all the economic significance of the sector — a large part of 
it should nevertheless be recognised. What is needed is perhaps a more 
trustworthy study based on accountable data, which is a matter of accuracy 
and objectivity. 
2.3 Good for society? Innovation and democracy 
2.3.1 (Ir)responsible innovation?  
The spillover effect of OBA may be even stretched further to the common 
welfare of the society. This is usually articulated by the marketing sector with 
two desirable-sounding terms: innovation and democracy. Included in nearly 
all the industry reports and statements mentioned in the previous sections, 
one common concern is that an unbalanced data protection system would risk 
stifling innovation in the society. The logic behind appears to be that, first, 
innovation is always something valuable for the society, and second, 
innovation depends on the unconstrained use of personal data. Neither of the 
statements seems self-evident and therefore both would need to be examined 
more closely. 
There is a growing body of research under the heading of ‘responsible 
innovation’ in science and technology studies (STS). One of the underlying 
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ideas is that ‘[o]nce we lift the lid on innovation to reveal its politics, we can 
start to see that, for all of the good intentions of individual researchers, 
innovation can be a form of what Ulrich Beck calls “organized 
irresponsibility.”’ 68  The potential threats to the environment or society 
stemming from innovative process should thus be taken into account as part 
of innovation policies. This would require innovation to be anticipatory of 
risks, reflective on practices, inclusive of public engagement and responsive to 
stakeholder values.69 It should be pointed out that the theories of responsible 
innovation mainly address issues arising from scientific innovation, not 
marketing innovation or generally commercial innovation. In some areas of 
scientific innovation, such as stem cell70 or nuclear energy71 research, a novel 
breakthrough, no matter how promising, is often subject to constant debate 
over its ethical implications. That is because innovation is a social process that 
needs to accommodate public values.72 As regards the innovative technologies 
that extensively make use of personal data, the ethical debate has however 
been disproportionately underwhelming. If even presumably well-
intentioned scientific innovation might lead to undesirable consequences, 
there is no compelling reason to assume that innovation in the profit-seeking 
OBA sector is intrinsically desirable. Quite to the contrary, as will be further 
explored in the next chapter, business practices in this field often ‘innovate’ 
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without sufficient assessment of impact, transparency or public participation. 
The innovation of the online advertising industry perhaps personifies the lack 
of responsibilities in innovative processes. 
The second problem of the innovation argument lies in its oversimplified 
assumption that innovation would be suffocated without free use of personal 
data. Understanding why this statement is problematic would require an 
innovative perception of innovation. Cohen critically investigates the idea of 
innovation and its relationships with privacy. She points out that in the context 
of targeted advertising, profiling represents a form of knowledge, but a highly 
manipulative and powerful one.73 She goes on to articulate why data privacy 
matters to innovation. A comparison is made between intellectual property 
law — which is intended to foster innovation — and the regulation over the 
use of personal data.74 Both intellectual property and data protection regimes 
form some sort of institutional arrangements that ensure certain boundaries 
are respected. 75  Exactly as how allowing unauthorised use of copyrighted 
works would threaten a society’s creativity, allowing unrestricted use of 
personal data would end up devastating a society’s innovation, as the 
cornerstone of data sharing is trust. Of course, most if not all intellectual 
property laws also impose a list of exceptions to the right holders of 
copyrighted works and patents, and they are both subject to a maximum term. 
Similarly, the right to data protection is not an absolute one but often subject 
to restrictions. For example, under the GDPR, the use of personal data for 
archiving, research and statistical purpose is subject to a ‘lighter’ version of the 
purpose limitation principle. 76  However, in both cases, the scope of such 
                                                 
73 Julie E. Cohen, ‘Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object’ (2000) 52 
Stanford Law Review 1373, 1405-1408. 
74 ibid 1416-1418. 
75 ibid. 
76 GDPR, art 5(1)(b). 
Big Promises That Big Data Holds 81 
exceptions should be limited to cases where there is an overriding interest, and 
the conditions for such exceptions should be firstly debated before the public, 
and then clearly defined by law. 
Moreover, a true sense of innovation, as Cohen puts it, ‘require[s] the 
ability to think outside or around existing, predictable technological and social 
pattern’, which is incompatible with ‘pervasive practices of monitoring, 
prediction, and preference-shaping’.77 A practical implication of this insightful 
assertion could be that, a new source of innovation — and economic growth 
— may not rest with the old practice of digging into consumer behavioural 
data, but perhaps with the new paradigm of privacy-friendly economy instead. 
In the European Parliament report, despite the remarks that the draft GDPR 
might have negative impact on the behavioural advertising sector, it at the 
same time highlights a new area where the technology industry can benefit 
greatly from the legal reform: privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs).78 It will 
remain to be seen whether the implementation of the new GDPR would 
actually open up such new opportunities for the European technology sector. 
Yet, it is quite clear that contradicting innovation with data protection does 
not provide a fully valid argument against legal restrictions over processing 
of personal data. 
2.3.2 Ad-funded publishing and democracy 
Last but hardly least, the online marketing industry occasionally makes 
reference to how OBA can be politically beneficial to the society as a whole. 
The starting point of this argument is that publishing matters to public debates 
in a democracy, and that advertising constitutes an important financial source 
of publishing. When it comes to a scenario of OBA, this argument is both old 
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and new. It is old because offline journalism has long been seeking advertisers 
as a major source of funds,79 making it an easy argument to make. Yet, it also 
represents a new argument that the Internet, unlike traditional mass media, 
offers the audience with greater mobility.80 Instead of reading passively from 
only a few local media in the pre-Internet era, people today are looking for 
news on a piece-by-piece basis from multiple sources in a much more active 
way.81 Publications are thus said to have been ‘unbundled’ now, exposing 
people to opposing points of view.82 
However, as will be further analysed in the next chapter regarding the 
implications of OBA on democracy, it is not difficult to explain why this is not 
the case. News readers today indeed have a much wider choice of what to see 
and hear. Yet, their time and attention remain scarce, leaving them only a 
limited capacity to receive and digest information. That means it is the filtering 
mechanisms that would determine what one actually sees, whether the filters 
are the user’s choice or the algorithm’s pick. This creates a new form of 
bundling, one that is not tied to particular media brands, but to the 
categorisation of readers, in a subtle, often indiscernible manner. It will be 
further illustrated how the filter bubbles as well as the consequent polarisation 
of society, both worsened by the pervasive practice of OBA profiling, would 
pose a serious threat to the democracy. 
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2.4 Summary: Validity and reality of the high expectations 
of big data 
Having gone through the popular claims that are often made in favour of the 
OBA industry, we can now summarise those arguments and identify the valid 
ones. From an individual point of view, the ‘relevant ads’ claim does not seem 
capable of supporting the industry’s position, as a user’s choice of tailored or 
non-tailored ads should be respected. Free content and services may count as 
a valid argument at least partly, but it suffers from the exaggerated value of 
such ‘free’ products and also the inadequacy of an opt-out mechanism. As 
regards the trade arguments, they are not all convincing, either. The call for a 
lighter regulatory regime fails to articulate why the OBA practices are risk-free 
or at least low-risk enough for self-regulation; a high standard of data 
protection might be detrimental to the EU’s online marketing businesses in the 
immediate future, but probably beneficial within a longer timeframe; the 
overall economy has actually benefited from the expanding OBA sector but 
again, the calculation might be biased. The slogan-like claim of ‘good for 
innovation’ holds very limited merits as innovation per se is not something 
intrinsically desirable. Neither can ‘democracy’ stand as a valid point because 
its advantage of diversifying sources of information is largely cancelled out by 
the concentration effect on individual or community level. 
Therefore, if we are to name the ‘legitimate interests’ that are related to the 
use of big data in an OBA context, the ones remaining on the list would be the 
‘free content and services’ and ‘digital economy’ arguments.83 However, it 
should be noted that, despite the same terminology, the ‘legitimate interests’ 
identified in this chapter are not necessarily the same as those weighed up in 
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the GDPR’s balancing test. It will be pointed out in Chapter 4 that one of the 
legal bases for lawful processing of personal data is the necessity for the 
legitimate interests of the data controller or a third party.84 Yet, according to 
the interpretation by the Article 29 Working Party, such interests must be 
lawful, sufficiently specific, and real and present in nature. 85 While ‘direct 
marketing’ is expressly recognised by the GDPR as a legitimate interest,86 it is 
unclear how ‘free content and services’ or ‘boosting the digital economy’ can 
be specific enough as the controller or a third party’s real and present interest. 
In addition, the fact, if proved, that OBA indeed represents a number of 
valid, legitimate interests does not mean that these interests can be pursued at 
all costs. Rather, the practices of intensive data use need to be justified on the 
balanced contemplation taking into account not only the benefits, but also the 
risks on the other side of the scale. An in-depth analysis of the values that the 
pervasive OBA-related activities might put in danger is therefore necessary, 
and that will be the main task undertaken by the next chapter.
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Chapter 3 Big Challenges of Big Data: 
A Theory of Big Data Risks in the Context 
of Online Behavioural Advertising 
The big corporations that are dominating the Internet have recently been the 
subject of fierce controversy. Some are acclaimed as ‘the most important 
contributors to the revolution of computers and technology’1 while at the same 
time discredited as untrustworthy. 2  Some are regarded as the hope for 
ordinary people to take on repressive regimes 3  while at the same time 
condemned as a threat to democracy.4 Those controversies hold true for the 
case of online advertising as well. As highlighted in the last chapter, trade 
associations representing the industry often claim that the entire ecosystem of 
the Internet has been supported by the advertising industry.5 They also claim 
that without the constant financial stream coming from the advertisers, free 
services, news, videos and apps will all vanish.6 After all, marketing is not 
something new at all. Long before the boom of the Internet, commercials on 
television, radio or newspaper had already been accepted as a fundamental 
financial source for these content providers. 
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Having a relatively clear picture of the reality within the OBA industry as 
outlined in Chapter 1, one can easily point out the difference between the 
traditional forms of advertising and the ones presented on the Internet. While 
commercial messages on pre-Internet media might be readily tailored to their 
target audience, it can hardly be done on an individual scale. The 
revolutionary architecture of the Internet has enabled them to decide what and 
to whom to showcase their products or services on a user-by-user basis. A 
newspaper that can read the reader’s mind might only exist in fantasy or sci-
fi literature (so far), but in the world of the Internet, this is no magic at all. All 
it takes to personalise the content is simply a small piece of code on the 
webpage as well as a standard web browser on the users’ side. 
Such facts do not automatically place these companies on the evil side. 
They are not necessarily insincere when they argue that all they do is simply 
‘to get to know their customers better, and to provide them with more directly 
tailored services.’7 In fact, as shown above, the whole point of constructing 
such a complex web of technologies is just ‘getting the right ad in front of you.’8 
As one commentator puts it, Google is neither evil nor morally good;9 at the 
end of the day, it is essentially just an advertising company.10 However, just 
because they do not mean to be immoral does not mean that they are indeed 
benign. It might well be an authentic statement that they do not wish to do 
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harms — which is not entirely relevant when it is what they do, not what they 
think, that matters — or even that they are actually contributing to the society 
— which has been challenged in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, these do 
not cancel out the side effects resulting from their practices. The debate about 
the ethics of OBA should not be framed as the choice of label between ‘creepy 
voyeur’ and ‘humble servant’. Rather, it is about both the positive and 
negative effects of the increasingly pervasive presence of online tracking, 
profiling and targeting, in particular the less immediate, tangible or 
individualistic ones. The rest of this chapter will therefore seek to identify and 
clarify the genuine values at stake, and in the last section, to explore an 
alternative approach to the theorisation of these risks. 
3.1 Private sphere facing invasion 
3.1.1 Privacy as a fundamental right 
Privacy is perhaps an obvious start of the exploration of big data risks. Many 
critics take a privacy approach to theoretic accounts for the dangers of the 
wide-spread application of big data, either in general terms11 or in particular 
contexts like advertising. 12  Since privacy has been widely accepted as 
something both morally and legally desirable, campaigns that promote 
privacy protection may conceivably have greater appeal to the general public. 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Terence Craig and Mary E. Ludloff, Privacy and Big Data (O’Reilly 2011); 
Julie E. Cohen, ‘What Privacy Is For’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 1904; Kate Crawford 
and Jason Schultz, ‘Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive 
Privacy Harms’ (2014) 55 Boston College Law Review 93; Ira S. Rubinstein, ‘Big Data: The 
End of Privacy or a New Beginning?’ (2013) 3(2) International Data Privacy Law 74; Omer 
Tene and Jules Polonetsky, ‘Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of 
Analytics’ (2013) 11(5) Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 239. 
12 See, for example, Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, Improving Privacy Protection in the Area 
of Behavioural Targeting (Kluwer Law International 2015); Steven C. Bennett, ‘Regulating 
Online Behavioral Advertising’ (2011) 44 The John Marshall Law Review 899; Avi Goldfarb 
and Catherine E. Tucker, ‘Privacy Regulation and Online Advertising’ (2011) 57(1) 
Management Science 57. 
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For these reasons, when talking about the concerns with regard to OBA, 
‘privacy’ would probably come first across one’s mind. Much less 
straightforward and consensually acknowledged, however, is the essence and 
merits of privacy. 
In Europe, privacy is one of the fundamental rights that constitutional laws 
guarantee. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not 
adopt the exact wording of ‘privacy’ but affords everyone an express 
protection of the ‘right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence’ in Article 8. 13  Likewise, Article 7 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union protects the ‘right to respect for 
his or her private and family life, home and communications’.14 At national 
level, many European countries’ constitutions have also incorporated the 
protection of privacy (or ‘private and family life’) as a fundamental right.15 The 
most intriguing part of looking into privacy issues from a European 
perspective is that, in the EU legal order, privacy and data protection are 
treated as two separate, albeit often interrelated, matters. This is evidenced by 
the fact that the Charter stipulates the right to privacy in Article 7 and the right 
to data protection in Article 8.16 The change of wording is also manifest in the 
                                                 
13 European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), art 8. 
14 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391 (‘Charter’), art 
7. 
15 These include Constitution of Belgium [2014], art 22; Constitution of Bulgaria [2007], art 32; 
Constitution of Croatia [2010], art 35; Constitution of Estonia [2011], art 26; Constitution of 
Finland [2011], s 10; Constitution of Greece [2008], art 9; Constitution of Hungary [2011], art 
VI; Constitution of Latvia [2014], art 96; Constitution of Lithuania [2006], art 22; Constitution 
of the Netherlands [2008], art 10; Constitution of Poland [2009], art 47; Constitution of 
Portugal [2005], art 26(1); Constitution of Romania [2003], art 26; Constitution of Slovakia 
[2014], art 19; Constitution of Spain [2011], s 18. The English-language versions of these 
constitutions are available on Constitute (https://www.constituteproject.org/?lang=en). See 
also Blanca R. Ruiz, Privacy in Telecommunications: A European and an American Approach 
(Kluwer Law International 1997) 22. 
16 Art 7 (‘Respect for private and family life’) reads: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his 
or her private and family life, home and communications.’ Art 8 (‘Protection of personal 
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secondary legislation. While Article 1(1) of the Data Protection Directive (DPD) 
states its object as protecting in particular the ‘right to privacy with respect to 
the processing of personal data’,17 Article 1(2) of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) has changed the expression to the ‘right to the protection 
of personal data’.18 
Those who are less familiar with data protection in an EU law context 
might find it difficult to understand the interactions between privacy and data 
protection. Indeed, an inquiry into the history of the emergence of data 
protection as a fundamental right would reveal that, the creation of the ‘data 
protection’ label, as well as its attachment to (and subsequent detachment 
from) the ‘privacy’ notion, originates at best artificially, and at worst as a result 
of sheer legal miscommunication. 19  The 1970s saw a wave of national 
legislation (including constitutional recognition) regulating automated 
processing of data in Europe, but without clear reference to the objective of 
protecting individual ‘privacy’. 20  At the same time, a parallel thread of 
developments was also taking shape in the light of international cooperation. 
In the course of drafting international instruments concerning data processing 
and free flow of data,21 the term ‘data protection’ was adopted and given 
                                                 
data’) reads: ‘1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or 
her. …’ 
17 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31 (‘DPD’), art 1(1). 
18 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1 (‘GDPR’), art 1(2). 
19 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of 
the EU (Springer 2014) 254-257. 
20 ibid ch 3. 
21 In particular, see OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data [1980] (‘OECD Guidelines’); Council of Europe Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data [1981] ETS 
No. 108. 
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sufficient substance — i.e. rules governing automated processing of personal 
data — to become a separate sector of law on its own.22 However, the language 
and objective of these instruments had been greatly influenced by the 
approach taken by the US. There, following Westin’s classical re-definition of 
privacy as the ability to determine the communications of information about 
oneself, 23  the emerging issues surrounding computerised processing of 
personally identifiable information had been resolved largely by expanding 
the concept of ‘privacy’ to cover what is known as ‘informational privacy’.24 
The concurrence of ‘data protection’ and ‘privacy’ in such international 
documents has profound impact on subsequent legislation at both EU and 
national levels. The DPD and the e-Privacy Directive, for instance, have been 
crafted in a way that highlights ‘privacy’ as their major value orientation.25 
The ambiguity, and often misuse, of the concept ‘privacy’ in varying 
contexts, such as ‘respect for private life’ in the ECHR, ‘right to be let alone’ in 
the fundamentalist American understanding and ‘control over personal 
information’ in the updated definition, has largely led to serious confusion 
regarding the relations between ‘data protection’ and ‘privacy’. Today, we are 
seeing a reversal of the development in EU law: As mentioned above, both the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the GDPR have intentionally signified the 
disconnection from privacy. This is probably why the term ‘data privacy’ is 
sometimes preferred. It reflects both the traditional approach of right to 
privacy and the contemporary reality of a data-driven society.26 Much ink has 
                                                 
22 González Fuster (n 19) ch 4. 
23 Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (The Bodley Head 1967). 
24 ibid 70. 
25 This is evident from the introductory recitals and Articles 1 of both Directives, as well as 
the title of the e-Privacy Directive. 
26 For a brief discussion of the choice of wording between ‘privacy’, ‘data privacy’ and ‘data 
protection’, see Lee A. Bygrave, Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective (Oxford 
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been spilt on the similarities and disparities between privacy and data 
protection.27 It is however not the main task of this section to investigate those 
interactions. Rather, this section is intended to clarify what ‘privacy’, in a 
narrow sense, means and why it matters in the context of OBA. Other related 
values can of course be discussed under the heading of ‘privacy’ with a 
broader perception, but that will be left to subsequent sections. Focusing on 
the core part of privacy would have the benefit of sharpening the arguments 
and making the contrast more visible. Therefore, the term ‘privacy’ is used 
here in a relatively strict sense to steer the discussion towards a more reflective 
direction. 
3.1.2 Defining elements of a classical understanding of privacy 
We cannot talk about privacy productively without at least briefly looking at 
its origin that predates the Internet. The earliest development of the right to 
privacy, at least in the Anglo-American sphere, is usually accredited to Warren 
and Brandeis, whose article The Right to Privacy has long been acclaimed as a 
ground-breaking work in the area. 28  In their eyes, privacy is a desirable 
remedy provided by the law for the invasion of private and domestic life by 
the press.29 Such an invasion starts from the increasing journalist interest in 
gossip about people’s private relations and ends in the mental pain and 
distress of those suffering from unwanted publicity.30 At that time, the idea of 
                                                 
University Press 2014) 1-4; Graham Greenleaf, Asian Data Privacy Laws: Trade and Human 
Rights Perspectives (Oxford University Press 2014) 5. 
27 For example, see Juliane Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, ‘The Distinction Between Privacy 
and Data Protection in the Jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR’ (2013) 3(4) 
International Data Privacy Law 222; González Fuster (n 19) ch 2; Menno Mostert and others, 
‘From Privacy to Data Protection in the EU: Implications for Big Data Health Research’ 
(2017) 25(1) European Journal of Health Law 43.  
28 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) IV(5) Harvard Law 
Review 193. 
29 ibid 195-196. 
30 ibid 196. 
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privacy was characterised by two points: the circulation of private information 
and the harm to one’s personality. In short, privacy deserves legal protection 
because otherwise people’s natural desire to retreat from public observation 
will not be satisfied. European jurisdictions have taken a different approach, 
which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Privacy theories, of course, have remarkably developed since then, and so 
have technologies. In the US, one example of such notable progress is the 
taxonomy of privacy torts. Prosser, in his milestone article published in 1960, 
conducts an extensive sweep of American court decisions with a privacy 
element.31 He summarises four typical forms of privacy breaches: intrusion, 
public disclosure of private facts, false light in the public eye and 
appropriation.32 Except for the first type, all other three bear a hallmark of 
Warren and Brandeis’s concept of privacy — the circulation of information. 
Also, these categories all involve the (mis)representation of the plaintiff in the 
public. The first category, namely intrusion upon one’s seclusion or solitude, 
or into private affairs, does not require the element of making information 
public. This clearly departs from the position of Warren and Brandeis, who 
view, for instance, eavesdropping as being governed by law of trespass, not 
law of privacy. 33  By contrast, under the classification of Prosser, even the 
illegal search of one’s shopping bag in a store would fall within the first 
category of privacy invasion.34 Therefore, the focus has obviously shifted from 
‘circulation’ to ‘observation’ of information, although the line between public 
and private spaces remains intact in all four cases. 
                                                 
31 William L. Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48(3) California Law Review 383. 
32 ibid. 
33 Warren and Brandeis (n 28) 212. 
34 Prosser (n 31) 389. 
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Such a development in the concept of privacy can arguably be attributed 
to the reality that physical boundaries drawn by property law (land, home or 
mailing) can no longer afford sufficient protection. It becomes even more so in 
an age of information. The Internet has provided an unprecedented space for 
new forms of media to flourish, and for ordinary people to collect and share 
information at very low costs. If newspapers in the late 19th century are the 
only ones who can efficiently discover and disseminate anecdote stories, the 
ease of both manual and automated collection and processing of personal data 
today has empowered almost everyone to do that job.35 Therefore, the privacy 
threats of big data are often theorised in the light of how intrusive processing 
of personal data can be. Tene and Polonetsky develop the concept of 
‘incremental effect’, a piecemeal process through which the profiles pertaining 
to individuals could become more revealing as a result of the accumulation of 
personal data. 36  Ohm depicts a similar scenario with what he terms the 
‘accretion problem’. In the event that separate pieces of information from 
anonymised databases are linked altogether, he argues, they can possibly be 
unlocked if only one of those pieces is associated with one’s real identities, 
ending up with an almighty, giant database-in-the-sky.37 
Their concerns are not simply pulled out of thin air or pure imagination, 
but rather tested by real-life cases. In 2006, AOL released a list of 20 million 
search queries that were de-identified with only a random ID assigned to each 
searcher. Shortly after the publication, The New York Times managed to identify 
a woman numbered as ‘User 4417749’ in person, merely from a number of 
                                                 
35 See, for example, Kim McNamara, ‘The Paparazzi Industry and New Media: The Evolving 
Production and Consumption of Celebrity News and Gossip Websites’ (2011) 14(5) 
International Journal of Cultural Studies 515. 
36 Tene and Polonetsky (n 11) 251-252. 
37 Paul Ohm, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization’ (2010) 57 UCLA Law Review 1701, 1746-1748. 
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keywords like ‘numb fingers’ and ‘60 single men’. 38  Once equipped with 
massive datasets about individuals’ details, and with technologies facilitating 
data mining, any state, business or even individual could easily have a grasp 
of people’s jobs, leisure activities, preferred supermarkets or other information 
as sensitive as medical conditions. 39  To that extent, monitoring someone’s 
online activities does not seem substantially different from paparazzi taking 
photos of a celebrity’s home. 
3.1.3 A technological middle ground: Difficulties of privacy 
conceptualisation for OBA 
Despite the similarities, in the case of data processing through new 
technologies, there are still a few characteristics that are different from what 
was experienced a century ago. They include the level of human intervention 
and the expected scope of private sphere. These features are worth further 
discussion, as they may constitute a compelling reason to differentiate the 
present situation from the past. 
In the case of OBA, user data is almost always collected and analysed in a 
fully automated manner. In the traditional idea of privacy, however, the 
rationale of providing such legal protection is based on the assumption that 
people care about what they look like to others. Here, ‘others’ can be only one 
person (in the case of wiretapping) or the unspecified public (in the case of 
media disclosure), but either way, it is human beings who are observing. Does 
that sense of privacy cover the monitoring by machines? Arguably not. It can 
                                                 
38 Michael Barbaro and Tom Zeller Jr., ‘A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749’ The 
New York Times (9 August 2006) <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.
html> accessed 7 January 2016. 
39 A 2009 study finds that it is possible to infer one’s sexual orientation from their Facebook 
friendships. See Carter Jernigan and Behram F.T. Mistree, ‘Gaydar: Facebook Friendships 
Expose Sexual Orientation’ (2009) 14 First Monday <http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/
fm/article/viewArticle/2611> accessed 7 January 2017. 
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be refuted by the statement that ‘[c]omputers don’t breach privacy — people 
do!’40 The idea behind this statement might be that, since privacy is threatened 
only when one is subject to human observation,41 the processing by purely 
automated means should not be regarded as a threat to privacy. It is true that 
those who operate such profiling databases can always delve into the data of 
a specific user, but what if that is limited to a minimal level by technological, 
organisational and even legal restrictions? It is of course technically possible 
for marketing analysts to do exactly the same as what The New York Times has 
done on their enormous database, but they have little, if any, interest in 
tracking down one particular customer in person. It is true that certain forms 
of automated processing of personal data are of course more sensitive and 
sometimes require human oversight. As will be seen in the next chapter, 
automated decision-making is one of the subject matters of EU data protection 
law. However, it is not completely clear at this point whether targeted 
advertising should count as a decision that ‘significantly affects’ the user.42 
Another problem of examining OBA through the traditional lens of privacy 
is the unclear territory of private space. The underlying justification for 
privacy is that one’s will to stay away from public exposure should be 
respected. The law thus provides an alternative option that, unless one 
indicates otherwise, what he or she does, says, writes or otherwise expresses 
in a relatively exclusive place (home, changing room, or even conference room 
in some cases) or manner (sealing a letter in an envelope) should not be subject 
to monitoring or publicity. When it comes to the Internet, however, the 
physical separation between private and external sphere is highly blurred. 
                                                 
40 Craig and Ludloff (n 11) 15. 
41 Daniel J. Solove, ‘Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
Privacy’ (2001) 53 Stanford Law Review 1393, 1418. 
42 GDPR, art 22. 
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There is no doubt that one’s electronic device is their property, but when a 
user visits a website by connecting the device to a remote server via the 
Internet, how far can the user’s ‘private space’ expand? From a purely 
technical point of view, this can be interpreted in completely different manners. 
Some might see the tracking of online footprints as observing one’s private life, 
because how one’s device is used is in most cases expected not to be shared 
with others. Others might however see the recording of online history by the 
websites themselves quite reasonable, because when Internet users visit the 
website, they have arguably placed themselves within the domain of that 
website, which cannot be seen as acting in a private space. Cookies are stored 
in the device, but the content is set and read according to the script sent from 
the website. To the extent that a web browser takes orders from both the 
website and the user, and that both sides possess a (but unequal) degree of 
control, can cookies and other forms of device fingerprinting be considered 
essentially a territory shared by both parties? 
This is even more complicated given how many actors are engaged in the 
loading of even just one webpage. As briefly outlined in Chapter 1, apart from 
the websites that the user means to visit, there are other third-party 
intermediaries engaged in the tracking, profiling and targeting processes. 
Most of these operations are not carried out directly between these services, 
but rather through the user’s browser. In technical terms, these 
communications are ‘requested’ by the browser as per the commands 
programmed by the website. Should they be deemed as part of one’s ‘private 
and family life’ as defined in the ECHR or the Charter, or within the territory 
for one ‘to be let alone’ as defined by Warren and Brandeis? Again, there might 
be polarised ways to narrate the underlying mechanisms, which may lead to 
quite opposing perceptions towards the actual level of invasiveness. For 
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example, one might contend that, even with the concession that the 
communications between the user and the website are protected as private 
and confidential, the interference by the third-party trackers is actually 
enabled by both sides and thus should not be considered as private anymore. 
In theory, the most common form of third-party tracking — by means of 
external reference — cannot take place without authorisation from both the 
website and the browser. However, the counter-argument can be that, since 
average users in most cases have no knowledge of the existence of third-party 
tracking, or have insufficient skills to disable the tracking, or have concerns 
over functionalities being restricted, their expectation remains that the 
communications should be nevertheless protected as if they were private 
conversations. 
Maybe there is no comparable instance of the private/public division in the 
offline world that can perfectly capture how exactly electronic 
communications work. That might be the reason why the classical notion of 
privacy can hardly come into play. When American judges and scholars are 
still debating whether the emission of smartphone geolocation data should be 
considered ‘voluntarily disclosed public movements’ and thus not protected 
by the Fourth Amendment, 43  the limitation of privacy as a legal concept 
becomes manifest. This also explains why, while the idea that one can be 
‘private in public’ is largely rejected in the US,44 this is readily accepted in 
Europe.45 The borders between private and non-private are not that clear-cut 
anymore in the case of the Internet. The private/public dichotomy is no longer 
                                                 
43 Monu Bedi, ‘The Curious Case of Cell Phone Location Data: Fourth Amendment Doctrine 
Mash-up’ (2016) 110(2) Northwestern University Law Review 507. 
44 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Privacy Revisited: A Global Perspective on the Right to Be Left Alone 
(Oxford University Press 2016) 5. 
45 N.A. Moreham, ‘Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 65(3) Cambridge Law Journal 606. 
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capable of explaining the structure of cyberspace, not least in the case of OBA.46 
A user’s electronic device is their extended arm to reach others, but it is also 
the latter’s extended arm to reach the user. 
The indistinct frontiers between the parties of e-communications are a 
product of the unique infrastructure and standardisation of the Internet. The 
HTTP protocol and cookies standards have largely determined the direction 
of data flows and the readiness of such data on request.47 The configurations 
of the Internet are therefore bidirectional but asymmetric. The use of cookies, 
for instance, has greatly enhanced user experience and made new forms of 
interactions possible. However, it has also subjected the device to the 
instructions of the website for their own good. From that point of view, such 
configurations are both enabling and limiting for individual users. The one-
way metaphor of the Panopticon fails to explain the active part that the 
‘prisoner’ might play in the instance of the Internet. Unlike a prisoner in the 
Panopticon, a user on the Internet has a degree of control over — and 
sometimes even benefits from — the observation by the watchers. Still, the 
possibility for individual users to exercise their choice is largely subject to 
technical, economic and social constraints. Technically, counter-tracking 
techniques are available but not always effective. On the one hand, disabled 
or cleared cookies can be bypassed with new tracking devices (including Flash 
cookies, mobile phone unique IDs or other forms of device fingerprinting that 
enable the so-called ‘cookie respawning’);48 on the other, despite the increasing 
popularity of smarter software or plug-ins designed to block online tracking, 
                                                 
46 See Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press 2008) 24. 
47 See Paul M. Schwartz, ‘Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace’ (1999) 52 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 1609, 1621. 
48 Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, ‘To Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing Transparency 
and Individual Control in Online Behavioural Advertising’ (2012) 13(1) Minnesota Journal of 
Law, Science & Technology 281, pt II. 
Big Challenges of Big Data 99 
these measures are facing an arms race from online marketers who have 
deployed anti-adblocking solutions. 49  Economically, disabling cookies or 
using anti-tracking software may mean excessive burdens on Internet users, 
including frustrating browsing experience, missing information or even 
outright denial of service.50 Socially, certain services may form an important 
part of the digital social life of a large group of people,51 for whom retreating 
from such services (as the only means to stop their tracking) is not a feasible 
option. If opting out from tracking continues to be unfamiliar, inconvenient 
and impractical, it is conceivable that the majority of the society might be 
conditioned to no longer care about taking alternative options. 
Hence, although the structure of the Internet is designed for both ends of 
the network, the technical, economic and social reality has in effect skewed the 
balance in favour of the online trackers. These factors may have a decisive 
impact upon what people expect to be private or public, but the problem is 
that these factors tend to be protean in an online environment. The boundaries 
of walls and envelopes are easier to identify, but in the case of online tracking 
techniques, the line is relatively hard to draw. The reduction of human 
interference as well as the increase of the general public’s awareness and the 
possibility to regain control may easily redraw the expected line of private 
sphere and lead to a different conclusion. 
                                                 
49 Rishab Nithyanand and others, ‘Adblocking and Counter-Blocking: A Slice of the Arms 
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51 Gwenn Schurgin O’Keeffe, Kathleen Clarke-Pearson and Council on Communications and 
Media, ‘Clinical Report—The Impact of Social Media on Children, Adolescents, and 
Families’ (2011) 127(4) Pediatrics 800, 801. 
Big Challenges of Big Data 100 
3.2 Informational self-determination under threat 
In spite of the etymological connection between ‘privacy’ and ‘private’, the 
concept of privacy as it is used today has gone beyond the scope of merely 
private and family life. This is in particular evident in Continental Europe. In 
a 1983 landmark decision, the German Federal Constitutional Court found that 
the freedom of individuals to decide on whether to engage in certain activities 
could be significantly inhibited if they can no longer ascertain who knows 
what about them and when.52 A right to informational self-determination has 
therefore been confirmed, based on the general right of personality as 
guaranteed by the Basic Law and not limited to domestic domains but 
applicable to the public aspects of personal activities, such as participation in 
an assembly.53 A similar idea also appeared in the Portuguese Constitution as 
early as in 1976, which explicitly prohibited processing of data not only limited 
to private life, but political convictions and religious faith as well.54 Viewed 
from this angle, the scope of privacy will be substantially expanded. 
In fact, long before the German judgment, there had been scholarly 
discussion about a new paradigm for privacy. Westin, for instance, argues in 
his book Privacy and Freedom that ‘[p]rivacy is the claim of individuals, groups 
or institutions to determine when, how and to what extent information about 
them is communicated to others.’55 Fried also suggests that ‘[p]rivacy is not 
simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is 
the control we have over information about ourselves.’ 56  For him, the 
construction of physical separation — such as one’s house — is but one means 
                                                 
52 BVerfGE 65, 1 [1965] s II. 1. a). 
53 ibid. 
54 Decreto de Aprovação da Constituição da República Portuguesa [1976], art 35(3). 
55 Westin (n 23) 374. 
56 Charles Fried, ‘Privacy’ (1968) 77(3) The Yale Law Journal 475, 482. 
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of control over information.57 The ability to have such control is vital to one’s 
liberty because if the information exceeds the social context in which it is 
meant to be construed,58 it might create inconvenience for that person and 
deter them from speaking something that is not morally wrong but unpopular 
or unconventional.59 
However, the justification for the right to informational self-determination 
is not as straightforward as it might seem at first glance. Determining the 
dissemination of one’s own data could arguably be seen as a way to 
manipulate the information about themselves, as Posner has demonstrated 
from an economic standpoint. 60 Manipulation is not necessarily something 
negative here. Posner believes that private information can be demanded by 
others as an asset to inform their decision-making.61 Therefore, the rationale 
behind privacy law granting control over private information is not much 
different from granting property rights: Voluntary exchange may help achieve 
the optimal equilibrium.62 To that extent, moralist and economic theories of 
informational self-determination do share certain common ground. If 
individuals have no control over their personal data, they would be more 
likely to try to keep information to themselves. While Fried would call it an 
unjust restriction upon people’s liberty to freely speak, Posner would say it is 
a suboptimal condition that impedes the yielding and communications of 
valuable information. 
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Maybe the more significant disagreement between the two strands lies in 
whether and how the self-determination can be limited. Fundamentalist 
privacy theorists are more inclined to treat informational self-determination 
as something closer to an absolute right. For them, the ability to have such 
control is a precondition for the formation of one’s unique ‘self’ out of the 
rather homogeneous social context. Lynskey argues, for example, that an 
individual’s public persona may have multiple facets, the conflation of which 
could hinder their self-development.63 Likewise, Rouvroy and Poullet have 
pointed out the paramount significance of informational self-determination as 
an absolute element of one’s personality and the construction of their 
identity.64 Cohen sees privacy as the breathing room for individuals’ dynamic 
subjectivity to emerge.65 
The ability of people to decide on how they are reflected in the external 
world by means of limiting information disclosure should therefore not 
simply be devalued to the disguise of their true selves. The diversity of social 
fabrics depends heavily on the resistance to being observed, assessed and then 
moderated to a monotonous pattern. To deny such a possibility is to deny 
human agency. Having said that, informational self-determination is not, and 
should not be, an absolute right. This holds true both from a utilitarian and an 
individualistic point of view. Posner contends that forced disclosure of private 
information is sometimes desirable if the nature of the information would lead 
to externalities or if transaction costs for voluntary acquisition are too high.66 
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Solove also advocates a similarly pragmatic approach that privacy issues 
should be decided based on the balance of societal interests on both sides of 
the scale.67 At the same time, looking from an individualistic viewpoint, the 
shaping of personal identity is not a product of merely isolated subjectivity. 
Social modelling and social constraints also play an important role in 
sustaining a stable society. Cohen, therefore, observes that the subjectivity 
should emerge ‘gradually, in ways that are substantially constrained but not 
rigidly determined by social shaping.’68 
There is little doubt that Internet users now have much less control 
regarding the use of data collected from them. In pre-OBA times, marketing 
research was done largely by means of surveys. Consumers could decide 
whether they would like to take part in any of these surveys and decide what 
answers to give for each question. By contrast, online behavioural data is 
collected automatically with only at best the safeguards of ‘opt-out’ or ‘implied 
consent’. There is no easy way to adjust the data to what we would like it to 
be before it is sent out. Moreover, when the data is collected by advertisers, ad 
publishers or ad network providers, the fate of such data is completely out of 
the users’ control. The whole idea of big data is all about maximising data 
collection and analysis, irrespective of how it is collected. That sense of lack of 
control runs throughout almost the entire process of OBA. In the tracking 
phase, for instance, only computer experts would have enough knowledge to 
monitor the data traffic so as to ascertain what kinds of data about the user are 
collected. As for the profiling phase, the highly sophisticated big data 
algorithms, combined with the lack of transparency, would make it extremely 
difficult for users to find out what profiles have been constructed and what 
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judgments, predictions or automated decisions have been made based on 
those profiles.69 Individuals might end up being subject to ‘algocratic’ systems 
where data is collected in a covert way and to inform certain forms of decision-
making whose reasoning is opaque to humans.70 
The less certain question is, should such form of deprivation of control be 
allowed as an exception to informational self-determination? The issues 
arising from OBA, or big data in a bigger picture, present a hard case for this 
question, whether within Posner or Cohen’s accounts: From a solely economic 
standpoint, the value of online behavioural data and the transaction costs to 
acquire such data, as shown in Chapter 2, are hard to measure and are subject 
to intense debates. Equally controversial is, from a more complex, libertarian 
stance, whether the losing control over behavioural data will constrain 
people’s liberty by imposing a chilling effect over the Internet. This would 
have profound implications for both human dignity and social democracy, 
which will be further investigated in Sections 3.3 and 3.5 respectively. As a 
conclusion of this section, it is sufficient to note that, whether examined with 
an individualistic or a collectivistic language, informational self-determination 
is an important value, but a rather instrumentalist one. There are scholarly 
discussions on whether privacy (or data protection) should be considered an 
instrumental value or an intrinsic one.71 Many scholars have however accepted 
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that it has at least some instrumental facets.72 When understood as the capacity 
to control personal data, the right to informational self-determination has a 
strong tendency towards an intermediate value.73 Courts and scholars often 
resort to further justifications like dignity and democracy.74 It clearly serves 
some values that are even more fundamental. The evaluation of the impact of 
OBA should therefore move forward to these underpinning values. 
3.3 Dignity, liberty and equality 
3.3.1 Human dignity and its two dimensions 
If the value of the right to informational self-determination is not self-evident, 
there is a need to trace back to the ethical grounds on which such a right can 
be justified. Human dignity is the most significant one among these values. Its 
overarching importance is highlighted by the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which incorporates the respect and protection of human dignity as its 
very first article.75 As with any other legal instruments that enshrine human 
dignity,76  the Charter does not itself spell out a clear definition of human 
dignity. Other clauses of Chapter 1 of the Charter (titled ‘Dignity’) protect 
individuals from threats to life (Article 2), integrity of the person (Article 3), 
torture (Article 4), and slavery or forced labour (Article 5). They have a 
common element requiring that everyone be treated as human with respect, 
and not subject to inhumane treatment. This is also in line with Kant’s moral 
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concepts. He distinguishes two forms of ends: dignity and price.77 He notes 
that dignity is the end itself and cannot be replaced by something else. 78 
Human dignity therefore requires to ‘[s]o act as to treat humanity, whether in 
your own person or in that of any other, in every case at the same time as an 
end, never as a means only.’79 
The very immediate implication of such a requirement, thus, would be that 
no one should be used only as a means to achieve other ends. From this angle, 
some critics of big data are particularly concerned that the unfettered use of 
personal data would potentially reduce people from subjects to mere objects. 
Lyon, for instance, warns that the increasingly intensive use of personal data 
by computers might have the risk of degrading individuals to mere 
commodities and subjecting human values to mere efficiency.80 Citron and 
Pasquale share a similar concern, showing how the present-day practices of 
data-driven scoring could turn individuals into ranked and rated objects.81 
Such a phenomenon is often illustrated in the context of credit scoring. For the 
financial sector, the use of big data credit scoring could probably save the costs 
for them, because they can figure out the patterns of potential default and most 
of their customers would fit into these patterns.82 For those who match the 
pattern but are in fact underrated, this is unfair as they are not treated as they 
should have been, but instead simply ignored for the benefits of the company. 
This will be further discussed in Section 3.3.3 with reference to discrimination. 
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Here, we only need to point out that the origin of such a danger lies at the very 
disrespect of individuals as humans, to the contrary of the requirement of 
human dignity. Even if the creditworthiness predictions are not accurate for 
each and every applicant, lenders may still benefit greatly from a big data 
system as it would indeed be better than sheer arbitrary decisions.83 The cost 
is that applicants are not evaluated in a way that people as individuals deserve. 
They are reducible to the sum of their data,84 which is disrespectful because 
they are ignored only for profit-seeking, and also unfair because quantifiable 
data cannot capture the texture of one’s life.85 This criticism would remain 
valid even in a less commercial scenario. For instance, while collecting and 
analysing healthcare data for medical research might sound more acceptable, 
probably few patient would agree to receive treatment that is advised by a 
fully automated system designed to apply the findings in a way that would 
cut the costs for human expertise. Here, the true concerns are that, first, certain 
decisions may impact some vital interests of people, and second, such 
decisions are made in an uncaring manner that prioritises corporate interests 
over individual well-being. 
In the context of OBA, a counter-argument has been made that it has very 
little impact on substantive rights or opportunities. Unlike creditworthiness 
check, insurance assessment, crime prediction or other application of big data, 
advertising is a much less sensitive sector when it comes to the direct effect on 
individuals. The denial of a loan or the raise of insurance premiums will have 
some immediate and tangible consequences, and therefore it makes sense to 
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require a higher standard of caution. If the companies fail to take into account 
the possible inaccuracy of their automated decision-making process or fail to 
provide reasonable information, safeguards and remedies, they can hardly 
excuse themselves from the accusation that they do not treat their customers 
with full respect. In that case, human dignity is arguably violated as they show 
no care for the welfare of their customers. As for OBA, however, the 
improvement of targeting could be something beneficial to the users. The 
objective of an OBA system is never to disregard the uniqueness of each 
individual, but rather to create the possibility for the merchants to understand 
the consumers and meet their unique demands. Hypocritical as this statement 
might sound, the benefits of OBA should not simply be disregarded. However, 
it does not by any means suggest that online marketers have the right to 
conduct their business the way they are doing now. What it implies is simply 
that personalisation of online commercial messages can be a win-win situation 
if it is directed towards a fairer direction that benefits not just one side. 
Online marketers often (knowingly dis)miss the point that, while it is one 
thing to admit the benefits of targeted advertising, it is another to say that they 
can do whatever they want to improve the targeting performance. It is not 
about whether it is desirable to tailor advertisements according to the users’ 
interests; it is more about whether it is acceptable to achieve that sort of 
optimisation with the technologies they are using now. Recalling the 
seemingly contradictory survey results about the attitudes of Internet users 
presented in Chapter 2, such a distinction would be even more evident. The 
implication here from a human dignity perspective is that, the effects86 are not 
the only thing that dignity concerns, it also concerns the vehicles to realise 
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those effects. It is clear and plain that in most cases we cannot force another 
adult to do something, even if it is factually beneficial for them to do so.87 It 
follows that it does not matter whether Internet users are actually better off 
with OBA; the deprivation of choice itself will suffice to constitute grave 
disrespect to human dignity. In other words, ends do not necessarily justify 
means. 
The most intractable part of OBA, however, is that it falls in a grey area in 
terms of the extent to which one should have the final say on certain matters. 
While the parents’ interference in the choice of a marriage partner, for example, 
is supposed to be a severe violation of their children’s dignity, the enforcement 
of traffic safety rules (e.g. requiring drivers and passengers to fasten seatbelts) 
can hardly be said to have disrespectfully violated one’s autonomy.88 This is 
particularly true not just because it is advisable for the driver to obey the rules, 
but also because it benefits the society to do so. The case of OBA shares some 
similarities: As concluded in the previous chapter, OBA does represent certain 
individual, economic and societal benefits (albeit often exaggerated), which 
cannot simply dismissed altogether. As such, the dignity argument itself 
requires more clarification in the context of OBA. This cannot be done only 
with a general reference to human dignity. We need to turn to its two 
particular dimensions: liberty and equality. 
3.3.2 Liberty 
Social relationships provide a prism through which the light of human dignity 
scatters into a spectrum.89 On the one end, we can observe the relationship 
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between an individual and society — known as liberty. On the other, the 
relationship between individuals themselves can be discussed under the 
heading of equality. 
Lyon argues that liberty is a preferable term over privacy when talking 
about the totalitarian tendencies in a surveillance society.90 In fact, a lot of 
discussion surrounding privacy has been oriented to the goal of protecting 
individuals from public intervention, especially taking into account the 
ubiquitous electronic surveillance at present. Although the exact meaning of 
liberty is not immutable, and sometimes overlapping with self-determination, 
it is by and large described as an individual’s unabridged natural right to 
follow their own will.91 In this context, the metaphors of the Big Brother and 
the Panopticon can be better understood here as one’s free will being 
restrained under surveillance, or merely visible yet unverifiable inspection.92 
This affects not only the well-being of individuals, but also the maintenance of 
a democracy. As shown in the case of Big Brother, people have no freedom in 
any sense as what they say and do are all under the monitoring of the state, let 
alone to oversee or criticise the activities of the dictator. Prisoners in the 
Panopticon are also compelled to obey the norms as any disobedience can be 
observed and punished. The fact that someone is under constant inspection 
therefore has very strong suppressive effects. The observation assisted by 
technologies can be even more so because the effect can be imposed anytime 
and anywhere without all-day inspectors. 
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Surveillance comes not only from totalitarian states, but also from present-
day decentralised consumerism. 93  The term ‘Little Brother’ 94 , or ‘Little 
Brothers’95, is coined as a variation of the Big Brother metaphor in the private 
sector. Their mundane practices are less likely to cause public attention as they 
are generally thought to have neither interest nor power in interfering 
individuals’ liberty. However, just because they have not yet done so does not 
mean that they cannot or they do not want to. Some giant businesses are in 
fact quite comparable to certain nations, and sometimes even more 
ambitious.96 Political power may not be their ultimate goal, but if that can be 
converted to cash streams, they do have the motivation to exert their influence. 
It is no secret at all that sometimes a business decision can be more effective 
than national legislation97 or political campaigns.98 
Another metaphor departing from Big Brother gains inspiration from 
Kafka’s The Trial. 99  In this novel, the protagonist is arrested, prosecuted, 
convicted and eventually executed without being informed of what crime is 
involved. This fictional work reveals how individuals might suffer from a 
sense of powerlessness and helplessness with no control over what is 
happening to them.100 The Trial differs from 1984 in that, as Solove observes, it 
                                                 
93 Lyon (n 80) 78. 
94 Marsha Morrow McLaughlin and Suzanne Vaupel, ‘Constitutional Right of Privacy and 
Investigative Consumer Reports: Little Brother Is Watching You’ (1975) 2 Hastings 
Constitutional Law Quarterly 773. 
95 Wendy R. Leibowitz, ‘Personal Privacy and High Tech: Little Brothers Are Watching You’ 
The National Law Journal (7 April 1997). 
96 See Julian Assange, ‘Assange: Google Is Not What It Seems’ Newsweek (23 October 2014) 
<http://europe.newsweek.com/assange-google-not-what-it-seems-279447> accessed 7 
January 2017. 
97 See Ethan Chiel, ‘When Google Is More Powerful than the Government’ Fusion (11 May 
2016) <http://fusion.net/story/301142/google-bans-payday-loan-ads-adwords/> accessed 7 
January 2017. 
98 See Zoe Kleinman, ‘Facebook to Update Trending Topics’ BBC (24 May 2016) <http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/technology-36367216> accessed 7 January 2017. 
99 Solove, ‘Privacy and Power’ (n 41) 1419ff. 
100 ibid 1421. 
Big Challenges of Big Data 112 
strikes at the heart of contemporary data processing — not to suppress 
individuality but to study and exploit it.101 Also, ‘The Trial captures the sense 
of helplessness, frustration, and vulnerability one experiences when a large 
bureaucratic organization has control over a vast dossier of details about one’s 
life.’ 102  To that extent, big data might effectively represent a means of 
unaccountable decision-making, as the responsibility to give utmost 
consideration to individual cases can be easily shrugged off by fostering a 
‘computer says no’ mentality.103  
The case of OBA perhaps makes more sense with the metaphor of The Trial. 
The bureaucratic data systems created by online marketers have put 
individuals in an absurdist situation where the intensive use of their data on a 
day-to-day basis leaves them with no clue whether this will end up with 
benefits or detriments to them. This alternative metaphor has its limitations as 
well. For one thing, only because it is not part of the marketers’ agenda to 
suppress individuals does not mean that it has no suppressive effects on 
them.104 One of my colleagues once told me that she from time to time resisted 
the temptation to watch online documentaries on terrorist activities because 
she did not want to appear to show interest or sympathy to terrorism. Her 
concern is not necessarily about putting herself into troubles as a consequence 
of her ‘suspicious’ pattern being flagged up to the authority, but the mere fear 
or dislike to be associated with a certain kind of image is strong enough to 
deter her from certain behaviour. For another, in the case of The Trial, the 
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characters are headed passively towards an unpredictable yet probably 
predefined ending on which they have no say at all. As regards online 
marketing, the users similarly seem to have lost control over how their data is 
processed and who will be brought to them to make a pitch. However, 
technically speaking, they have the options to keep away from tracking (by 
disabling cookies) or to evade it (by using privacy enhancing technologies). 
There is indeed something they can do, but again, it would be inconvenient 
and costly, and not always effective. These options allow users to opt out in 
the first place but once the users accept (or tolerate) them, engagement in the 
process is impossible and there is probably only one way out: leaving the 
Internet entirely. 
The impact of OBA on individuals’ liberty should therefore be illustrated 
with reference to both the Big (Little) Brother(s) and The Trial. It constraints 
people’s daily online activities in quite an indiscernible way and limits their 
autonomy in deciding how they would like to appear to others. The ‘others’ 
here can be either human beings or computers, but in slightly different ways. 
The need to protect individuals from human observation has been largely 
addressed in a narrow, traditional sense of privacy. Then why is it imperative 
to care about how we appear to computers? This is probably a mixed fear of 
the unknown. Indeed, the use of behavioural data for OBA purposes would 
unlikely give rise to direct effects of what can be considered discriminatory 
treatment. However, the data as such may serve non-OBA purposes as well, 
which may be much more sensitive and problematic. One case in point is the 
use of social media data for credit scoring,105 something that might give OBA 
data holders some ‘innovative’ ideas. A lot of decisions today are made by 
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completely automated means based on one’s data profile. These could be 
decisions related to employment, education, financial status, business offers, 
and so on. Internet users have no idea whether and how their profiles will 
inform these sorts of decision-making, so they would rather play it safe. If it is 
natural for a job applicant to feel concerned about the interviewers’ first 
impression of them, then the desire to create a particular image in the database 
will be something quite understandable. The need to maintain one’s public 
image stems largely from the fear of discrimination, and that is another form 
of big data risks that needs further investigation. 
3.3.3 Equality 
Apart from the protection against public interference, human dignity also 
requires everyone to be treated equally. Traditionally, it is anti-discrimination 
laws’ task to tackle these issues. This is usually achieved by identifying certain 
categories of the vulnerable groups, and then prohibiting discrimination based 
on these categories. For instance, Article 21 of the Charter enumerates a list of 
such bases: sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, 
religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national 
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.106 These labels 
are listed on a non-exhaustive basis,107 but the recognition of protection against 
new forms of discrimination would generally take a lot more time and efforts. 
Existing studies have identified two kinds of dangers arising from big data 
with regard to discrimination. On the one hand, big data may facilitate and 
reinforce existing discriminatory treatments.108 Unjust discrimination becomes 
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easier as new ways of collection and prediction of sensitive data have 
developed. Also, big data makes discrimination less detectable by ‘black-
boxing’ the potentially discriminatory decision-making. Either the original 
data-set or the algorithms can be contaminated by biased preconceptions,109 
but the complicated data processing involved may ‘mask’ such inappropriate 
elements and render it harder to trace the origins.110 Also, even though no 
discrimination is intended, the message generated from unbiased input data 
with unbiased algorithm can nevertheless reinforce existing prejudice. 111 
Suppose that a minor racial (or otherwise protected) group, for instance, is 
found less employable in a big data-powered study. It is proved that no racial 
information or other relevant indicators are included and the data processing 
is entirely objective. The conclusion can only be that they are actually less 
employable. However, if they are less employable only because they are the 
victims of previous stigmatisation of their group in history, then the 
widespread application of this study in the labour market will only serve to 
carry this stigma even further, and possibly undetectably.112 
On the other hand, and even more importantly, big data might create new 
forms of discrimination. The power of big data consists in its ability to draw 
out certain correlations from a massive pool of data. These correlations do not 
have to be one-factored, and do not have to be associated with any sensitive 
factor under anti-discrimination law.113 For instance, a conclusion that ‘the 
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residents in a particular area of the city are more likely to commit crime’, or 
that ‘the loyal consumers of a particular brand who also work in a particular 
industry are more likely to default on loans’, can have adverse effects on those 
who match these patterns. A person might be treated unfairly if they happen 
to be a member of these groups by chance. The entire group might suffer from 
what Citron and Pasquale call the ‘negative spiral’ 114  and end up being 
‘segregated’ from the society.115 This effect has in fact found itself in certain 
controversial areas, such as insurance116 and crime mapping117. 
The essence of anti-discrimination law thus needs re-clarification here. As 
Zarky notes, ‘[a]ntidiscrimination policy is not only about assuring equal 
treatment to equals, but also about assuring that specific differences among 
individuals should be ignored.’118 In both the case of stigmatised protected 
groups and that of unspecified unprotected groups, big data could have very 
profound implications — probably in negative ways. This kind of 
repercussion is less visible in a context of OBA, because the mere selection and 
presentation of advertisements can be hardly seen as ‘treatment’. Marketing 
flights from Edinburgh to Edinburgh-based users and those from London to 
London-based users can barely be considered discriminatory, although it 
might indeed limit a user’s opportunities to be exposed to airlines from 
elsewhere. The necessity to require marketers to ignore the unfair differences 
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between individuals can be further justified in two strands of discussion. One 
has very immediate and tangible consequences on individual users, namely 
price discrimination; the other is even more dangerous for the society, but will 
only manifest itself in the long run — the ‘filter bubble’ effect. 
We shall start with price discrimination. 119  Online price discrimination 
began to receive public attention in 2000, when Amazon was suspected to have 
implemented price discrimination based on cookies. 120  Since the public 
outrage following media coverage, personalised pricing has become a rare 
practice,121 but some less blatant forms remain, such as search result sorting.122 
Bad as discrimination might sound, ‘price discrimination’ is not necessarily a 
disapproval term in the discipline of economics. Quite the opposite, 
economists tend to prove that under certain constraints, price discrimination 
may produce an increase in overall social welfare. 123  Restaurants offering 
student discount might be welcome; a retail chain selling products at different 
prices in different stores might be understandable; a theme park charging 
people with disabilities a higher fee might be offensive. These are all price 
discrimination but not equally acceptable. The problem with OBA-based price 
discrimination is that the signals of market demands are detected but not 
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given consciously by the consumers themselves. Also, the pricing strategies 
and the basis on which consumers are segmented are often invisible to Internet 
users. Transparency in information and possibility of signalling are both 
preconditions for positive price discrimination to function. In a classical price 
discrimination scenario, if a customer finds out that a supermarket in a 
different neighbourhood offers more favourable prices than the one in their 
own neighbourhood, they may decide which one to go depending on how 
much they value the price difference and the costs. This is the way they give 
out their market signal. In an online setting, however, they would never be 
able to tell for sure if they are correctly categorised by an OBA system when 
buying an air ticket. Also, they would not be able to tell whether the criteria of 
discrimination are fair: Is he offered a higher price just because they live in a 
wealthy area, or because they have shown greater interest?124 Those who do 
not have the skills or resources to work around the pricing scheme might end 
up being ‘second-class citizens’ or the ‘data have-nots’125 in the society. The 
asymmetries of information will dismiss the justifications for online price 
discrimination practices. 
Beyond price discrimination, another kind of adverse effect of big data 
emerges in a way similar to the two forms of segregation discussed in previous 
paragraphs. Imagine someone happens to click on an ad of a fishing kit, and 
is therefore profiled by an OBA system as someone interested in fishing. Later 
she finds (maybe unconsciously) herself surrounded by marketing 
information more or less related to fishing: fishing courses, fishing backpacks, 
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fictional books (with a fishing element) and flights (to destinations with fishing 
points). The more she is exposed to these ads, the more likely she clicks 
through and sees information, the more likely she is (labelled as) a fishing 
lover, and in turn, the more likely she is served with fishing-related ads. 
Rauhofer sees this practice as demand-side manipulation of the customer, 
‘who is thus reduced to the picture he presents based on previous purchases, 
website visited and services used.’ 126  At this rate, individuals will be 
segregated, not necessarily from the society, but from the full range of 
possibilities and opportunities, in what Pariser calls their own ‘filter bubble’127 
or Turow calls the ‘comfort zone’128. Indeed, it is impossible to experience 
every possibility in our life and most of the time we need to make a choice, but 
when we make a certain choice (e.g. picking up fishing instead of a foreign 
language), all these possibilities are open to us and we are aware of the 
alternatives. As regards OBA, however, if the decision is made or strengthened 
by automated means, the space for other options will be compressed 
significantly. This might sound already too far from the traditional 
understanding of discrimination, but they follow a same path of the negative 
spiral. 
3.4 Unfair imbalance of power 
Whereas human dignity is an imperative attribute that allows us to actualise 
our ‘selves’ through social engagement, we are also involved in a diversity of 
social activities in different capacities. One of the most important capacities 
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today is acting as a consumer. The engagement in exchange activities reflects 
a significant facet of our lives in an economic sense. If consumers’ personal 
data are collected in the course of provision of goods or services, they are 
protected as data subjects. In that event, data protection constitutes a 
cornerstone of consumer welfare.129 There is however evidence suggesting that 
unfair data processing practices take the form of not just visible breaches of 
consumers’ privacy and dignity but also of gaining an unjust transactional 
edge over consumers.130 Economists have built different models to map the 
market distortions caused by information asymmetries. 131  The power 
imbalance resulting from excessive collection and use of personal data is 
notably highlighted in existing research. 
In a previous section about the narrow sense of privacy, it has been pointed 
out that the technical structure of the Internet is bidirectional but asymmetric. 
Online content and services are delivered from the server to the user, which is 
visible to both sides, whereas behavioural data is recorded and transmitted in 
ways that are much less transparent to the user. The communications taking 
place each time a webpage is visited resemble an exchange of goods — ‘free’ 
information and services at the cost of allowing the access to information about 
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what the user has done online. The problem here, however, is that the design 
of how information flows throughout the Internet is skewed towards the 
collection of data from the client side. When the user clicks a link or enters an 
address in a browser, a standard HTTP request will be constructed so as to 
contain quite a lot of information, such as the browser version,132 the webpage 
from which the user navigates, 133  the IP address (which roughly indicates 
geolocation),134 and most notoriously, the cookies. These details are sent by 
default and not easy to hide. That means, the Internet standards require users 
to disclose such information ‘voluntarily’ in the first place as they 
communicate with a website. 
Upon receiving such a request, a server will respond by sending the 
content of a webpage back to the user, but not always. Sometimes the server 
just simply takes the payment (in the form of information) and gives nothing 
back in return. One might wonder who would visit a website that offers 
nothing, but this is happening all the time in a setting of online tracking. In 
2015, Facebook was revealed to have kept track of even non-Facebook users 
on third-party websites. 135  By employing third-party cookies, Facebook 
managed to inject its codes to these websites. More striking is that, these 
websites are not necessarily ad publishers, or at least not on Facebook’s ad 
network. What they did was simply put a ‘Like’ button on their webpages,136 
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in the hope of increasing website traffic. However, this would allow Facebook 
to monitor user activities on these websites, something not necessary what 
these websites meant to do. This is how the Internet is standardised in favour 
of these service providers: Users give away the details of their online activities 
by default, and sometimes gain nothing back, or more ironically, just the 
display of a ‘Like’ button. Privacy settings or privacy enhancing tools may be 
of some help, but it is not always unobtrusive or effective.137 
The imbalance between consumers and businesses stems not just from the 
configurations of the web, but also from information asymmetries. In the 
context of OBA, information asymmetries are manifest with the lack of 
knowledge about the conditions under which personal data is ‘sold’ to 
businesses. As with copyrighted works, the use of personal data often comes 
at a price. Unlike selling movies or music for cash, however, data subjects are 
usually paid by means of ‘free’ online content or services. A copyright 
agreement often imposes certain conditions on the user, such as the 
prohibition on sharing the work to third parties, but in the world of marketing, 
data sharing is ubiquitous. Mozilla began to develop an add-on called 
‘Lightbeam’ for its web browser Firefox in 2011, which was designed to record 
and visualise how third-party websites are connected in the background for 
data collection (most notably by means of third-party cookies).138 An Internet 
user, enabled by this tool, reported that when he visited 31 routine websites, 
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‘the number of sites [he] was connected to was a staggering 117.’139 Lightbeam 
also shows how seemingly unrelated websites are actually connected by one 
or more data collectors. These facts are largely unknown to average Internet 
users, who would probably have changed their mind had they been informed 
— and given a choice.140 When they give consent to the collection and use of 
their data (sometimes ‘by continuing to use the website’), they are unaware of 
the consequences because of the high costs to obtain such information. Certain 
services, like Netflix, would not even work if cookies are disabled.141 What 
makes it worse is that, unlike those trackers who are ‘trackable’ by Lightbeam, 
a large part of data processing is simply undetectable. How data is shared, 
analysed, combined and reused is entirely black-boxed by a sophisticated big 
data system. The users’ insufficient knowledge of how big data has made the 
harvest of personal data much easier and the aggregation of it much more 
valuable gives the business side an unfair advantage. 
Another threat that exacerbates the already unjust power imbalance is the 
users’ lack of bargaining power, which results partly from information 
asymmetries but has more to do with market dominance. As highlighted in 
Chapter 1, a number of ad network providers (such as Google and Facebook) 
are also dominant service providers in different sectors of the online market. 
As a result, Internet users are not left with many viable choices in these sectors. 
One can of course stop using Google or switch from Facebook to other services, 
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but the costs will be so high that they are in effect forced to accept, as no 
realistic alternatives are available. The use of big data may add more fuel to 
the fire because those who possess more resources to harness data will profit 
a lot more from big data, and thus, the power tends to concentrate to a few 
oligarchies.142 Also, on the individual side, Rauhofer has pointed out how the 
intrinsic power asymmetries may render the weaker parties more susceptible 
to giving up their data,143 which in turn strengthens the already unfair status 
quo.144 More importantly, these services are connected to the rest of the web in 
one way or another through the advertising network. That means, even if a 
user decides to retreat from a certain service, it does not mean that they will 
be completely out of touch with that service provider, since the latter, or its 
partner, is probably one of the ad network providers of other websites that 
they have visited. Perhaps the only effective bargaining chip is to cut off 
entirely from the Internet. 
As a last point, we should also recall the manipulative power gained by the 
marketers as discussed in the previous section. It is worth some reiteration, 
and further exploration, of the repercussions here in the light of business-
consumer relationships. Consumers are arguably placed in a weaker position 
as their preferences are somehow distorted. It is of course true that the whole 
point of advertising is to encourage potential customers to make the purchase, 
and the entire industry will vanish if advertisers are not allowed to have any 
influence on consumers in any sense. However, what makes OBA stand out 
from other forms of advertising on traditional media is that consumers are 
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targeted on an individual basis in accordance to their online behaviour. By 
detecting the ‘soft spot’ in their hearts, OBA gives businesses an edge over 
consumers, an informational edge that empowers the supply-side to appeal 
better to those they target.145 This is achieved through the intense collection 
and analysis of individual consumer behaviour, often without their awareness, 
and this is why it is more effective, and more invasive. 
Throughout this section, the interests of Internet users, in the role of 
consumers, have been the major concerns. A few dimensions of OBA, as a 
representative of big data, have been examined with regard to how it changes 
the dynamics between businesses and consumers in a commercial world: 
infrastructural power, informational power, bargaining power and 
manipulative power. This is not the end of the list. If we treat individuals not 
just as consumers, but also members of a desirable democracy, then it might 
lead us to the discussion of another kind of power: political power. 
3.5 Our undermined democratic society 
The potential threats of big data are not limited only to those from 
individualistic standpoints. It also has certain implications for what we 
considered ethically good for the people in a community as a whole. 
Individuals should be perceived not merely as consumers but also as 
citizens, 146  who deserve adequate political participation in a democratic 
regime. The big data impact in societal terms is often underestimated as its 
effects are more long-term and intangible. Still, these matters deserve a close 
observation. As highlighted by many researchers, the values we cherish in our 
democracies could potentially become eroded without our awareness. For 
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instance, Cohen notes that autonomous, unmonitored choice is essential for 
the diversity of speech and behaviour.147 She then goes on to explain how a 
community can benefit from this kind of diversity in various manners, 
including inter alia reasoned participation in governance, encouraged 
innovation in markets, reinforced stability of social fabric and a collectively 
defined role for technologies in the society.148 Similar points are also made by 
Schwartz, who warns that once surveillance becomes the norm, cyberspace 
will no longer function as a forum for deliberative democracy.149 When people 
are aware or suspicious of being monitored, they would probably feel 
constrained and become subject to, say, self-censorship as a consequence of 
the chilling effect. 150  The monitoring of OBA networks is no exception. 
Consumer data might be less directly associated with censorship, but it does 
facilitate potential surveillance attempts. The chilling effect can be even more 
powerful in particular when it is widely reported that intelligence services like 
the NSA or the GCHQ have access to records of personal online151 and offline152 
traces. If Internet users have concerns with what they read and what they say 
being monitored, even just by an OBA system, they might refrain from certain 
activities, including the perfectly legitimate ones. Even worse, under the 
slogan of ‘[i]f you’ve got nothing to hide, you shouldn’t worry about 
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government surveillance’ 153 , future generations might be conditioned less 
resistant to surveillance use of online behavioural data. 
The sensitivity of OBA becomes even more evident when political 
campaigns are now actually advertisable. With the revelations about 
Cambridge Analytica using social media data to help campaigners target 
voters, 154  it is clear that political advertising can be powerful, and also 
controversial. In fact, not just third-party companies like Cambridge Analytica 
are playing a role in political targeting; major platform providers are also 
actively involved. 155  Both Google 156  and Facebook 157  have their own 
advertising products that are specifically designed for political campaigners. 
It is anything but new today for these campaigners to employ targeting 
technologies to reach their voters more effectively.158 In a political market, as 
with any other markets, talking to the ‘right’ customers is of paramount 
importance. However, the application of OBA to political marketing, as 
discussed regarding manipulative power in the preceding section, could give 
the campaigners an unfair competitive edge as they target individual voters. 
This can be done by predicting an individual’s favourite products, sports, 
music, etc., and then personalising their messages with reference to the 
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appropriate brands, teams or artists.159 They can also find out those who are 
more likely to be mobilised,160 and then, in Facebook’s words, ‘lower [the] cost 
by optimising the delivery of adverts to the people most likely to take 
action.’161 This could be an effective way to promote a campaign, but would 
probably make those who are already inclined even more committed, and 
those who are considered ‘untargetworthy’ more marginalised in political life. 
Beyond the chilling effect and political manipulation, some scholars have 
provided alternative accounts for some remoter, less observable negative 
effects arising from unfair data processing practices for non-surveillance 
purposes. Sunstein, for example, uses the term ‘cyber-polarisation’ to describe 
how online media could shape our minds into certain groups, severely 
contrary to social pluralism.162 Turow163, Tene and Polonetsky164 have applied 
this theory to the advertising industry. They argue that it is indispensable for 
a vibrant society to maintain a healthy balance between those media targeting 
the entire society and those tailored to certain communities.165 The boom in 
tailored media in the past decades, however, has driven the society towards 
the heavily segment-making extreme.166 
To summarise, three dimensions of democratic values might be 
compromised by the uchecked practices of OBA. First, the tracking of Internet 
users, if not conducted in a transparent way, will cast a shadow over the free 
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use of the Internet. Second, the profiling of individual preferences will give 
unfair advantage to certain camps. Third, the targeting of voters, if not making 
users informed of the alternatives, will give rise to the polarisation of the 
society. All these negative consequences will greatly impair the proper 
functioning of a democratic society in the long run. OBA is a product of private 
interests, but it might end up with some serious societal impacts. From this 
point of view, the case study of OBA is not just a representative of big data in 
the private sector, but also touches on some part of its application in public 
affairs. 
3.6 The falling walls of the data world 
The preceding sections have so far introduced the major theories of the 
potential threats of big data. They then have been examined with the case 
study of OBA. Some of these arguments are more relevant to the OBA industry 
while others are less so, but generally OBA may be investigated as a useful 
representative of big data. The question then is: What can we learn from these 
perspectives? What are the valid arguments regarding big data in the context 
of OBA? What common ground do these arguments share? Can these 
arguments be applied to a wider backdrop of big data developments? 
To answer all these questions, it is essential that we find an appropriate 
narrative to make sense of the ways in which the use of big data has intensified 
all the threats flagged up above, whether the individualistic, collective or 
societal ones, and whether quantitatively or qualitatively. With the help of the 
case study of OBA, at least four dimensions of transformation can be revealed 
and should be reiterated here: First, the fine line between private and public 
space has been technically smudged and then redefined. A user’s terminal 
device now no longer serves as a shield of information, but rather a mere node 
in the gigantic, complex network for generating, communicating and 
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consuming behavioural data. Even in Europe, where protecting ‘private in 
public’ is more widely admitted, this would have profound implications as the 
shift of the boundary would make certain practices look less invasive, and thus 
harder to defend against. Second, the uncontrollable digital footprint has been 
fused with the controllable profile voluntarily created by the user. While some 
online services offer users the chance to, for example, refine their online 
profiles by adding, removing or editing certain details, or even indicate their 
advertisement preferences, it only provides a sense of control, not the genuine 
control of the invisible profile. While there are some ‘dash board’-like 
functionalities in OBA networks to allow users to calibrate the behind-the-
scenes creation of the hidden profiles, their roles are limited. The actors of the 
network do not have the incentives to provide such a possibility, and they may 
argue that it is technically impossible to do so given the heterogeneity of the 
industry structure. Third, and as a related point, the construction of 
advertising profiles has been led towards a multi-layered, multi-faceted, and 
mutually informative model. As pointed out in Chapter 1, a massive number 
of actors in the OBA network may respectively keep a record of a same user’s 
online activities, with varying degrees of focus, breadth and precision. These 
records may maintain certain amounts of differences but have the potential to 
inform, strengthen and rectify each other. Fourth, the interpretation of an 
individual user’s personal life has largely been based on the demographic and 
behavioural patterns of others. All these user profiles in the interconnected 
databases thus, in themselves, make up an unmeasurable network in which 
everyone’s digital image(s) is susceptible to those of others. 
All these new socio-technical realities point towards the need for a coherent 
account for the substantial, additional dangers of big data. A useful conceptual 
metaphor to capture the real dangers exposed from the four dimension above 
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could be that, we are now experiencing the falling walls in our highly 
datarised world — in all four senses. 167  The ‘walls’ represent the techno-
economic divide between four pairs of domains that used to be separate but is 
now largely intermingled: private and public realms, manageable and 
unmanageable profiles, one data representation portrayed by an entity and 
another by a different entity, and one’s data representation and the others’. 
The rest of this section will serve to test this metaphor by illustrating how it 
can better depict the escalating risks from all the perspectives covered in 
previous sections. 
3.6.1 Privacy 
We have noted that the essential concept of privacy draws a line that separate 
one’s private life to their public one. The information within the private life 
circle should be protected against unauthorised observation and circulation. 
By controlling how much information can go through the sluice gate to the 
public domain, individuals are in effect managing their public presence, or in 
Posner’s words, manipulating information about them. 168  The classical 
definition of privacy as the ‘right to be let alone’ 169  does not imply that 
individuals do not care about their public life. Rather, it is more likely to be 
the case that they want to be let alone once in a while because they know they 
will eventually need to return to the public life and therefore do not want 
private matters to impede their future engagement in public life.170 Privacy, 
thus, may serve the purpose of maintaining a good (or at least not bad) image 
to the public side of life. 
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In an age of the Internet, apart from a good image in real life, those who 
wish to connect actively with others will also need to maintain their decent 
presence online. For instance, it is very common these days for corporations to 
make use of mass media, corporate media and social media to build up and 
maintain a corporate reputation. 171  Similarly, blogging and tweeting have 
become popular among academics as a means to increase professional 
visibility and public impact. 172  A large portion of Internet users are also 
building up their online profiles to impress their friends or a broader audience. 
Such forms of online presence management share a key factor with their 
offline versions: They have a heavy focus on reputation. In other words, it is 
about the strategies to give an impression appealing to others — family, 
friends, colleagues, employers, fans, customers or anyone who happens to 
show interest in that person. Maintaining a good name is not the only but a 
major purpose of managing one’s offline and online presence. 
However, the case of OBA, or a lot of other forms of big data application, 
is associated with reputation in a less immediate but more delicate way. As 
noted in Section 3.1, one of the major difficulties of applying traditional 
privacy theories to an instance of OBA is that human observation is 
substantially minimised. Simply put, if being observed by an insect on the wall 
is not a privacy problem,173 why should being observed by a computerised 
system be? In The Black Box Society, Pasquale employs the concept of ‘digital 
reputation’ to demonstrate the threats we are facing today in ‘an Era of 
                                                 
171 Grahame Dowling and Warren Weeks, ‘Measuring Media Corporate Reputations’ in 
Sabrina Helm, Kerstin Liehr-Gobbers and Christopher Storck (eds), Reputation Management 
(2011) 113. 
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173 Solove, ‘Privacy and Power’ (n 41) 1418. 
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Runaway Data’.174 By way of example, he examines the latest trends of making 
use of scoring technologies in finance175 and health sectors176. The use of credit 
scores and medical records are of course known as the most notorious 
examples of potential tarnishing effect on one’s reputation. 
With the prevalence of OBA, the digital reputation might become 
increasingly difficult to locate and manage, and the underlying user profile 
might become conflated with the private one, the visible one, the ones held by 
various profilers, and even the ones of others. The walls between what is private 
and what is public have largely evaporated in the online world. The structure 
of the Internet makes it easier for marketers to build up user profiles but does 
not enable the users to manage such presence. If the creation of a technological 
artefact tips the balance of existing interest distribution in an unfair way, 
policy reconfiguration might prove necessary. An electronic device is the 
property of its owner, but it serves not just its owner, but also those remote 
online marketers. For this reason, computers or web browsers should now be 
seen as only one section of the channel between Internet users and their service 
providers. Even worse, as we have seen in Chapter 1, tracking, profiling and 
targeting are all done in a multi-levelled, decentralised manner. Advertisers, 
ad publishers, ad network providers, bidding agencies and other actors may 
each have a profile of a given user. These profiles support each other but 
maintain certain differences. To such an extent, big data has made data 
reputation outright unmanageable: If credit scoring is based solely on loan 
history, one can easily figure out how to avoid the adverse factors or what 
went wrong when something happens; but if it is based on a complex set of 
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data that is connected to an uncertain scope of private activities, hidden 
profiles, external sources and other customers, it would be impossible for one 
to audit the scoring system. 
3.6.2 Informational self-determination 
Apart from privacy, the notion of the ‘falling walls’ may also help us reflect on 
other values that we have discussed. Informational self-determination, for 
example, has a lot to do with such a concept. While we tend to conceive 
‘information’ as pieces of message that would disclose certain events of our 
life, what might be ignored is that the overall digital image should also count 
as a form of personal information and thus be subject to the principle of self-
determination. At the time when records of personal data were kept isolated 
and static, having control over those separate pieces of information would 
suffice for the purpose of determining one’s digital self. Now that one’s 
digitalised image has been entrenched in a network and dynamically affected 
by so many factors, it is simply impossible to achieve the goal of developing 
one’s informational self by only controlling individual data points. The 
informational walls in the offline world with which the distance between 
people is maintained do not stand in the online world anymore. Big data has 
brought integration of personal information to such a new level that asking 
individuals to decide the fate of their information each time they give out such 
information is no long effective, or fair. The building of one’s public presence 
is much harder without such personal room surrounded by the walls. In other 
words, in the age of big data, informational self-determination should cover 
not just the ‘in and out’ of information, but more importantly, the border of 
their own data realm. So understood, the very idea of informational self-
determination is actually facing more challenges, and thus requires a new 
paradigm to achieve. 
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3.6.3 Human dignity 
As noted above, informational self-determination has a strong instrumentalist 
flavour. It serves certain underpinning values such as liberty and equality. It 
has been explained why people’s liberty might be at stake with the metaphor 
of the ‘Little Brother(s)’. The fact that Internet users have no idea when, how, 
by whom and what kinds of their personal data is being utilised would cause 
a psychological effect on them, who might in turn feel constrained when 
surfing the web. This effect partly stems from the potential, often unknown, 
consequences of the exploitation of their profiles, which will be further 
explored below. Another often neglected origin of the chilling effect can be 
outlined better with reference to the concept of the ‘falling walls’. The problem 
here is that an impression is created, albeit only by computers. While it is true 
that being watched by an insect on the wall is not a problem for most people, 
being watched by a silent person at home might have a stronger impact upon 
one’s behaviour. Even if that person will never tell anybody else about 
anything they have seen, their presence and observation will nevertheless 
create a sense of unease. The difference here is probably that a person is able 
to understand and judge on humans’ behaviour, whereas insects are not. In 
the case of OBA, all the tracking, profiling and targeting processes are meant 
to make sense of individual Internet users’ behaviour. Such kind of 
understanding do not have to have any negative consequence on individuals 
or to serve any surveillance purpose for the government. The mere fact that 
one is being monitored by something that would make sense of their speech 
or actions would suffice to cause self-consciousness and mental tensions. The 
fact that OBA data might be ‘repurposed’ for non-OBA uses and slip through 
the ‘revolving door’177 to the public sector would even add greater weights to 
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such stress. In a world of the falling data walls, the chilling effect might be 
even greater because of the stronger sense of human involvement: A user 
might feel even more constrained as the monitor might have more to do with 
private events, might be relevant to online human interactions, might cover a 
wide range of life and might take into account the behaviour of a larger group 
of people. The concern itself might be irrational but is indeed natural — people 
care about how they are mirrored even in a purely digital world. The 
possibility of one’s data presence being misused for non-OBA purposes would 
also add to the problem. The fear of being misunderstood or misrepresented, 
no matter by insects, animals, humans or machines, is a powerful instinct. In 
this light, our desire to control our data portrait, even if only faced with 
machines, would become understandable. 
What is even more straightforward is the discriminatory effects of OBA. 
The fact that the boundary of one’s data presence has been blurred can lead to 
one’s employment, healthcare, education and financial opportunities being 
impaired. Price discrimination is a case in point, and can be generalised to 
other areas: Without the clear lines between private and public information, 
between user-given and predicted details, between different databases, and 
between different users, the targeting of a particular group of people or the 
sorting of results based on individual differences can be more accurate on 
discriminatory classifiers, or less accurate on fair classifiers. Either way, 
discrimination is exacerbated, and less detectable. Also, apart from such 
potential yet tangible impact on individuals, the long-term filter bubble effect 
is also problematic. A user’s data profile is indeed deduced from their actual 
activities, which can be arguably quite accurate. However, certain saliences of 
such presence may be augmented through the processing of an OBA system, 
which might in turn end up reshaping individual behaviour and trapping 
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them in the group’s own echo chambers. The contours of such bubbles would 
become even less discernible as a result of the more complicated, interrelated 
nature of online profiling. People would be less likely to see alternative 
possibilities in life, let alone to escape such filter bubbles. 
3.6.4 Power asymmetries 
In Section 3.4, four forms of power imbalance have been flagged up: 
infrastructural power, informational power, bargaining power and 
manipulative power. Each of these imbalances would be aggravated when 
creating a complex advertising network is becoming less costly and more 
valuable while individual users remain to have few options on how they can 
negotiate or decide on the use of their data. Tracking, profiling and targeting 
techniques have had enormous developments since the advent of cookies. At 
the same time, however, while Internet browsers are becoming more privacy-
aware and smarter, the degree to which users are empowered is simply not 
comparable to the degree to which businesses are empowered. The fluid 
boundaries of one’s data domains allows the online profilers greater flexibility 
to gain information, to bargain, and to manipulate, whereas individuals are 
left with greater uncertainties and difficulties to do the same. A lot of average 
Internet users are even unaware of the fact that they are disempowered during 
the expansion of the network, not to mention to tackle the problem. 
3.6.5 Democracy 
Lastly, the democratic issues related to the abuse of online tracking, profiling 
and targeting can be identified in ways discussed in previous sections. For 
example, the chilling effect concerning freedom of expression has been 
explored under the heading of human dignity; the unfair advantages secured 
by particular political campaigns share the same root with the unfair 
commercial powers gained by online businesses; the highlighted polarisation 
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of participants in a civil society may benefit a lot from the discussion of the 
filter bubble effect. In similar veins, these repercussions will escalate when the 
vanishing borderlines between data domains become the norm. Such effects 
are less indirect to individuals but definitely no less important to the society 
as a whole. 
3.7 Summary: From privacy to democracy — Crisis for 
individuals, collectives and the society 
This chapter has so far attempted to cover a wide range of interests that being 
threatened by big data. They have been examined in the context of OBA, which 
offers a useful perspective for the clarification and verification of various 
arguments. In the last section, a theory has been put forward in the search of 
a coherent account for the risks intensified by big data: It has created a digital 
reality where there is no longer separation between private and public profiles, 
between controllable and uncontrollable profiles, between one’s profile in one 
place and another, and between different individuals’ profiles. To understand 
why this metaphor is important, we need to have in mind a picture of how we 
— as individuals, collectives and a society — have maintained the healthy 
relationships between each other. In the pre-Internet and the (pre-big data) 
Internet times, while the walls built on multiple dimensions to maintain 
obscurity may have drifted from time to time, regulatory or technological 
solutions have managed to catch up and put them back in place. Today, the 
walls are not just moving, but rather collapsing. 
Such a crisis resulting from the collapse of the walls in the data world 
should be taken seriously. Throughout this chapter, it has been shown how 
important it is to maintain these walls for independent individuals, collectives 
sharing common interests and the civil society. The unclear borderlines of 
individual data domains against disclosures, against predictions, against 
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separate data holders, and against others call for further regulatory initiatives 
to address these new challenges. Before answering the question as to what 
regulation can and should do, one would inevitably have to first figure out what 
regulation has done. As such, the focus of the next chapter will be on an 
important area of regulation over the use of data: data protection law.
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Chapter 4 Legal Regulation Confronted with Big Data: 
Understanding EU Data Protection Law in 
the Context of Online Behavioural 
Advertising 
4.1 The data protection legal system: An EU perspective 
In the previous chapters, a general picture has been sketched out regarding 
how OBA as a prominent application of big data has connected online users 
with a wide range of economic actors, as well as how its popularity may bring 
forth both benefits and risks. Compared to the relatively young trend of big 
data, data protection law has a history of decades in its course of development. 
Over the years, the data protection legal framework has been constantly 
criticised as ‘outdated’ or ‘obsolete’, especially in the face of big data. 1 
However, it is also believed that, despite the new challenges brought about by 
big data, the essential objectives and principles of the current data protection 
regime remain sound. 2  Indeed, it is not unusual that regulatory efforts in 
certain fields manage to overcome new issues over time, as long as the changes 
are not fundamental enough, or as long as the safeguards are designed to be 
future-proof.3 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Ira S. Rubinstein, ‘Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?’ 
(2013) 3(2) International Data Privacy Law 74; Alessandro Mantelero, ‘The Future of 
Consumer Data Protection in the E.U.: Re-thinking the “Notice and Consent” Paradigm in 
the New Era of Predictive Analytics’ (2014) 30 Computer Law & Security Review 643; Steve 
Lorber, ‘Data Protection: A contextual Approach to Regulation’ (2014) 14(5) Privacy and 
Data Protection 11. 
2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1 (‘GDPR’), Recital 9. 
3 It is subject to debate whether data protection laws may actually be ‘future-proof’, but the 
European Commission seems to believe so. See Commission, ‘Proposal for a regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regards to 
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Besides, in the realm of data protection, regulatory initiatives have not 
ceased to move onwards in the hope of keeping pace with the ever-changing 
socio-technical landscape, at least not in Europe. One of the latest — and most 
significant — legislative efforts in this area is the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), which was adopted on 27 April 2016 and has taken effect 
as of 25 May 2018. 4  It is well acknowledged by the GDPR that ‘[r]apid 
technological developments and globalisation have brought new challenges 
for the protection of personal data’ and thus ‘require a strong and more 
coherent data protection framework in the Union’. 5  Among these 
developments, big data is probably the most noticeable, and hence, the 
resolution of its challenges is claimed to lie at the heart of the agenda for this 
data protection reform.6 Whether the GDPR can achieve its goal of affording a 
high level of protection to individuals with regard to their personal data while 
not stifling data-driven innovation will depend upon the extent to which it can 
deal with the challenges arising from big data. 
To allow for a meaningful assessment of the effectiveness of the GDPR, this 
chapter will focus on the substantive parts are relevant to OBA — and in a 
bigger picture, big data — with particular highlights on the newly introduced 
safeguards. Section 4.2 will briefly present the general data protection 
framework laid down by the GDPR, in particular how data processing is 
regulated through the interactions between the basic concepts, essential 
principles and legitimate grounds. Each of these elements will be analysed in 
depth in subsequent sections: Section 4.3 addresses the definition of personal 
                                                 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation)’ (2012) COM(2012) 11 final, 104. 
4 GDPR, art 99. 
5 ibid Recital 6. 
6 Commission, The EU Data Protection Reform and Big Data Factsheet (2016) <http://ec.europa.
eu/justice/data-protection/files/data-protection-big-data_factsheet_web_en.pdf> accessed 22 
February 2017. 
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data and its applicability to the context of OBA; Section 4.4 examines the legal 
bases by which data processing can be lawfully carried out, with particular 
emphasis on consent under the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive; Section 4.5 
focuses on three fundamental principles that are particularly relevant to an 
OBA context; Section 4.6 gives a brief analysis of the implications of the new 
concept of ‘profiling’ for OBA. By means of conclusion, Section 4.7 will 
summarise how the regulatory model has evolved from the DPD to the GDPR, 
and what legal obstacles the OBA industry will face as the GDPR is enforced. 
The reason why this study takes EU data protection law as the legal 
framework rests on quite a practical consideration. When it comes to data 
protection law (or known as data privacy law in other jurisdictions), the EU 
has been a pioneering leader in terms of both legislation and case-law. The 
availability of abundant materials offers the best opportunity to reflect on the 
topic with a variety of propositions taken into account. The latest overhaul of 
data protection law also puts a global spotlight on the latest developments of 
data protection in Europe. The GDPR, though far from perfect, personifies the 
up-to-date outcomes of theoretical and practical efforts in promoting data 
protection over the last two decades, which will be further demonstrated in 
subsequent sections. Before digging deeper into the specific rules, however, it 
is essential that we have a general grasp of the history and legal context in 
which EU data protection law has developed. 
4.2 An overview of the General Data Protection Regulation 
4.2.1 Regulating data protection in Europe — A very brief history 
National initiatives to regulate the use of personal data in Europe date back to 
the 1970s.7 Domestic legislation of data protection was first seen in the German 
                                                 
7 For a more detailed historical overview of national data protection laws in the 1970s, see 
Judith Rauhofer, ‘Privacy Is Dead, Get Over It! Information Privacy and the Dream of a Risk-
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federal state Hesse in 1970,8 followed by nation-wide data protection laws in 
Sweden (1973),9 Germany (1977),10 France (1978),11 and so on. At European 
level, the Council of Europe adopted a Resolution in 1973 specifically 
expressing concerns over the adverse effects of the intensive use of 
computerised personal information. 12  The Resolution includes a set of 
principles for protecting individuals from the abuse of data banks in the 
private sector. Three years later, the work began for drafting the Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data.13 The Convention was open for signature in 1981 and became 
the first legally binding international instrument with a particular focus on 
protecting personal data. In addition to expanding and refining the principles 
already enshrined in the Resolution, certain ground-breaking elements of data 
protection law were also introduced, including the free movement of personal 
data across borders and international cooperation.14 To fully understand the 
developments of data protection law, it is important to bear in mind that its 
original aim is to align national laws and eliminate potential obstacles to cross-
border data flows. 15  As will be seen below, the objective to achieve a 
harmonised regulatory regime from which free movement of data may benefit 
                                                 
free Society’ (2008) 17(3) Information & Communications Technology Law 185, 188; Eleni 
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8 Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz [1970]. 
9 Datalag (of Sweden) [1973]. 
10 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (of Germany) [1977]. 
11 Loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés (of 
France) [1978]. 
12 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Resolution (73)22 on the Protection of the 
Privacy of Individuals vis-à-vis Electronic Data Banks in the Private Sector [1973] 
(‘Resolution 73(22)’). 
13 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data [1981] ETS No. 108. 
14 See ibid chs III, IV. 
15 David Bainbridge, Data Protection (2nd edn, XPL Law 2005) 16. 
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has remained a hallmark of subsequent data protection initiatives of 
international or regional organisations. 
Among these initiatives is the OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection 
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data in 1980.16 The Guidelines, 
though not legally binding on OECD Member countries, have remained 
influential to date.17 Eight basic principles were put forward concerning the 
protection of individual privacy. These principles include collection limitation, 
data quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security safeguards, 
openness, individual participation and accountability. 18  The values of 
utilisation of personal data were also a main concern of the Guidelines, and 
thus, a different Part also sets out the principles of free flow and legitimate 
restrictions. National implementation and international cooperation were also 
touched upon, but only very lightly. 
The first international instrument that outlines a full set of regulatory rules 
and enforcement mechanisms should be accredited to the European 
Communities, now the EU. Data protection legislation within the 
Communities was first proposed in 1990 and eventually adopted as Directive 
95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive, DPD) in 1995. Inspired both by the 
Council of Europe Convention and the OECD Guidelines, the DPD 
incorporates, and adapts, primarily all principles from both instruments. It 
also remains characterised by the dual objectives of protecting individuals 
with regard to their personal data, as well as facilitating the free movement of 
                                                 
16 OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
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University Press 2014) 31. 
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personal data.19 That latter objective is achieved through the creation of a ‘free 
zone’ for data transfers within the EU/EEA where conflict of laws is 
minimised. 20  Moreover, the concepts of data subject (‘an identified of 
identifiable natural person’) and data controller (who ‘determines the 
purposes and means of the processing of personal data’), for instance, are 
largely the same as defined in the OECD Guidelines.21 Beyond these inherited 
features, the DPD includes a larger number of specific definitions and rules to 
give substance to the fundamental principles. 
One of the most significant innovations of the DPD consists in the 
additional requirement of legitimate grounds for processing of personal data. 
Under this regime, the processing of personal data in question must comply 
with all of the principles, and also rely on at least one of the legal grounds 
provided by the Directive. In other words, processing of personal data is in 
principle prohibited unless it has a sufficient legal ground that is explicitly 
provided by law, which is different from some jurisdictions where processing 
of personal data is generally allowed unless otherwise restricted by law. Such 
legal grounds range from unambiguous consent obtained from the data 
subject to legitimate interests of the data controller or third parties.22 That 
means, data controllers must not just demonstrate that the data protection 
principles (which are abstract and ambiguous) are fulfilled, but also that they 
have a sufficient legal basis to carry out the processing. 
                                                 
19 See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31 (‘DPD’), Recitals 1-3, art 1. For a detailed 
analysis, see also Orla Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law (Oxford University 
Press 2015) ch3. 
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On the other hand, the DPD also puts noticeable emphasis on the specific 
rights of data subjects, such as the right to information,23 the right of access24 
and the right to object.25 Procedural and enforcement matters also take up a 
large part of the DPD, including the registry system, 26  the prior checking 
requirements,27 the powers of supervisory authorities28 and the remedies for 
data subjects.29 
The DPD had been such a success in promoting data protection as a 
fundamental right that, as secondary legislation, it has inspired the 
incorporation of this right into primary laws of the EU (i.e. the Treaties). In 
2000, as the drafting work began for an EU Charter of Fundamental Rights30, 
a German representative proposed a separate article for data protection, and 
it soon gained support from the members of the drafting body.31 Despite the 
suggestion by some members that the right to data protection be confined to 
an aspect of the right to ‘respect for private and family life’ or even be absorbed 
into the latter, a separate, stand-alone Article 8 headed ‘protection of personal 
data’ eventually made its way into the final text of the Charter.32 The article 
has three paragraphs, with emphasis respectively on: a) the official recognition 
of ‘the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her’; b) the 
key elements of legitimate use of personal data, namely ‘be processed fairly’, 
‘for specified purpose’, and safeguarded by ‘consent of the person concerned’ 
or ‘other legitimate basis’, as well as the particular stress on the right of access 
                                                 
23 ibid ch 2, s IV. 
24 ibid art 12. 
25 ibid art 14. 
26 ibid art 18. 
27 ibid art 20. 
28 ibid art 28. 
29 ibid ch III. 
30 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391 (‘Charter’). 
31 González Fuster (n 7) 195-196. 
32 ibid 196-198. 
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to, and rectification of, personal data; and c) the oversight of data protection 
by an independent authority. 
It should be noted that the Charter did not have legally binding force until 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.33 The Treaty of Lisbon 
amended two treaties that are now officially known as the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) — which gives the Charter ‘the same legal value as the Treaties’34 
— and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).35 Article 
16 of the TFEU reiterates the right to data protection in almost the same 
manner as Article 8 of the Charter, and also provides the legal basis for 
secondary legislation on data protection with no need to articulate the 
connection with the establishment of the single market. 36  Although the 
objective of free movement of personal data remains explicitly included in 
Article 16, greater importance has clearly been given to protecting personal 
data as a fundamental right at Treaty level.37 Thus, through Article 8 of the 
Charter and Article 16 of the TFEU, data protection has in effect gained a 
‘constitutional’ status in the EU legal order, meaning that the interpretation of 
EU law must be put in line with this right, and any secondary legislation or 
decision in violation of this right will be found invalid.38 
As a result of data protection now being an independent fundamental right, 
the GDPR, unlike the DPD, has shown a complete disconnection from the 
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terminology of ‘privacy’, although the regulatory model founded by the DPD 
has been generally retained. The underlying structure of a set of data 
protection principles coupled with a list of legitimate bases for data processing 
remains unchanged. A very brief overview of its principal mechanisms is 
necessary for the subsequent analysis of their applicability to the practices of 
OBA. 
4.2.2 Concepts, principles, grounds and special rules: The structure 
of EU data protection law 
The GDPR inherits the underlying framework of the DPD in many aspects and 
remains founded on four sets of building blocks: definitions of key concepts, 
general data protection principles, legal grounds for processing and special 
rules in particular contexts. These fundamental ideas are supported by, and 
materialised as, the rights of data subjects, the responsibilities of data 
controllers and the enforcement mechanisms implemented by competent 
authorities. The GDPR itself constitutes a highly sophisticated system that, 
combined with relevant sector-specific legislation (such as the ePrivacy 
Directive, as will be analysed in Section 4.4.3), deserves an examination at 
length. It is however not the task of this study to cover every aspect of the 
GDPR, nor even some of the most important provisions such as those 
concerning the public sector.39 Rather, the focus of this study will be directed 
towards only those provisions closely related to the case study — the practices 
of OBA. With this in mind, certain parts of the law would be deliberately 
omitted or merely lightly touched on. Nevertheless, it is worth a very brief 
section to go through the four pillars of the GDPR, with general comments on 
how they relate to the case of OBA. Detailed analyses of the relevant 
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provisions in the GDPR within the context of the operation of an OBA system 
will be left to the remaining sections of this chapter. 
(a) Definitions 
Article 4 of the GDPR defines a series of critical legal concepts and terms, some 
of which are of paramount significance. For example, the meaning of ‘personal 
data’ is defined as ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person (‘data subject’)’.40 This concept of personal data is perhaps the 
most important one — and thus most controversial — because data protection 
law applies in general only to personal data. If the processing in question is 
carried out on fully anonymous data, the data protection principles would not 
apply in the first place.41 The criterion of identifiability, however, is not always 
clear-cut. 42  It is often subject to intense debate over whether, say, IP 
addresses,43 behavioural44 or even emotional data45 of unnamed persons are 
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personal data. Some ad network providers have argued that the data they 
collect and handle is non-personal data, since they cannot tell the identity of 
the user from the data they process.46 Privacy advocates, on the other hand, 
often maintain that such data concerns a person that can be ‘singled out’ from 
others, and therefore should be considered personal data and subject to legal 
restrictions. 47  The GDPR makes particular attempts to mitigate the legal 
uncertainty arising from the ambiguous scope of personal data. For one thing, 
Article 4(1) itself, read together with Recitals 26 and 30, provides further 
guidance on how to determine the personal nature under a given circumstance, 
including the factors that should be taken into account and a number of 
instances of these factors. 48  For another, a few new concepts have been 
introduced to clarify some scenarios that are not clearly covered by the DPD. 
Pseudonymisation, for instance, is employed to deal with the case where ‘the 
personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the 
use of additional information [..] kept separately […]’.49 It is made clear that 
pseudonymised data remains personal data, but the adoption of 
pseudonymisation can be regarded as a security measure and hence can be 
used to demonstrate compliance. 50  Another relevant, ground-breaking 
concept is ‘profiling’, which refers to the processing of personal data intended 
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47 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural 
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49 ibid art 4(5). 
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‘to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person’. 51  Such 
aspects include, inter alia, a person’s ‘personal preferences, interests, […] 
behaviour, location [and] movements’,52 which are all highly relevant to OBA. 
These key concepts, as well as a list of others will be further examined as we 
investigate to what extent the GDPR is applicable to OBA-related activities. 
(b) Principles 
The GDPR, in its Article 5 (‘Principles relating to processing of personal data’), 
specifies seven principles to which processing of personal data should adhere: 
(1) lawfulness, fairness and transparency; (2) purpose limitation; (3) data 
minimisation; (4) accuracy; (5) storage limitation; (6) integrity and 
confidentiality; and (7) accountability.53 The essence and implications of the 
first three principles will be analysed in detail below. One point worth 
emphasising here, however, is that these principles apply universally and 
accumulatively. That means, first, regardless of the purpose of processing (for 
private or public interest), the justification of processing (consent or otherwise) 
or the nature of data (sensitive or not, or pseudonymised or not), these 
principles would generally apply to any processing of personal data so long 
as it falls within the scope of the GDPR. Therefore, a data controller would 
nevertheless have to fulfil its obligations under the principle of, for instance, 
transparency even when the personal data is collected from a third party other 
than the data subject in a way that does not require consent by the data subject. 
Second, every single operation conducted on personal data must adhere to all 
of the seven principles, although the GDPR has laid down a limited list of 
circumstances under which the principles may be restricted. 54  Any non-
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compliance with even just one of these principles would lead to the processing 
concerned being unlawful. 
(c) Legal grounds 
Although the data protection principles have been more or less reflected in 
previous international data protection initiatives (such as the Convention 108 
or the OECD Guidelines), it is the EU’s data protection law that first lays down 
the legitimising grounds on which processing of personal data can be based. 
The DPD provides an enumerative list of six such legal grounds, which are 
largely retained in the GDPR with certain changes that have greater or lesser 
significance. These grounds are: (1) the data subject’s consent; (2) performance 
of contract; (3) compliance with legal obligation; (4) vital interests of data 
subject or another natural person; (5) public interest or official authority; and 
(6) legitimate interests of data controller or third parties.55 It should be noted 
that no basis can be added or removed from this list by Member States.56 This 
set of legal grounds functions in a way different from how the general 
principles do. These legal bases are required in a selective manner, meaning 
that the data controller only needs to demonstrate the fulfilment of one of these 
requirements. Moreover, a legitimate ground for processing is not required all 
the time. So long as further processing of personal data is compatible with the 
initial purposes for which the data is collected, there is no need for that 
processing to be based on a new legal ground, provided that the initial 
processing has already been safeguarded by one of the six grounds.57 Among 
these grounds, some are obviously more relevant to OBA than others. One 
might be able to imagine how an ad network provider, for instance, could 
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claim to justify its practices on the bases of consent, performance of contract 
and legitimate interests of its own. Yet, it would be very unlikely for them to 
invoke the grounds of, say, compliance with legal obligation, vital interests of 
someone or public interests. The latter group of the three bases are more 
concerned with public policies, not commercial activities. Consequently, the 
discussion below will be only focused on whether and under what conditions 
the actors in an OBA network may justify their operations based on the former 
three grounds. 
(d) Special rules 
Based on the general framework made up by definitions, principles and legal 
bases, the specific rules giving substance to the framework constitute the main 
body of data protection law. Some of these particular provisions have great 
impact on the operation of OBA businesses. Most notably, Article 21 of the 
GDPR grants data subjects the right to object to processing for direct 
marketing purposes.58 Also, when sensitive data is involved, the processing is 
prohibited in principle and allowed only in a limited number of exceptional 
cases such as explicit consent having been obtained. Apart from the 
requirements set out by the GDPR, data controllers would also need to comply 
with sector-specific lex specialis, including, notably for OBA, the ePrivacy 
Directive. Article 5(3) of that Directive — which will be discussed in further 
detail in Section 4.4.3 — imposes specific restrictions on the use of tracking 
techniques like cookies.59 The consideration of these special rules contributes 
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to a more comprehensive understanding of how OBA is regulated under data 
protection law. 
A last remark of this section is that, the GDPR, or more generally, data 
protection law, has been developed in an organic manner that cannot be 
investigated in parts separately. For example, the way ‘consent’ has been 
defined has significant impact on what may form valid consent as a ground 
for data processing. Likewise, the reading of the data minimisation principle 
would certainly inform the assessment of whether a given case of processing 
may be allowed for being necessary for the performance of a contract. 
Therefore, while this chapter will endeavour to analyse the legal framework 
as clearly as possible, frequent references to other parts of the GDPR, or even 
other legislation, will be inevitable. 
4.3 Defining personal data through identifiability: Is online 
behavioural data personal data? 
It appears to be a straightforward question as to whether the data collected by 
OBA platforms in the tracking phase should be considered personal data. If 
the data is all about what the users have done on the Internet, how can it be 
possible that such data is not their personal data? This should not be a difficult 
problem, in particular not so under the GDPR, as we will see later. However, 
at the time of the DPD, there was indeed a legal debate between the industry 
and the regulators.60 The point of dispute lies in the concept of identifiability: 
Are Internet users identifiable when they are being tracked by an OBA system? 
The problem results partly from the insufficient clarity of the ‘personal data’ 
definition under the DPD. Its Article 2(a) conceptualises personal data as ‘any 
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information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data 
subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or 
more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural 
or social identity’.61 More clarifications have been given in Recital 26, which 
states that, ‘to determine whether a person is identifiable, account should be 
taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or 
by any other person to identify the said person’.62 
According to the logic of the DPD, for a set of data to be personal data, it 
needs to be associated with the identity or certain characteristics of a person. 
This can be done with the help of additional information that can be 
reasonably acquired by the data controller or a third person. The ‘additional 
information’ requirement turns out to hold particular significance at a time of 
big data, when large volumes of data that was thought ‘anonymised’ can in 
fact be ‘de-anonymised’ by bringing together pieces of information from 
various sources. It is well documented how this can be done with striking 
ease,63 and in this light, a much wider scope of data would fall within the 
definition of personal data as long as it has the potential to contribute to the 
‘database-in-the-sky’ that can connect all the dots about anyone.64 
Even setting aside the complexities of integrated data, the identifiable 
nature of a piece of information alone can be intractable. The identity (or the 
personal features) of an identifiable person would be of a kind either explicitly 
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designated by law (e.g. ‘identification number’) or one that is distinctive 
enough to specify the person (e.g. ‘physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity’). The distinction between these two ways of 
establishing ‘identifiability’ is noted by the Article 29 Working Party, who 
distinguish ‘directly identifiable’ from ‘indirectly identifiable’ persons. 65 
According to their analysis, a person’s name, as a most common identifier, 
would be precise enough to ascertain the identity of a person in many 
contexts. 66  A person’s identification number, by the same token, would 
generally suffice as a direct identifier. As regards indirect identifiers, if various 
categories of information about a person’s certain characteristics come 
together to form a ‘unique combination’, that person would be considered 
identifiable.67 
In the case of OBA, however, it is not entirely clear whether the data 
collected by ad network providers should always be considered personal data 
under the DPD. One who wishes to argue that such data constitutes personal 
data could have two approaches: First, to argue that the behavioural or 
demographic data contained in the datasets is specific enough to identify the 
individual; second, to argue that the dataset contains a particular form of 
‘identification number’. However, the first approach appears to have raised 
more questions than it has solved. Again, what would be precise enough to 
tell a person from others is not free from disputes.68 For a non-registered user, 
the functioning of an OBA system would probably not involve the real name, 
ID number or address of a user, but the system is very likely to have some 
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clues about the user’s neighbourhood, gender or consumption preferences.69 
Would these factors count as ‘physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity’? The law itself has not provided further answers. 
An alternative approach is to prove that the tracking techniques employed 
in OBA involve an ‘identification number’ or equivalent, so there is no need to 
further show that the person can be identified from other features. Of course, 
rarely would any ad network provider collect the national ID number of their 
users, but what about the unique ID that they assign to each user and 
store/retrieve as cookies, or other identifiers like IP addresses? If these forms 
of device fingerprinting 70  can be considered ‘identification number’ or 
something to that effect, then there would be no doubt that such data is 
personal data. The Article 29 Working Party seems to have taken this strategy. 
It is believed that ‘behavioural advertising normally involves the collection of 
IP addresses and the processing of unique identifiers (through the cookie). The 
use of such devices with a unique identifier allows the tracking of users of a 
specific computer even when dynamic IP addresses are used.’71 
For this reason, during the legislative process of the GDPR, the Working 
Party insisted that certain recitals of the proposal be redrafted to explicitly 
include the situations where the data subject can be ‘singled out’ by means of 
cookies, IP addresses or otherwise.72 As a result, in the final text of the GDPR, 
it is stated in Recital 30 that ‘[n]atural persons may be associated with online 
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identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and protocols, such as 
internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio 
frequency identification tags.’73 Accordingly, the explanation in Article 4(1) 
regarding the meaning of ‘an identifiable natural person’ has been amended 
as ‘one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference 
to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online 
identifier or to one or more factors […]’.74 The GDPR has thereby expanded the 
list of ‘direct identifiers’ from only ‘identification number’ to three more 
categories, including online identifiers. Read together with Recital 30, which 
clearly states that cookie identifiers are one form of online identifier, there 
would be little, if any, room for the argument that data collected through 
tracking cookies, or any other forms of identifiers created by individual- or 
device-specific tracking techniques, does not constitute personal data. This 
clearly marks a paradigm shift from the DPD whose concerns are almost 
entirely about the real-life identities, to the GDPR which underlines 
identifiability also in terms of online identities. As illustrated in Chapter 1, 
tracking (by cookies or similar techniques) serves as the foundation stone of 
an OBA system, and any behavioural information is worthless unless 
associated with a particular tracking id. To such an extent, it should be 
concluded that, under the GDPR, processing of online behavioural data in 
OBA systems is fully subject to data protection law. 
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4.4 Legal grounds: What legal basis for OBA use of 
personal data? 
4.4.1 Consent, contract and legitimate interests 
As we have seen above, the GDPR (like the DPD) provides six legal grounds 
on which the data controller may legitimise the processing of personal data: 
(1) consent; (2) performance of contract; (3) compliance with legal obligation; 
(4) vital interests of data subject or another natural person; (5) public interest 
or official authority; and (6) legitimate interests of data controller or third 
parties.75 Depending on the specific circumstances, any of these legal bases 
might be relevant for an instance of data processing by an OBA operator. For 
the private sector, however, three of these bases are much more relevant for 
their day-to-day business. For instance, a retailer may use their customers’ 
address details for the delivery of goods under a sales contract.76 With regard 
to OBA, it is not fully clear which one(s) could constitute a valid legal basis for 
the use of personal data. 
Zuiderveen Borgesius has carried out a thorough analysis of the 
applicability of these three bases to OBA, and concluded that the only practical 
basis is consent. 77  Although the analysis is conducted within the legal 
framework of the DPD, the conclusion about the grounds of ‘performance of 
contract’ and ‘legitimate interests’ remains sound as no material change has 
been made by the GDPR regarding these two grounds. 
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The reason why an OBA operator cannot rely on the ground of necessity 
for performance of contract is that, even in the case where the user has indeed 
entered into a contract with the service provider (which is not always the case), 
it would be almost impossible for the data controller to prove such processing 
for OBA purposes to be ‘necessary’ for the performance of the contract. 78 
Similarly, the Working Party has taken the view that the performance of 
contract is not an appropriate basis for profiling based on online behavioural 
data, whether such processing is covered by a contract or not.79 What matters, 
as the Working Party argues, is ‘the exact rationale of the contract, i.e. its 
substance and fundamental objective’.80 
By the same token, neither the ‘legitimate interests’ of the data controller 
nor third parties would be a viable option as the industry can barely pass the 
necessity threshold. 81  It is argued that, while direct marketing is indeed a 
legitimate interest,82 alternative business and technical models that are less 
intrusive, such as contextual advertising or browser-based profiling, may 
render the current OBA practices disproportionate.83 
For these reasons, the safest, if not the only, legal basis for OBA operators 
to count on is consent. This is also the view taken by the Working Party in a 
2013 Opinion.84 Another reason — perhaps the most practical one — for this 
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study to focus only on consent is that, as will be seen later in this chapter, 
consent is the only legal ground for processing of personal data collected by 
cookies. 85  In other words, it is safe to conclude that consent is the only 
legitimate basis for data processing in the tracking stage. As regards the 
profiling and targeting stages, while in theory performance of contract and 
legitimate interest may arguably be acceptable as the valid legal basis, the 
analysis above shows that they are not practical options. The legal 
requirements surrounding consent will be further discussed in subsequent 
sections, in the light of the GDPR and the ePrivacy framework. 
4.4.2 Consent in the GDPR 
Consent is the first — and sometimes considered the most important — basis 
provided by data protection law.86 The prevalence of this legal basis perhaps 
results from its nature of being most indigenous to the idea of respecting the 
data subject’s choice. This is also the most controversial one, partly as a result 
of an arguable over-reliance on this basis by data controllers in the past,87 and 
partly as a result of the uncertainty of the validity of consent in practice. 88 
Article 4(11) lays down a number of restrictions by defining consent as ‘any 
freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data 
subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative 
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action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him 
or her’. 89  Several elements can be easily identified from the text of this 
provision. 
(a) ‘freely given’ 
First of all, consent must be ‘freely given’. While the DPD does not provide the 
criteria as to what does or does not constitute ‘freely given’ consent, the GDPR 
clarifies that ‘[c]onsent should not be regarded as freely given if the data 
subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw 
consent without detriment.’90 This echoes the Working Party’s long-standing 
position that ‘if the data subject has no real choice, feels compelled to consent 
or will endure negative consequences if they do not consent, then consent will 
not be valid.’91 It is therefore clear that if the data subject’s refusal to give 
consent would put them into an adverse situation, then the consent in dispute 
could not be considered freely given. How ‘negative’ should be gauged, 
however, is not without doubts. A public authority threatening to issue a fine 
or an employer firmly demanding the disclosure of personal data are of course 
examples of consent not being obtained free from duress, because the data 
subject would be worse off than their status quo should they refuse to consent.92 
Yet, the more difficult question is, what if the consequence of not giving 
consent is simply the loss of interests or opportunities from which the data 
subject could have benefited? What if, for example, an Internet user would be 
denied service by a website unless they agree to allow the website to collect 
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their personal data in the first place? Perhaps this can be examined with regard 
to the ‘without detriment’ requirement highlighted in Recital 42. The Working 
Party takes the view that, if the withdrawal of consent would lead to ‘the 
performance of the service being downgraded to the detriment of the user’, 
then ‘consent was never validly obtained’.93 
Article 7(4) sheds further light on this problem. It reads, ‘[w]hen assessing 
whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter 
alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is 
conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary 
for the performance of that contract.’94 In other words, if the processing of 
personal data is not necessary for service provision yet the provider 
nevertheless requests it as a precondition, then the consent would be very 
likely to be found invalid, as that situation would be taken into ‘utmost 
account’. When the draft GDPR was considered by the European Parliament, 
an even tougher version was proposed, requiring that ‘[t]he execution of a 
contract or the provision of a service shall not be made conditional on the 
consent to the processing of data that is not necessary for the execution of the 
contract or the provision of the service […].’95 This was first entirely rejected 
by the Council,96 but then later reintroduced with a softer tone97 and rephrased 
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to its current form as the European Parliament insisted on the strengthened 
wording.98 The current toned-down version means that prerequisite consent 
to data processing unnecessary for the performance of contract is not always 
invalid, but the data controller would need to demonstrate a very strong 
justification for this. 99  As such, for the acquired consent to be valid, OBA 
operators must prove either that those users who refuse to consent would not 
be denied service, or that there is a compelling reason to outweigh the ‘utmost 
account’ that would otherwise lead to the conclusion that the consent is not 
‘freely given’. 
In essence, the effect of Article 7(4) is to unbundle consent to data 
processing from the underlying service contract, which leads to the practical 
question regarding the substantial difference between these two consensual 
bases. In theory, of course, consent is no different from a contract to the extent 
that it represents the mutual agreement between the data subject and data 
controller on how personal data should be processed. Indeed, the Working 
Party suggests that when determining the validity of consent, the 
requirements laid down by other areas of law, such as contract law, should be 
taken into account.100 Yet, in cases where such consent has not been obtained 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the data controller may still 
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process the data provided that this proves to be necessary for the fulfilment of 
contractual or pre-contractual arrangements. The real problem, however, is 
whether data controllers may use the contracts with their registered users — 
e.g. terms and conditions — to cover the processing of personal data for OBA 
purposes. 
Article 7(4) has clearly envisaged the possibility that consent co-exists with 
a contract while the former does not necessarily form part of the latter. Indeed, 
the Article is intended to regulate the bundling of these two measures by 
questioning the validity of such a practice. In this light, it is sometimes even 
necessary to hold them apart while they are formally intermingled, so as to 
avoid circumvention of this requirement. This is in line with the Working 
Party’s position that ‘Article 7(4) seeks to ensure that the purpose of personal 
data processing is not disguised nor bundled with the provision of a contract 
of a service for which these personal data are not necessary.’101 This is further 
illustrated with a use case of mobile app: Processing of location data for OBA 
purposes is not necessary for the functioning of a photo-editing app and thus 
access to the app cannot be made conditional on consent to the use of such 
data. 102  That means, the demarcation of the scope of a ‘contract’ involves 
substantive, not formal, assessment. If the processing concerned is found 
unnecessary for the genuine, principal purpose of a contract (e.g. provision of 
social media service), the authorisation given by the data subject regarding the 
processing in question, whether formulated as part of a written contract or not, 
would be considered consent, not a contract. This way, the validity of such 
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authorisation is subject to rules governing consent, such as Article 7(4), which 
considers such consent generally not ‘freely given’ if the service is provided 
on condition of giving consent. The Working Party takes the view that OBA is 
a different purpose separable from — and unnecessary for — the provision of 
online services.103 In other words, the practice of ‘tracking wall’ — that is, 
requiring users to consent to the use of their data for advertising purpose 
before they can access the service — will be likely to be considered 
incompatible with the GDPR, at least from the regulators’ perspective.104 
(b) ‘specific’ 
A valid instance of consent also needs to be ‘specific’. Unlike the ‘freely given’ 
element, the GDPR itself has not provided any clarification or examples on 
what amounts to specific consent. Therefore, further guidance has to be sought 
from opinions issued by regulators. In its Opinion on the definition of consent 
under the DPD, the Working Party provides its interpretation that ‘[t]o be 
specific, consent must be intelligible: it should refer clearly and precisely to the 
scope and the consequences of the data processing.’105 It is further explained 
that ‘open-ended’ consent cannot be specific, and the context in which the 
consent applies must be limited.106 Such a context should be specified notably 
on these aspects: the scope of data being processed, the purposes of the 
processing, and the activities or consequences of such processing. 107 These 
requirements are also reflected in Articles 13 and 14, which lay down the 
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categories of information that should be provided to the data subject, although 
the scope of information covered by these two Articles is wider than what 
constitutes ‘specific’ consent. For this reason, the ‘specific’ requirement is 
intrinsically connected to the ‘informed’ element as will be discussed below.108 
Apart from ensuring the context of consent is not too general, the Working 
Party has also added one more dimension to the specificity criteria in its latest 
guidelines regarding the GDPR. 109  Granularity, the Working Party argues, 
underlies not just the ‘freely given’ test but also the ‘specific’ one. In other 
words, data processing for multiple purposes may not be covered by one all-
inclusive instance of consent, but should each be justified by specific 
consent. 110  The unbundling effect here is thus slightly different from that 
stemming from the ‘freely given’ condition: While the ‘freely given’ element 
deals mainly with the conditionality imposed between the main service and 
additional data processing, the ‘specific’ element can further question the 
specificity of such additional processing. Taking OBA as an example, it is a 
matter of voluntariness whether a social media service provider may use one 
instance of consent to cover both purposes of ‘provision of service’ and ‘direct 
marketing’. Yet, it is a different matter — a matter of specificity — whether the 
service provider may use one instance of consent to cover, say, both 
‘commercial marketing’ and ‘political marketing’. The desired level of 
granularity under this new approach to the ‘specific’ requirement — which, as 
will be analysed below, also concerns the principle of purpose limitation — 
remains highly unclear at this point. Under the DPD, Korff suggests that in 
general cases a statement of ‘for direct marketing’ would be specific enough.111 
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In various documents and recommendations, the Working Party also seems to 
show approval of the wording of this purpose when they consistently use the 
expression of ‘for direct marketing purposes’.112 Despite the same (and equally 
ambiguous) wording under both the DPD and the GDPR, it is at least 
disputable — in particular considering the state-of-the-art techniques 
developed by the marketing sector in recent years — whether the mere 
reference to ‘direct marketing’ would be specific enough any longer under the 
GDPR. 
(c) ‘informed’ 
The third criterion of the validity of consent is whether it is given in an 
‘informed’ manner. The Working Party explains that, ‘[f]or consent to be 
informed, it is necessary to inform the data subject of certain elements that are 
crucial to make a choice’ and such information ‘must be clear and 
distinguishable from other matters and provided in an intelligible and easily 
accessible form.’113 As such, the ‘informed’ requirement is directly linked to 
the principles of transparency and purpose limitation, as well as the data 
controller’s obligation to provide information. A close connection and even 
overlap thus clearly exists between the ‘specific’ and ‘informed’ 
requirements. 114  Indeed, Recital 42 of the GDPR makes it clear that ‘[f]or 
consent to be informed, the data subject should be aware at least of the identity 
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of the controller and the purposes of the processing for which the personal 
data are intended’,115 which echoes the discussion of specificity above. 
Having said that, as pointed out before, the information that a data 
controller is obliged to provide has a wider scope than what the ‘specific’ 
component requires. In accordance with Articles 13 and 14 of the GDPR, the 
data controller should provide, among other things, the following details: (a) 
the information about the data controller; (b) the purposes of, and the legal 
basis for, the processing; (c) the categories of personal data concerned; (d) the 
identities or categories of the data recipients; (e) the period of storage of 
personal data; (f) the data subject’s right to withdraw consent; and (g) the 
existence of automated decision-making, the logic involved and the potential 
impacts upon the data subject.116 
As far as an OBA system is concerned, all these aspects should be covered 
by the privacy policy or consent statement when the consent is obtained. Apart 
from specifying the purposes, which has been analysed in the preceding 
section, the information about the data controllers is also indispensable. As 
shown in Chapter 1, the collection of personal data within an OBA network 
usually takes place not just in the website that the user intends to visit (the ‘ad 
publishers’) but also the servers of ad network providers and a few more 
categories of actors. Such information as to the scope of the entities who are 
involved in the data collection and subsequent dissemination (i.e. the 
advertisers, ad publishers, ad network providers and other involved parties) 
should be clearly stated to the data subject. Equally important is the scope of 
data being processed (i.e. cross-site behavioural and demographic data) as 
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well as the logic of how data is processed and what kind of potential 
consequences might result from such processing. 
(d) ‘unambiguous’ 
The last defining element of the notion of consent — ‘unambiguous’ — might 
sound like a synonym for the ‘specific’ requirement but in fact has different 
implications. The condition of unambiguity requires that the action by the data 
subject must represent a clear indication of their will. If it cannot be ascertained 
that the data subject indeed means to authorise the specific processing 
concerned, the consent cannot be considered ‘unambiguous’. For this reason, 
the GDPR itself spells out quite clearly that, by way of example, ‘[t]his could 
include ticking a box […], choosing technical settings […]’, whereas ‘[s]ilence, 
pre-ticked boxes or inactivity’ would not meet the criterion.117 According to 
this logic, one of the most popular practices on the Internet that treats users’ 
navigation through the website as giving consent may very well fail to pass 
the unambiguity test: Arguably, the mere clicking on a link on a webpage with 
a warning banner conveys an even weaker message of acceptance than by 
clicking an ‘I agree’ button along with a pre-ticked box. This also mirrors the 
consistent position of the Working Party (even before the adoption of the 
GDPR) that, with the example of an online game, the indication of intention 
by using the website and providing personal details does not constitute 
unambiguous consent for processing player data for marketing purpose.118 In 
the latest guidelines on consent, it is made even clearer that ‘merely continuing 
the ordinary use of a website is not conduct from which one can infer an 
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indication of wishes by the data subject to signify his or her agreement to a 
proposed processing operation.’119 
(e) ‘explicit’ (?) 
The wording of ‘explicit’ is not explicitly included in the definition of consent, 
but the phrase ‘explicit consent’ appears in various provisions such as consent 
for processing of sensitive data,120 and for automated decision-making.121 Prior 
to the adoption of the GDPR, the distinction between ‘unambiguous consent’ 
(for non-sensitive data) 122  and ‘explicit consent’ (for sensitive data) 123  had 
already caused a degree of confusion.124 In the original Commission proposal 
of the GDPR, it was suggested that ‘[i]n the definition of consent, the criterion 
“explicit” [be] added to avoid confusing parallelism with “unambiguous” 
consent and in order to have one single and consistent definition of consent, 
ensuring the awareness of the data subject that, and to what, he or she gives 
consent.’125 Accordingly, consent was defined in that draft as ‘any freely given 
specific, informed and explicit indication’. 126  The same approach gained 
support from the European Parliament in the first reading.127 However, this 
proposed definition suffered a significant setback when being considered by 
the Council: ‘At the COREPER meeting of 8 May 2013, many delegations 
stated that the requirement for “explicit” consent in all cases — which differ 
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[sic] from the requirements of the 1995 Data Protection Directive — was 
unrealistic.’128 The ‘explicit’ requirement was then removed from the draft129 
— on which only the Commission and seven Member States made a 
reservation 130  — and was, again, substituted with the ‘unambiguous’ 
phraseology (as in the DPD) in almost the last minute of the trilogue, to ensure 
what was called a ‘balance’.131 
Hence, the legislators have clearly made a distinction between 
‘(unambiguous) consent’ and ‘explicit consent’, and required that sensitive 
data be treated with special protection. This differentiation, however, does not 
mean that processing of non-sensitive data can be justified by what is 
sometimes referred to as ‘implied consent’ or ‘opt-out consent’ by the 
industry132  and even regulators133 . As explained above, the ‘unambiguous’ 
requirement itself has precluded the possibility of pre-ticked boxes, inactivity 
or similar approaches as valid consent. This interpretation is also suggested in 
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a latest document of the Working Party, in which the ‘explicit’ requirement is 
considered an extra safeguard (such as two-stage verification) in addition to 
the already escalated ‘unambiguous’ standard.134 The legitimacy of the so-
called ‘implied’ or ‘opt-out’ consent will be further analysed in the next section 
regarding consent for ‘cookies’, since such practices are often contended for in 
that context. 
4.4.3 Consent in the ePrivacy Directive 
(a) The development and enforcement of the so-called ‘cookie law’ 
The GDPR — or its predecessor, the DPD — is not the only data protection 
statute at EU level. In fact, certain sector-specific legislations exist, with most 
notably the ePrivacy Directive dealing with data protection matters in the 
electronic communications sector.135 Although the operation of OBA systems 
usually does not involve the provision of publicly available electronic 
communications services in public communication networks,136 one provision 
of the ePrivacy Directive holds special significance to OBA practices. 
Techniques that store or retrieve information from a networked terminal 
equipment, particularly cookies and other forms of device fingerprinting, are 
regulated by Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive. 
In the original 2000 Commission proposal of the Directive, Article 5 
(‘Confidentiality of the communications’, which remains unchanged in later 
versions) mainly tackles only ‘listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of 
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interception or surveillance’. 137  During the first reading by the European 
Parliament, a new paragraph was proposed: ‘Member States shall prohibit the 
use of electronic communications networks to store information or to gain 
access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user 
without the prior, explicit consent of the subscriber or user concerned.’138 This 
new provision was justified by an explanation that: 
‘[t]erminal equipment of users of electronic communications networks and 
any information stored on such equipment are part of the private sphere of 
the users […]. So-called cookies, spyware, web bugs, hidden identifiers and 
other similar devices that enter the users’ terminal equipment without their 
explicit knowledge or explicit consent […] may seriously intrude the 
privacy of these users.’139 
The stringent condition of ‘prior, explicit consent’, however, was knocked 
down under the consideration of the Council in the face of industrial 
opposition, 140  and was replaced with a much softer version that allowed 
cookies ‘on condition that the subscriber or user concerned receives in advance 
clear and comprehensive information […] and is offered the right to refuse 
such processing by the data controller.’141 This approach was backed by the 
Commission, who considered it a ‘right balance between the EP amendment 
and the concerns that were raised by economic operators regarding that 
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amendment.’ 142  Interestingly enough, when this common position was 
returned to the Parliament for a second reading, the wording had been even 
further toned down by the Parliament from ‘receives in advance [information]’ 
to ‘has access to’.143 The Parliament adopted a dramatic change of position: 
‘Cookies are legitimate tools which serve a range of useful purposes […] In 
addition, the means to accept and/or reject cookies already exist in most 
browser software. Consequently, the obligation for website operators to 
provide this possibility is superfluous.’ 144  With some slight changes of 
language, the ‘clear and comprehensive information’ + ‘right to refuse’ model 
— sometimes known as ‘opt-out consent’ — was eventually adopted in the 
ePrivacy Directive in 2002. 
Five years later, in 2007, the Commission proposed a legal reform on 
multiple legislations, including the ePrivacy Directive, with a view to 
improving protection to consumers and users in an information society. 145 
While Article 5(3) was part of the package, the proposed amendment was 
largely a definitional patch on the scope of that provision, 146  with the 
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regulatory model entirely unchanged.147 The idea of switching the condition 
for using cookies from ‘opt-out consent’ to ‘opt-in/prior consent’ was first 
raised by the Parliament during first reading.148 It should however be noted 
that the Parliament had also amended a Recital to recognise that ‘browser 
settings constitute prior consent’,149 which received strong objection from the 
Working Party. 150  Both the ‘prior consent’ requirement and the recital 
concerning browser settings were squarely rejected by the Commission in its 
amended proposal151 as well as by the Council in its common position.152 In the 
course of second reading, such amendments were brought up again by the 
Parliament, although with a much less forthright tenor on the point of browser 
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settings. 153  Under this version, cookies would be allowed only with ‘prior 
consent, which may be given by way of using the appropriate settings of a 
browser or another application’.154 Again, certain compromises were made 
when the final version was adopted, with the Parliament’s initial amendments 
somehow watered down. First, the explicit wording ‘prior’ that qualifies 
consent was removed. Second, a new recital was added to the reform package, 
stating: 
‘It is therefore of paramount importance that users be provided with clear 
and comprehensive information […]. The methods of providing information 
and offering the right to refuse should be as user-friendly as possible. 
Exceptions to the obligation to provide information and offer the right to 
refuse should be limited […].’155 
The repetitive phraseology of ‘information’ and ‘right to refuse’, as will be 
shown below, is interpreted by some as an indication of retaining the same 
regulatory model. Third, while the reference to browser settings remains part 
of the reform, it was moved to Recital 66 instead of staying in the main-text 
provision. It reads: ‘Where it is technically possible and effective, in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of [the DPD], the user’s consent to 
processing may be expressed by using the appropriate settings of a browser or 
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other application.’ In practice, such changes have caused confusions and 
controversies over how the revised Article 5(3) should be implemented. Some 
hope of clarification has been pinned to the ongoing reform of the ePrivacy 
framework, with a Regulation proposed to replace the Directive.156 
(b) The rise and fall of browser-based approaches 
Since the amendment of the ePrivacy Directive in 2009, it has been widely 
discussed what would count as valid consent under the new Article 5(3). The 
particular strand of debates concerning browser settings became dominant 
among the stakeholders, not too surprisingly given the explicit mentioning of 
this approach in the ‘cookie law’. However, there has been no consensus on 
how browser behaviour as well as how the action or inaction by a user should 
be interpreted. This concerns two technical solutions that rely on slightly 
different sets of actors in the industry. 
Browser default settings 
Since cookies are completely dependent on the functioning of a web 
browser, the browser itself may, technically speaking, have full control over 
which (categories of) cookies to allow and how such cookies are stored and 
accessed. Almost all modern web browsers allow users to enable or disable 
cookies, with a greater or lesser degree of customisability and varying 
configurations of default settings. The problem is, if a browser is set to have 
cookies enabled, does that amount to consent for the use of cookies? What if 
cookies are enabled by default? Does it make a difference if they are enabled 
manually? While trade groups representing the OBA industry believe that 
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Recital 66 means (default) browser settings can be seen as sufficient consent,157 
this is clearly not the position taken by regulators and researchers. 158  For 
example, the Working Party has consistently rejected the idea that default 
settings may serve as consent for cookies. 159  On national level, the UK 
Government as well as the ICO are both of the view that default browser 
settings would not fulfil the requirement of consent under the amended 
ePrivacy Directive.160 
Since browser settings play a key role in allowing or blocking the use of 
cookies and default settings have a significant ‘nudge’ effect on user decisions, 
it is suggested that the responsibility to allow users to signify meaningful 
consent for cookies should fall upon browser manufacturers.161 In fact, the UK 
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Government has pledged ‘to continue to work with browser manufacturers to 
see if browsers can be enhanced to meet the requirements of the revised 
Directive.’162  However, such efforts have failed to come to any substantial 
fruition, whether on national or EU level. This approach seems doomed to 
failure for several reasons. Politically, the EU or its Member States do not 
appear to have much leverage over mainstream browser manufacturers who 
are all based in the US163 and whose business models rely heavily on online 
tracking. 164  Technically, even if web browsers have been improved with 
sufficient sophistication, it would still be impossible to make sure all users 
have updated their browsers to the latest version, if they use those major 
browsers at all.165 Legally, it is questionable whether browser-level consent — 
even assuming this is done by changing the default settings on a voluntary, 
informed basis — can be considered ‘specific’ or ‘ambiguous’, 166  as such 
settings can essentially be considered blanket permissions to future use of 
cookies, although it would of course depend on the specific design. 
Do Not Track (‘DNT’) 
Even if such shortcomings could be overcome, endeavours on cookie 
settings would still suffer another fatal defect: Such solutions are technology-
specific, meaning that they can only control cookies, but not other forms of 
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tracking device, such as Flash Cookies or device fingerprinting. 167  In this 
regard, an alternative browser-based approach was proposed to cover all sorts 
of online tracking. In a 2010 report, the US FTC suggested that ‘[t]he most 
practical method of providing uniform choice for online behavioral 
advertising would likely involve placing a setting similar to a persistent cookie 
on a consumer’s browser and conveying that setting to sites that the browser 
visits, to signal whether or not the consumer wants to be tracked or receive 
targeted advertisements.’168 This has developed into what is now known as Do 
Not Track (‘DNT’). Unlike browser settings, switching on DNT itself does not 
block access to cookies, but simply sends out a request of non-tracking to the 
websites. It would technically be up to the websites how this request should 
be interpreted and complied with. In fact, when Microsoft decided to have 
DNT enabled by default on Internet Explorer 10 in 2012, it was immediately 
met with massive criticisms from the advertising industry, who threatened to 
ignore such DNT flags.169 As such, for DNT to constitute a meaningful choice 
that is effectively honoured, it must be enforceable either by legislation or by 
industrial self-regulation. 
However, little consensus has been achieved on how DNT should be 
translated into practical measures. On the legislative front, while a number of 
bills have been filed in the US Congress, none has been enacted.170 In the EU, 
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Article 5(3) and Recital 66 of the revised ePrivacy Directive have remained the 
only relevant provisions. On both sides of the Atlantic, much hope has been 
pinned on industry-wide standardisation of the DNT mechanism. Since 2011, 
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) — an international organisation that 
develops standards for the Web — has been working with representatives of 
various stakeholders on ‘defining mechanisms for expressing user preferences 
around Web tracking’.171 The standardisation work has been divided into two 
building blocks, Tracking Preference Expression (DNT) and Tracking 
Compliance and Scope (TCS), with the former dealing with the technical 
specifications of signal transmission172 and the latter with interpretation and 
compliance of such signals.173 At the time of writing, both standards are in the 
status of ‘Candidate Recommendation’ but not yet adopted.174 
A significant divergence exists on how the signals of ‘DNT:0’ (preference 
to allow tracking) and ‘DNT:1’ (preference of non-tracking) should be 
honoured in practice. For instance, while the Working Party has constantly 
insisted that ‘DNT:1’ means ‘Do Not Collect’, ‘Do Not Use’ and ‘Do Not Share’ 
without exceptions,175 this is clearly not the approach taken by the W3C in their 
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recommended draft.176 Also, in the case of ‘DNT:0’, the W3C suggests this 
should amount to ‘no restrictions on collection or use of data’ unless 
overridden by the website’s own statement or consent obtained otherwise.177 
Yet, the Working Party has repeatedly emphasised that ‘[a] DNT:0 signal must 
not be interpreted by a data controller as consent for anything other than 
clearly defined tracking activities’ and that in the absence of  a clear DNT value, 
it should be assumed that ‘a user is not aware of tracking’.178 In short, the 
Working Party’s position on DNT can be summarised as ‘no means no, silence 
means no, and yes does not necessarily mean yes’. Therefore, a meaningful 
consensus on what DNT signals represent — one that would be both 
considered compliant by European regulators and accepted by various 
stakeholders — does not seem to have a bright future. 
(c) ‘By continuing to use this site’ … can one disagree? 
Given the technical deficiency as well as the legal uncertainty of these solely-
browser-settings-based solutions, it would be reasonable to expect website 
operators to continue to ask users for consent in traditional manners: banners, 
dialogues and walls. In any event, as mentioned above, browser settings and 
signals can be overruled by consent that is obtained in more specific ways.179 
In a Working Document, the Working Party provides certain guidelines on 
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obtaining consent for cookies.180 Of course, the ‘best practice’ that is most likely 
compliant with the ePrivacy Directive would be ‘a clear, comprehensive and 
visible notice’ supported with sufficient information, 181 with no cookies set 
‘before that user has signalled their wishes’182 ‘by clicking on a button or link 
or by ticking a box’,183 choosing ‘between the option to accept some or all 
cookies or to decline all or some cookies’, with ‘the possibility to continue 
browsing the website without receiving cookies’.184 However, it is obvious that 
not all websites will be willing to adhere to such a highest standard, and a 
common approach is to display a banner with a link to more information on 
cookies, and a statement that ‘by continuing to use this site, you agree to our 
use of cookies.’ Such a practice raises two concerns about compatibility with 
the ePrivacy Directive: whether continued use of a service can be considered 
a valid form of consent, and whether the provision of service can be made 
conditional on such consent. 
The controversy of ‘implied consent’ 
The disputes over how Article 5(3) should be enforced in the context of 
online tracking result largely from the diverse understanding of what counts 
as consent under the ePrivacy Directive. In the UK, for example, this has 
caused public debates on whether the idea of ‘implied consent’ may be 
acceptable. In May 2011, the ICO published a notice on the implications of the 
revised Article 5(3), which stated that, to obtain meaningful consent, the data 
controller would ‘need to provide information about cookies and obtain consent 
before a cookie is set for the first time’, which requires ‘a positive indication […] 
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most commonly obtained by asking the user to tick a box’ and that ‘[a]ny 
attempt to gain consent that relies on users’ ignorance about what they are 
agreeing to is unlikely to be compliant.’185 However, this interpretation was 
not welcome by the UK Government, who issued an open letter later in the 
same month, explaining its position that the definition of consent ‘is not time 
bound — i.e. there is no constraint on when consent may be given’, and that 
‘Article 5 of the revised e-Privacy Directive does not specify that the consent 
must be “prior consent”.’186 This led to a softened tone in the ICO’s updated 
guidance in December 2011.187 In that version, while the ICO acknowledged 
that it was hard to see how consent could be obtained after the cookies were 
set, it also recognised the difficulties for some websites to obtain prior 
consent.188 Moreover, the concept of ‘implied consent’ was discussed in that 
guidance for the first time. It was suggested that ‘[a]t present evidence 
demonstrates that general awareness of the functions and uses of cookies is 
simply not high enough for websites to look to rely entirely in the first instance 
on implied consent.’189 However, ‘[a]s consumer awareness increases over the 
next few years it may well be easier for organisations to rely on that shared 
understanding to a greater degree.’190 In less than a year, the ICO seemed to 
have entirely changed to embrace the idea of ‘implied consent’ in a more 
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straightforward manner. Its renewed guidance in May 2012 considered 
implied consent ‘always […] a reasonable proposition’ and ‘certainly a valid 
form of consent’ that serves as ‘an option that was perhaps more practical than 
the explicit opt-in model.’191 To explain what would suffice as implied consent, 
the guidance goes on: ‘This might for example be visiting a website, moving 
from one page to another or clicking on a particular button.’192 This remains 
the ICO’s position to date, reiterated in another guidance issued in 2016.193 
The UK’s position on consent drew support from 13 Member States, who 
argued that the change of wording in Article 5(3) was not intended to alter the 
existing requirement. 194 Instead, they believed that, based on Recital 66 — 
‘providing information and offering the right to refuse’195 — the regime should 
remain an ‘opt-out’ one. However, this approach has received constant 
criticisms. As early as in 2011, the Working Party had stated that implied 
consent was incompatible with the definition of consent under the DPD.196 The 
change of language in Article 5(3) clarifies that the so-called ‘opt-out’ consent 
is no longer a legitimate basis for the use of cookies. 197  This is also the 
interpretation endorsed by the Working Party in a 2013 Working Document, 
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where they maintain that ‘consent should be sought before cookies are set or 
read’ and ‘through a positive action or other active behaviour’.198 While the 
Working Party has clarified its position against the practice of implied consent 
in the form of ‘by continuing to use this site’-style notice in the latest guidelines 
regarding the GDPR, 199  the lack of enforcement or legal actions on this 
matter200 means that the effectiveness of this interpretation would depend on 
the final adopted text of the ePrivacy Regulation, as well as the enforcement 
thereof. 
The tracking walls 
Another issue concerning the way consent is obtained for cookies has to do 
with the ‘freely given’ element as discussed above. It is subject to constant 
debate whether online service providers can or should be allowed to ask users 
for consent for tracking as a condition for access to their services. Practices of 
denying service to those who refuse to consent are known as ‘tracking walls’ 
or ‘cookie walls’.201 Recital 25 of the ePrivacy Directive provides that ‘[a]ccess 
to specific website content may still be made conditional on the well-informed 
acceptance of a cookie or similar device, if it is used for a legitimate purpose.’202 
This, at first glance, seems to suggest that tracking walls are not prohibited. 
However, the Working Party has taken a more nuanced reading of this recital, 
explaining that ‘[t]he emphasis on “specific website content” clarifies that 
websites should not make conditional “general access” to the site on acceptance 
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of all cookies but can only limit certain content if the user does not consent to 
cookies’.203 In other words, a user’s refusal to consent on tracking cookies for, 
say, advertising purpose may only prevent the user from using advertising-
related functions of the website, not all of it. Such an interpretation would 
sound more reasonable with in mind Article 7(4) of the GDPR, under which 
consent for data processing not necessary for the service provision would be 
presumed not ‘freely given’ if the service is made conditional on such consent. 
To minimise legal uncertainty and fragmented interpretation, however, 
further clarification on this point would still be needed. 
(d) The proposed ePrivacy Regulation 
As soon as the GDPR was adopted in 2016, discussions on updating the 
ePrivacy Directive so as to put it in line with the new standards set out by the 
GDPR had begun. In early 2017, the Commission proposed a draft ePrivacy 
Regulation, intended to replace the ePrivacy Directive. 204  At the time of 
writing, an amended proposal has been drafted by a Committee of the 
Parliament and is pending for approval in first reading. The Council is also 
working in parallel on its own amended version. Article 8(1) of the 
Commission’s proposal can be seen as an updated continuation of Article 5(3) 
of the ePrivacy Directive. While the regulatory regime under the proposed 
provision remains by and large similar to the old one, two significant changes 
should be noted. First, the definition of consent is to be completely aligned 
with the GDPR; second, as suggested by the Working Party,205 first-party web 
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audience measuring is to be introduced as a new ground for the use of 
cookies. 206  However, the practice of using ‘by continuing to use this site’ 
banners remains unaddressed. The Parliament version, along with certain 
minor amendments to the proposal, attempts to introduce two more 
exemptions — necessity to ensure security of the device, and necessity for 
executing an employee’s tasks — which have little to do with tracking for OBA 
purposes. Much more relevant is a newly proposed article, which reads: ‘No 
user shall be denied access to any information society service or functionality 
[…] on grounds that he or she has not given his or her consent under Article 
8(1)(b) to the processing […] that is not necessary for the provision of that 
service or functionality.’ 207  This provision, if eventually adopted by the 
legislators as it is, would be a final blow to the current practices of tracking 
walls. Having said that, as clearly demonstrated in the course of legislating the 
GDPR, it is not uncommon for the Parliament to make certain last-minute 
compromises and accept some weakened measures. However, given the 
failure of the browser-based approaches to consent, as well as the new risks of 
the ubiquitous tracking practices flagged up throughout this study, the stakes 
involved in such compromises this time would be greater than ever before. 
4.5 Data protection principles: An abstract ‘safety net’ 
Identifying the appropriate legal basis for processing marks only the first 
hurdle in establishing the lawfulness of data processing. Even more 
complicated is to prove that the processing in line with a set of data protection 
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principles, which are abstract, sophisticated, inter-related and organic — and 
they are all of paramount importance in a data protection regime. Among the 
seven principles expressly enumerated in the GDPR,208 each and every one is 
relevant to our study on OBA, or big data in more general terms. However, 
these principles can each be a topic for an independent study, and it is not the 
task to conduct a comprehensive analysis here. Instead, it would make more 
sense to focus on the three particularly relevant ones: lawfulness, fairness and 
transparency; data minimisation; and purpose limitation. Most of these 
principles are more or less already in place in the DPD, but certain subtle 
changes may make a significant difference. 
4.5.1 Lawfulness, fairness and transparency 
It has been long established as a principle in the DPD that personal data must 
be processed fairly and lawfully. Now a third element of transparency is 
added to this principle. There is little doubt that lawfulness, fairness and 
transparency are all the most fundamental principles in data protection law. 
However, as with many of the legal principles, these three terms are arguably 
of more declarative than practical importance. Their overarching status gives 
them an almost all-encompassing, yet highly ambiguous scope. Having said 
that, from a practical point of view, in particular with the case study of OBA, 
certain specific implications of these principles can be seen more clearly, 
particularly based on the discussion above on the legal bases provided by 
Article 6. 
To begin with, the lawfulness requirement can be largely met by ensuring 
an appropriate legal ground for the processing. Recital 40 of the GDPR makes 
it quite clear that ‘[i]n order for processing to be lawful, personal data should 
be processed on the basis of the consent of the data subject concerned or some 
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other legitimate basis’. 209  As concluded in the previous section, the only 
appropriate (and practical) legal ground for data processing in an OBA context 
would be consent. When it comes to sensitive data, this needs to be explicit 
consent. It is also arguable that having a lawful basis for the processing in 
question is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for the lawfulness 
principle. For example, this principle may also suggest that data processing 
must observe the rules of other areas of law, such as contract law or consumer 
protection law. 
In this regard, the principle of fairness is perhaps a better place to discuss 
the influence from other branches of EU law on data protection, as the concept 
of ‘(un)fairness’ has a longer history in, inter alia, contract law or consumer 
protection law. The Unfair Contract Terms Directive defines an unfair contract 
term as one that ‘has not been individually negotiated [… and …] causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the 
contract, to the detriment of the consumer.’210 Translating this idea to data 
protection law would mean that data controllers must not exploit their 
advantageous position and in effect impose a requirement on the data subject. 
This would in theory involve an assessment of whether there exists an 
imbalance of power between the data controller and the data subject.211 This 
concerns the discussion about the ‘freely given’ element of consent, and in 
particular in the context of OBA, the conditionality test set out in Article 7(4). 
In other words, the practice of bundling up consent for unnecessary data 
processing with access to service is assumed exploitative by the GDPR, and 
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therefore, presumably, cannot be compatible with the fairness principle. 
Another interpretation of fairness may have more to do with fair treatment to 
individuals. The Working Party is of the view that use of data ‘may be unfair 
and create discrimination, for example by denying people access to 
employment opportunities, credit or insurance, or targeting them with 
excessively risky or costly financial products.’ 212  According to this 
understanding, data use for OBA purposes should not create any 
discriminatory effects. 
The third principle, transparency, is in close connection with the ‘specific’ 
and ‘informed’ requirements of consent when it comes to OBA, since, again, 
consent serves as the only practical lawful basis. Of course, as a general 
principle, transparent information is required regardless of the legal ground 
chosen and throughout the entire lifecycle of data processing. That means, 
OBA operators are obliged to provide information not merely at the point of 
obtaining consent, but throughout the entire lifecycle of data processing. 
Circumstances under which additional information may be required to fulfil 
the transparency requirement include, inter alia, the receipt of and decision on 
data subject requests,213 further processing of personal data,214 rectification or 
erasure of personal data,215 and personal data breaches.216 
4.5.2 Purpose limitation: Primary and secondary uses 
The principle of purpose limitation in the GDPR replicates nearly word-by-
word its equivalent in the DPD. This principle requires personal data to be 
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‘collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purpose and not further 
processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes’. 217  This 
principle holds particular significance to the case of OBA, as it is constantly 
questioned what amounts to compatible secondary use when personal data is 
used for marketing purposes. Here, two separate issues could be concerned: a) 
Can OBA constitute a compatible secondary use if the personal data in 
question was originally collected for a different purpose of, say, provision of 
online services? b) If personal data is processed for the (parallel) primary 
purpose of OBA, what types of further use will be allowed as compatible 
further processing? Before these two questions can be answered, it is necessary 
to have an overview of the key elements of this principle. 
In examining the essence of the principle, the Working Party breaks 
purpose limitation into two components: purpose specification and 
compatible use.218 The first building block, purpose specification, stipulates 
that personal data must be ‘collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes’.219 These three elements have been more or less translated into the 
legal bases for lawful processing. For consent to be valid, it must be specific and 
explicit in terms of the content of the consent, including the purposes for which 
the processing is consented. The legitimacy condition, albeit not expressly 
included as part of the definition or perquisites for valid consent, can be 
inferred from the nature of consent. The Working Party takes the view that the 
legitimacy element in the purpose specification principle ‘also requires that 
the purposes must be in accordance with all provisions of applicable data 
protection law, as well as other applicable laws such as employment law, 
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contract law, consumer protection law, and so on.’220 As we have analysed 
previously, consent is by definition a mutual agreement, and therefore its 
validity is also subject to other sectors of law that might lay down further 
restrictions on contractual arrangements. This way, the examination of 
legitimacy as required by purpose specification forms an intrinsic part of 
identifying valid consent. Considering that consent is very likely the only legal 
basis for the OBA industry to rely on, the fulfilment of the conditions set down 
by provisions regarding consent may, generally speaking, suffice to satisfy the 
requirement of purpose specification. 
The more problematic part of purpose limitation lies in its second building 
block — compatible use. This component requires that personal data not be 
further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes as 
specified at the time of primary use. The implications of this are two-fold. On 
the one hand, further use of personal data for incompatible purposes is 
prohibited; on the other, compatible use of such data should be allowed with 
no need for any legitimising basis. At the time of the DPD, the Working Party is 
of the view that, since ‘compatibility’ and ‘lawful ground’ are two 
independent, accumulative requirements, further processing even for 
compatible purposes must also be based on one of the six lawful grounds.221 
While the Working Party seems to retain the same interpretation in its latest 
Guidelines,222 this is clearly not the interpretation taken by the GDPR. Recital 
50 clarifies that ‘[i]n such a case [where compatible use is established], no legal 
basis separate from that which allowed the collection of the personal data is 
                                                 
220 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation’ (n 84) 
20. 
221 ibid 11. 
222 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on consent under Regulation 
2016/679’ (n 76) 12. 
Legal Regulation Confronted with Big Data 196 
required.’223 It would make more sense to follow the GDPR’s own approach, 
because were a further legal basis required for further processing, it would be 
pointless to distinguish ‘initial processing’ and ‘further processing’ — all 
‘further processing’ justified by its own lawful basis would be de facto turned 
into ‘initial processing’. This change — or rather, clarification — will have 
profound implications, at least in theory, in that it has essentially transformed 
the nature of purpose limitation from a purely prohibitive principle 
(incompatible use is prohibited) to a partly permissive one (compatible use is 
permitted with no need for an additional legal basis). That said, the impact in 
practice might be neutralised by the fact that the compatibility test is quite 
high a threshold itself. 
When assessing whether the intended further processing is compatible 
with the original purpose, Article 6(4) provides a list of factors that should be 
taken into account: the link between the original and new purposes; the 
context of data collection, in particular the relationship between data subjects 
and the data controller; the nature of personal data; the possible consequences 
for data subjects; and appropriate safeguards.224 These criteria are helpful for 
the two questions regarding OBA raised in the beginning of this section: (a) Is 
OBA a compatible secondary purpose? (b) If OBA is the primary purpose, 
what are the secondary purposes compatible with it? 
For the first question, the Working Party has constantly reiterated that 
online marketing cannot stand as a compatible purpose if the initial purpose 
is, for instance, the provision of online services. By way of example, the 
Working Party illustrates in a 2013 Opinion that for a photo-sharing social 
media service, advertising is not a compatible purpose with the original one 
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(allowing users to share photos) for a number of reasons: The two purposes 
are ‘clearly unrelated’; the nature of the data can be sensitive; it may cause self-
censorship; and there is an imbalance of power between the website and its 
users.225 This is further confirmed in the latest Guidelines with regard to the 
GDPR, with another example of incompatibility between the purpose of 
suggesting new movies by a cable TV network and that of showing targeted 
advertising.226 It is therefore the view of the Working Party that OBA would 
not count as a compatible purpose. Accordingly, repurposing existing data 
sets for OBA would need to be justified by one of the lawful bases, presumably 
consent. 
Much more complicated is the second issue, namely the scope of 
compatible uses when personal data is collected for marketing purposes. 
Indeed, most online services today have explicitly listed personalised content, 
including advertisements, as one of their purposes of data collection. Google, 
for example, states that user data is used to ‘offer you tailored content — like 
giving you more relevant search results and ads’.227 Of course, as explained 
above, the mere reference to ‘relevant ads’ alone would not suffice to justify 
all three complex stages of OBA: tracking, profiling and targeting. More details 
are required about how data is actually handled during each of these phases. 
Assuming all information regarding the originally envisaged purposes and 
processing operations has been sufficiently covered, the next question would 
be how newly developed OBA techniques may rely on the original legal basis. 
In the tracking stage, for instance, the ad network provider might decide to 
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expand the tracking device from first-party to also third-party cookies, or from 
cookie-based techniques to non-cookie-based device fingerprinting, or from 
certain categories of data to more categories. These practices would lead to a 
higher level of accuracy for the tracking device, which on the one hand can be 
regarded improvements that would better serve the OBA purpose, but on the 
other also represents an escalating level of intrusiveness. Depending on the 
nature of data and the potential impact on the data subject, such enhanced 
techniques might well be found incompatible with the initial ones. 
A similar issue arises from certain practices in the profiling stage as well. 
For instance, an OBA operator may decide to merge user profiles across 
services to build up a fuller profile, which was, as mentioned in Chapter 1, 
precisely what Google did in 2012 with its updated privacy policy and what 
Facebook did in 2016 with its plan to aggregate data from WhatsApp. The 
Working Party already made it clear in 2000 that ‘[i]f ad network providers 
want to use information gathered for behavioural advertisement for secondary, 
incompatible purposes, for example across services, they need additional legal 
grounds to do so’.228 Yet, in subsequent enforcement actions against Google 
and Facebook, neither the Working Party nor national authorities have 
explicitly pointed out that such aggregation of data across services violates the 
principle of purpose limitation.229 Nevertheless, it should remain clear that for 
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the purpose of OBA, combining user profiles from multiple sources can hardly 
be held compatible with such original purposes. 
In the stage of targeting, the issue of compatibility is particularly 
complicated in view of real-time bidding. It remains highly uncertain whether 
it would be allowed as a compatible further use of data if an OBA operator 
switches from a non-RTB-based solution to an RTB-based one. It is however 
argued here that adopting an RTB-based solution cannot be considered a 
compatible use if this is not initially envisaged, for the following reasons: a) 
real-time bidding in itself is designed to maximise the profit from a successful 
match, although it does improves the relevance of the ads as well; b) the lack 
of direct connections between the user and potential advertisers or bidding 
agents would not give the user any reasonable expectation that their personal 
data is shared with these third parties; and c) the benefits of adopting certain 
safeguards are largely reversed by such new techniques. For example, the 
existence of cookie matching largely cancels out the positive effects of 
pseudonymisation. While it is true that the user IDs communicated between 
the ad network provider and the bidders are always encrypted pseudonyms, 
the practice of cookie matching may potentially enable the bidder to identify 
the user in their own databases and trace the user’s online footprints across 
the Internet. As such, to ensure the targeting phase does not contravene the 
purpose limitation principle, OBA operators would need to either obtain valid 
consent for activities related to real-time bidding (so as to turn it into a primary 
use), or resort to an alternative technical model that shows a higher degree of 
compatibility. 
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Apart from upgrading the tracking, profiling and targeting techniques, 
further processing can also take the form of analysing OBA data for new 
purposes. For example, OBA data collected initially for commercial targeting 
can be easily put into use for political targeting. Also, such data can be used to 
personalise or prioritise news feed or social media content. The risks of such 
instances of further use of OBA data have been underlined in Chapter 3 and 
should not be underestimated. It would be hard for the data controller to argue 
that such secondary purposes are compatible with that of OBA. When it comes 
to marketing, the Working Party takes a particularly strict test of compatibility. 
In an example concerning mobile apps designed to help users find nearby 
restaurants offering discounts (primary purpose), the use of location data for 
advertising pizza delivery (secondary purpose) is considered incompatible.230 
It is therefore hard to see how this type of repurposing of OBA data could be 
considered compatible with the purpose limitation principle. 
4.5.3 Data minimisation: What is ‘necessary’? 
Another principle that deserves a closer examination is data minimisation. In 
fact, this principle has a scope broader than its name implies. Three particular 
criteria are set forth in Article 5(c): ‘adequate, relevant and limited to what is 
necessary’. The spirit of this principle shares a lot in common with that of the 
purpose limitation principle in that all the three tests mentioned above should 
be applied with particular reference to the purposes of the processing. Neither 
the DPD nor the GDPR further defines what ‘adequate’ or ‘relevant’ means, 
but it is conceivable that in the cases where the personal data cannot serve the 
purposes for which the processing is intended, such criteria are not fulfilled. 
The third standard, namely ‘limited to what is necessary’, seems to fit the name 
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of the principle ‘data minimisation’ most and attracts most critical attention. 
In practice, OBA operators need to answer the question as to whether the data 
processing they carry out is indeed necessary for the purposes they claim. 
The exact wording in the GDPR (‘limited to what is necessary’) is obviously 
stronger than that in the DPD (‘not excessive’). This seems to be a compromise 
between an even stricter version in the Commission’s proposal (‘limited to the 
minimum necessary’) and the Council’s preliminary amendment (changing 
back to ‘not excessive’). As explained in the statement of the Council’s reasons 
for the final version, ‘the principle of “data minimisation” has been adjusted 
to take into account the digital reality and with a view to establishing a balance 
between protection of personal data, on the one hand, and possibilities for 
controllers to process data, on the other hand.’231 None of these documents has 
further clarified the practical implications of such a change, but it is clear that 
the legislators wish to see a standard of data protection higher than what it is 
now yet not too high for reasonable uses of personal data. 
Despite the lack of substantial specifics in the text of legislation, much can 
be drawn from the previous discussion of related principles and legal grounds. 
The strongest connection can be identified with purpose limitation, as the 
assessment of whether certain processing exceeds what is necessary depends 
greatly on what the purpose of processing is supposed to be. Without a well-
defined scope of the purpose, there would be no benchmark to determine 
necessity or the lack of it. To such an extent, purpose limitation underpins data 
minimisation. If the primary purposes are sufficiently specified, explicit and 
legitimate, and the secondary purposes are compatible with the primary ones, 
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then the next step would be to examine if the intended processing is actually 
necessary for those specific purposes. 
The necessity test, as the CJEU interprets in Schecke in a data protection 
context, requires the processing in question to be ‘strictly necessary’, ensuring 
the measures adopted are consistent with the objective of the processing while 
at the same time cause less interference to the data subject.232 Now that direct 
marketing is confirmed as a legitimate interest,233 are tracking, profiling and 
targeting for OBA necessary for direct marketing? If OBA is indeed a necessary 
manner, are the techniques employed and the data collected by an ad network 
provider as shown in Chapter 1 necessary for OBA? With a sceptical tone, it 
can even be argued that OBA itself is not necessary at all, because direct 
marketing can be done through less intrusive ways, such as contextual 
advertising, although that would cost the efficiency of targeting.234 Neither is 
the ‘financial necessity’ a convincing argument here, as proved in Chapter 2. 
The popular practices among the OBA industry make it even harder to pass 
the necessity test. The techniques employed in the targeting phase, for 
example, are not merely intended to predict what might interest a particular 
user, they also enable the ad network provider to identify the advertisers who 
could afford more on reaching that user. There is no denying that in the offline 
world, it is commonplace for a middleman to work out a potential match from 
the supply and demand sides, such as a letting agent. In the setting of OBA, 
however, the data subject has no interest in, or expectation of, being picked by 
the one who wants to talk the most. At the end of day, unlike a real-life bidding, 
the money coming from the real-time bidding does not go to the seller, i.e. the 
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Internet user, at least not in monetary form, but wholly to the auctioneer. 
Again, while Internet users indeed benefit from such ‘free services’, it can be 
argued that the degree of benefits is severely disproportionate to the potential 
risks, as well as the interests gained by the industry. As such, a strong case can 
be made against the current practices of the industry in the light of the data 
minimisation principle under the GDPR, unless the purpose is clearly defined 
to reflect the nature of real-time bidding and measures to achieve such a 
purpose is made transparent to the users. 
4.6 The (new?) role of ‘profiling’ in the GDPR 
4.6.1 The concept of profiling 
Besides the principles and legal bases that OBA operators need to comply with, 
there is also a provision in the GDPR that holds particular relevance. ‘Profiling’ 
as a legal concept has been introduced into the GDPR for the first time in the 
history of EU data protection law. Article 4(4) gives the definition of profiling 
as ‘any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of 
personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, 
in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s 
performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, 
interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements’.235 A few key points 
can be quickly identified from the text of this provision.236 First, profiling has 
to be ‘automated processing’, which means, practices involving personal 
profiles established only manually would not be considered as profiling. 
Second, the purpose of such processing has to be ‘to evaluate certain personal 
aspects’. It follows that building up records of merely factual personal data 
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without the intention to evaluate the data subjects is not ‘profiling’ under such 
a definition. Third, and perhaps most importantly, profiling is carried out over 
personal data, and therefore, the use of fully anonymous data for the purpose 
of evaluating an entirely unidentifiable natural person is not profiling as such. 
This thus leads to a somewhat interesting conclusion that, the express 
inclusion of profiling as a legal concept in the GDPR has not expanded the 
scope of data protection law; it has simply made it clearer. This distinction has 
not just theoretic merits, but also matters in practice, in particular to OBA-
related activities. 
It is almost indisputable that the construction of user profiles by an ad 
network provider is conducted by automatic means and intended for 
evaluating the users’ personal aspects, namely ‘personal preferences’ or 
‘interests’. When it comes to the third point — whether the data concerned is 
personal data — however, the provider might make an argument, not least in 
the cases where the user’s profile is not associated with their registered 
account, that the profiling does not involve any ‘processing of personal data’. 
Of course, according to the analysis in Section 4.3, such data should generally 
be considered personal data because it is linked to unique cookie IDs. Here, 
what needs to be emphasised is that the new concept of ‘profiling’ does not 
change the boundaries of ‘processing’ or ‘personal data’. Instead, it identifies 
a new subset of processing, removing a degree of uncertainty from the notion. 
In other words, it becomes clearer under the GDPR that the practices of OBA 
profiling are regulated by data protection law, but that change has more to do 
with the better-defined scope of personal data than with the introduction of 
the ‘profiling’ notion itself. In fact, the GDPR does not create any obligations 
or rights that are solely connected to profiling practices. The term appears in 
the text mostly in the phrase ‘including profiling’ as a means of emphasis, 
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clarification or exemplification 237  — although profiling is nevertheless one 
form of processing of personal data, and is therefore regulated by data 
protection law.238 
4.6.2 Profiling and automated decision-making 
Maybe the greater significance of defining ‘profiling’ lies in its relationship 
with the old concept of ‘automated decision-making’ retained from the DPD. 
Under Article 22 (‘Automated individual decision-making, including 
profiling’), data subjects have the ‘right not to be subject to a decision based 
solely on automated processing’. The concepts of ‘profiling’ and ‘automated 
individual decision-making’ are overlapping but do not necessarily take place 
simultaneously.239 When profiling is employed in the context of automated 
individual decision-making, Article 22 applies; otherwise, the general rules of 
the GDPR apply.240 It should be noted that although Article 22 is phrased as 
‘the right not to be subject to a decision […]’, the Working Party consider this 
provision as a general prohibition rather than a right to be invoked.241 Recital 
71 is cited to supported this interpretation, which reads ‘decision-making 
based on such processing, including profiling, should be allowed where [one 
of the exceptions applies]’. Three such exceptions are provided by Article 22(2). 
The first exception is substantially identical to one of the general grounds for 
data processing, ‘performance of contract’. The conclusion above thus holds 
true here: It is very unlikely for an OBA marketer to rely on this basis 
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considering the lack of compatibility between the main purpose of the contract 
and the advertising purpose. The second exception allows EU or national law 
to form a basis on which such decisions can be made solely by automated 
means, provided that suitable safeguards are in place. However, there is no 
sign that the lawmakers — at least at EU level — will give the special green 
light to the OBA sector, and thus, this should not be the hope of the industry. 
The least unpractical choice thus seems to be consent. It should be noted that, 
in this Article, what is required is explicit consent. In other words, there is no 
room for the argument of ‘implied consent’ — an affirmative act by the user 
such as hitting a button or manually ticking a box will be required. 
One particular point that might give rise to uncertainty in this respect is 
the potential argument that the current OBA profiling practices should not 
count as ‘decisions’ as they are not material enough to have significant impact 
on the user. Article 22 regulates only automated processing (including 
profiling) that ‘produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly 
significantly affects him or her.’ This qualifier serves to exclude those profiling 
practices whose consequences are too trivial to affect the data subject.242 The 
question then is whether the impact imposed by OBA on Internet users is 
comparable to ‘legal effects’? If the business model involves price 
discrimination or denial of service provision, this would obviously have an 
impact equivalent to ‘legal effects’. However, as examined in Chapter 3, most 
of the negative effects of OBA are intangible, chronic and sometimes collective, 
having very few immediate implications for individual Internet users. It is 
therefore at least arguable that Article 22 does not apply to general cases of 
OBA. The Working Party is of the view that ‘[i]n many typical cases the 
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decision to present targeted advertising based on profiling will not have a 
similarly significant effect on individuals’. 243  However, the possibility of 
‘significant effect’ is not completely excluded by the Working Party, who 
argues that, depending on the ‘particular characteristics’ of the actual practices, 
an impact as significant as legal effects might nevertheless exist.244 While an 
example of the effects of gambling ads on individuals in financial difficulties 
is given in the guidelines, the Working Party has not taken a further step to 
also address the long-term risks as highlighted in Chapter 3. Recital 71 
instructs data controllers to ‘prevent[], inter alia, discriminatory effects on 
natural persons on the basis of [sensitive categories]’. It is true that in general, 
OBA operators would refrain from collecting sensitive data, but certain types 
of profiling may lead to implicit discriminatory effects based on users’ 
sensitive (or non-sensitive) status. If read in such a broader sense, it would be 
reasonable to believe that OBA practices fall under the scope of Article 22, 
although this remains open to discussion. 
It should also be reiterated that, as underlined by the Working Party, even 
when profiling does not constitute ‘decision-making’, it is nonetheless subject 
to the general provisions of the GDPR.245 One practical implication of this is 
that the data subject always reserves the right to object to such profiling for 
purposes of direct marketing,246 whether significant impacts are involved, and 
whichever legal basis the profiling relies upon. Once the data subject exercises 
this right, the data controller should unconditionally cease any further 
processing for this purpose, and erase the data at the request of the data 
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subject.247 This provision should not be interpreted as replacing the explicit 
consent requirement with a softer ‘opt-in’ or ‘allowed-unless-objected-to’ 
regime in a direct marketing context. It simply means that even if the profiling 
practices in question could be seen not as ‘automated individual decision-
making’ (which is questionable) and could rely on the legal ground of 
‘legitimate interest’ instead of ‘consent’ (which is also questionable), data 
subjects would still retain their right to object to such processing. 
4.7 Summary: Consent and necessity — Still the best 
partners?  
4.7.1 The GDPR: A complex system featuring consent and necessity 
It has been two decades since the adoption of the DPD in 1995, during which 
time the reality of information technologies have advanced so dramatically 
that our understanding of the essence of data protection issues has been 
constantly challenged. In the meantime, people’s attitudes towards 
technology, society and law have also experienced remarkable changes. With 
the inputs from regulatory authorities, judiciary, academia and advocacy 
groups, data protection law in Europe has developed to its current complexity. 
The GDPR is expected to incorporate and translate such developments into the 
framework legislation. As we have seen, the underpinning principles and 
mechanisms established by the DPD have remained largely intact in the GDPR, 
with some of them strengthened. In the course of the analysis of how the 
GDPR’s definitions, principles, legal grounds and special rules will apply to 
and affect the OBA sector, the interactions between all these elements have 
contributed to a sophisticated picture of the legal efforts to protect personal 
data. Still, two discernible characteristics emerge out of the convoluted regime. 
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First, the role of consent has been significantly reinforced. This should not 
come as much a surprise, since consent has constantly been at the heart of data 
protection controversies. Businesses, individuals and regulators all have 
different perceptions of what counts as valid consent. Such inconsistencies 
exist even between regulators from one Member State to another. The 
divergent propositions regarding whether ‘implied consent’ can be compliant 
at all may serve as a good example of the problems. As such, the GDPR 
clarifies what constitutes ‘unambiguous’ consent, making it almost impossible 
to argue that consent can be given in a passive manner. Also, the conditions 
under which consent can be accepted as valid are also set down in greater 
detail. Such provisions make it mandatory for the data controller to 
demonstrate compliance, to separate consent from other contractual matters 
and to provide the possibility to withdraw consent. 248  All these measures 
amount to a clearer, higher legal bar for the OBA industry to obtain consent 
that can produce legal effects. 
Consent remains but one of the six legal grounds on which processing of 
personal data can be permitted, but the ubiquity of consent in the GDPR in 
effect gives it a special status. Consent almost becomes the foremost, 
unexceptional exception to the restrictions on data processing. With valid 
consent, the data controller may in general process personal data,249 including 
sensitive data, 250  conduct automated individual decision-making 251  and 
transfer personal data to a third country.252 
The other noteworthy tendency is that the test of necessity has become 
even more prevalent. As has been made quite clear above, the ways ‘necessity’ 
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features in the GDPR are three-fold: First, it serves as a data protection 
principle, namely the data minimisation principle; second, it appears as part 
of a number of legal bases whereby data controllers can lawfully process 
personal data, such as necessity for performance of contract and necessity for 
legitimate interests; third, it also operates as a legal test to complement other 
safeguards in the GDPR, such as consent and purpose limitation. The last point 
may be less noticeable but in fact makes the biggest difference. For one thing, 
consent, as analysed above, has explicitly incorporated the necessity element 
in the assessment of the ‘freely-given’ factor. For another, the necessity test is 
also mirrored in the principle of purpose limitation, albeit in a subtler fashion. 
When evaluating the compatibility of the further purpose with the original one, 
one essential aspect concerns the relationship between these purposes. The 
GDPR itself does not require the secondary purpose to be necessary for the 
primary one, but it is reasonable to infer that this would make a strong case 
for the satisfaction of compatibility. In fact, save that it is expressly provided 
by law or safeguarded by consent, it is hard to come up with a compatible 
purpose that is unnecessary for the original one. 
That means, even when OBA operators decide to base their processing 
activities on consent, they would still need to pass two necessity tests: first, 
whether the data processing envisaged is necessary for its purpose (necessity 
as a principle, data minimisation); and second, whether the processing is 
necessary for the performance of contract, if the contract is conditional on the 
consent (necessity as a legal test). Here, it is important to keep in mind that 
under EU data protection law, processing of personal data is prohibited as a 
matter of principle, and only permissible when certain criteria are met. 
Accordingly, the failure in passing either of the tests would lead to the 
invalidity of the processing entirely. Such criteria include a set of legal 
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principles, a set of legal bases, and a set of special arrangements, most of which 
are now more or less informed by the necessity test under the GDPR. 
4.7.2 OBA: Gloomy legal future unless radical changes are made 
Now it becomes even more evident how the components of data protection 
law impact one another. The GDPR, supplemented with other sector-specific 
legislations, operates in a way that entails an overall understanding from the 
most abstract principles to the most specific rules, among which certain critical 
ideas have built strong connections. The EU data protection regime is 
bolstered by the GDPR’s higher consistency and comprehensiveness, and that 
is probably not good news for the OBA industry. To sum up the legal 
evaluation conducted in this chapter, if the business practices of the most 
common operational model of an ad network provider may arguably be 
considered on the edge of compliance under the current legal framework — 
the DPD — then there is little chance, at least in theory, that they may survive 
the enhanced standards under the GDPR. 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the previous sections: (a) The 
data collected and processed in an OBA network will doubtlessly fall within 
the scope of personal data under the updated version of definition; (b) Consent 
will be the only practical option when it comes to the legal basis on which data 
processing for OBA purposes can be based; (c) The principles of lawfulness, 
fairness and transparency, data minimisation, and purpose limitation must be 
observed for all the data processing activities; (d) Special rules, such as those 
regarding profiling, must also be fully enforced. In practice, the analyses above 
will have three major implications for the OBA industry. 
First, the way consent is obtained needs to be brought further in line with 
the ‘unambiguous’ requirement. The so-called ‘implied consent’, as examined 
above, would be most unlikely to be considered compliant in the light of the 
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GDPR’s new provisions. At the beginning of the data lifecycle, the collection 
of user data for tracking purpose, especially by means of cookies, must be 
warranted by the user’s ‘opt-in’ consent. It would probably not suffice to 
simply display a banner on the webpage with the notification like ‘by using 
our website, you agree to our privacy policy and use of cookies’. Instead, at 
least two options, yes or no, should be provided to the user for the first visit to 
one of the participating websites (ad publishers) of an OBA network. Before 
the user clicks ‘yes’, no data processing may take place. 
Second, consent for data processing for OBA purposes may no longer be 
requested as a condition for service provision, not even on an ‘opt-out’ basis. 
It follows that OBA operators might be allowed to collect behavioural data 
only on a fully voluntary basis, or where at least alternative options are 
provided so individuals are genuinely entitled to ‘free choice’. That means, if 
the user decides to say ‘no’, they should nevertheless be allowed to use the 
website, at least for those parts that do not necessitate verification of identity, 
and with no harm to their user experience, such as obtrusive, repetitive 
requests of consent. 
Third, although real-time bidding or other programmatic trading 
techniques are not illegal themselves, it is most likely that they will no longer 
qualify as a compatible secondary use of personal data, if that does not form 
part of the primary purpose for which the data is originally collected. In other 
words, these categories of processing should be in most cases treated as initial 
use and justified by one of the legal bases. The nature and measures of such 
activities must be clearly stated in the consent request. 
Of course, the severity of non-compliance will still depend on how the law 
is going to be enforced, and almost certainly, the OBA sector will argue for a 
much weaker approach to these safeguards. However, with the regulators’ 
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supportive interpretations cited throughout this chapter, the purely doctrinal 
analysis here will almost inevitably lead to the conclusion that the 
continuation of current practices would be found in breach of the GDPR. This 
results from all the new measures introduced into the GDPR, which in effect 
have strengthened the existing regime under the DPD, and give rise to a 
‘consent + necessity 2.0’ model. Within this model, the criteria of valid consent 
have been enhanced, while the necessity requirement has become more 
ubiquitous, as a fundamental principle, as legal bases, and as a benchmark for 
other safeguards. 
The implementation of all these new requirements would have little 
technical obstacle, as will be further shown in Chapter 6. Before considering 
these practical issues for the perspective of data controllers, it would make 
more sense to evaluate, from a fundamental right perspective, the extent to 
which the GDPR can safeguard the freedoms and rights of individuals, as well 
as the collective well-being of the society. In this Chapter, the focus was mainly 
on how GDPR will regulate OBA, not how it should. Therefore, the next chapter 
will turn to a less doctrinal, but more critical approach.
Competence of Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data 215 
Chapter 5 Competence of Data Protection Law in the 
Age of Big Data: 
A Critical Assessment of EU Data 
Protection Law in the Context of Online 
Behavioural Advertising 
5.1 Reimagining data subjects 
Since the design of any regulatory framework depends largely on how the 
policymakers assume all the affected parties would behave within certain 
constraints, it is essential that the enacting of any legislation be based on 
reasonable assumptions of policy objectives and behavioural patterns. For a 
very long time during the development of data protection law, there have been 
a number of such assumptions. For instance, it is assumed that individuals are 
those who deserve special protection when it comes to automatic processing 
of information about them.1 In the same vein, it is also assumed that, provided 
with sufficient information and genuine choice, individuals would make the 
best decisions for themselves.2 As a result, the concept of ‘data subject’ has 
been put forward as a legal creation, surrounding which an organic set of 
rights, duties, mechanisms and remedies have taken shape. The European data 
protection model was developed — and believed to be effective — at a time 
when data processing was low-scale, scattered, traceable, costly and time-
consuming. 
A lot has changed, however, as demonstrated in the preceding chapters. 
The emergence of big data technologies means that the present-day practices 
                                                 
1 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Resolution (73)22 on the Protection of the 
Privacy of Individuals Vis-à-vis Electronic Data Banks in the Private Sector. 
2 Lorrie Faith Cranor, ‘Necessary But Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for Privacy 
Notice and Choice’ (2012) 10 Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law 273. 
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of data processing have become more powerful and more omnipresent. The 
use of personal data concerns not only some aspects of life anymore; it affects 
nearly all aspects of life. It has also presented new challenges to our 
perceptions of what ‘data subject’ means — not merely in the sense that these 
technologies have extended the frontiers of ‘identifiable person’, but more 
importantly, in the sense that they have called into question the values that 
data protection law pledges to protect with the legal identity of ‘data subject’. 
While the GDPR aims to protect ‘fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal data’, how 
this should be translated into the specific regulatory measures seems to be 
based on what is at best an abstract idea without conceptual reflection and at 
worst a hollow repetition. As highlighted in Chapter 3, the risks arising from 
the use of personal data in the age of big data today are multi-level and multi-
faceted, requiring reflections on the policy premises as well as the regulatory 
approaches. Most importantly, when designing an appropriate framework, it 
is essential to conceive of data subjects not as isolated individuals, but rather 
actors with various motives and interests in a highly complex network, 
interacting with each other, and also other categories of actors. 
As will be seen in Section 5.2, data subjects are first and foremost 
autonomous agents achieving self-actualisation through those mundane 
decisions that are surrounded by the delicate balance of constraints and 
choices. To create and maintain the conditions for the fulfilment of one’s 
autonomy, however, it is critical to first revisit the essence of autonomy, in 
particular in the context of intensive use of personal data today. Besides, data 
subjects are also engaged in different types of social relationships, which can 
be of economic or political nature. Considering data subjects largely as 
consumers, Section 5.3 will recapture the dilemma of choice as highlighted in 
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previous chapters, with a fresh, critical approach to the implications for policy-
making. This will be further explored in a political context in Section 5.4, where 
data subjects are seen as an organic part of a democratic community. Such a 
capacity carries a distinct kind of interest that is more collective than 
individualistic, presumably involving strategies against what one might call 
the ‘tragedy of the commons’.3 
These inquiries offer a sound analytical foundation for the assessment of 
the extent to which a given legal framework may or may not address the big 
issues of big data. Given the diverse nature of the interests and relationships 
examined throughout this chapter, the analysis of the framework concerned 
— the GDPR — will be conducted separately in each section. The investigation 
will draw heavily from the findings in Chapter 3, where the potential risks of 
big data have been theorised, as well as Chapter 4, where the ‘consent + 
necessity 2.0’ model has been extracted from the main body of the GDPR. As 
the limitations of the GDPR reveal themselves in a range of different contexts, 
the theoretical, overarching flaws of the current regime will emerge and be 
summarised at the end of this chapter. 
5.2 Retaining autonomy through data protection 
5.2.1 Autonomy: Why it matters to self-determination, liberty and 
equality 
In Chapter 3, a range of potential risks arising from the use of personal data 
have been identified. Some values highlighted there are more individualistic 
than others, in that they have more concerns about the development of one’s 
identity of ‘self’, among which are informational self-determination and 
human dignity. Also, human dignity has been further clarified and 
                                                 
3 For an introduction to the concept, see David Feeny and others, ‘The Tragedy of the 
Commons: Twenty-two Years Later’ (1990) 18(1) Human Ecology 1. 
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materialised into two essential points: liberty and equality. In this section, an 
argument will be first advanced that autonomy, from a fundament rights point 
of view, underpins self-determination, liberty and equality. It will be shown 
why, in order to safeguard these fundamental values, a data protection 
framework needs to embrace a critically re-examined notion of autonomy. 
After that, a more in-depth enquiry into the genuine essence of autonomy in 
the context of personal data will be conducted, followed by an assessment of 
whether and to what extent the regime of the GDPR may sufficiently protect 
the autonomy of data subjects — who are largely considered independent 
actors in this context. 
(a) Autonomy as the ultimate objective of self-determination 
The relationship between individualistic autonomy and informational self-
determination deserves some further explanation here. Essentially, somebody 
being autonomous in a society means he or she possesses what it takes to make 
major decisions in life.4 As such, minors are commonly not considered fully 
autonomous,5 as they are assumed to lack the intellectual maturity to make 
informed decisions. Slaves are unlikely to be autonomous, as they do not enjoy 
the necessary freedom to act as they wish.6 Those who have no disposable 
property at all can hardly claim to have autonomy as they do not have the 
minimum instrument to realise their even most limited choice.7 Among the 
crucial elements that make a person autonomous, the ability to control their 
own personal information is becoming more important than ever in a 
contemporary society. Reminded of what the German Constitutional Court 
                                                 
4 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press 1986) 369. 
5 See Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge University Press 
1988) 9. 
6 See ibid 129. 
7 See N.E. Simmonds, ‘Property, Autonomy and Welfare’ (1981) 67(1) ARSP 61, 66. 
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stated in the case confirming the right to informational self-determination, this 
point would be even more straightforward.8 If at that time, the unfettered 
collection of demographic information about citizens in a national census 
could be held as potential interference with individual freedom, today’s 
ubiquitous tracking practices on the Internet should be even more alarming. 
In the past, people needed privacy, because they would otherwise be 
subject to constant observation and judgment, which would in turn largely 
limit their choice of what they can do in a care-free manner. To such an extent, 
those without privacy live without true autonomy. While these effects all 
remain significant in today’s big data reality, what brings the seriousness to a 
different level is the fact that, without effective control over personal data, 
people would not even be aware that decision-making in life might have been 
compromised. Individuals would in effect be subject to the manipulation of 
those who get hold of their data if their personal data has been utilised without 
their oversight. OBA serves as a case in point here. As shown in previous 
chapters, the marketing industry indeed has the technological power to 
analyse user behaviour with rather high accuracy and then personalise the 
content so as to better target their users. In a world without regulation over 
the use of personal data, individuals would be vulnerable to such influence, 
and thus, would not be able to make their own decisions in a truly autonomous 
way. 
Informational self-determination thus forms an indispensable part of 
autonomy, in particular with regard to the activities involving the use of data, 
which is making up an increasing part of contemporary life. In other words, 
in the data society that we are currently experiencing, it is impossible to 
                                                 
8 BVerfGE 65, 1 [1965]. 
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achieve autonomy without effective informational self-determination. 9 
However, it should be stressed that there is an important difference between 
informational self-determination and autonomy,10 which leads to the more 
complex issues about the essence of autonomy. Narrowly defined within the 
‘control’ paradigm, informational self-determination mainly concerns one’s 
control over personal information,11 whereas autonomy has more to do with the 
choice of one’s principal course of life. Essentially, determining what happens 
to one’s own data is but one of the approaches to autonomy. This also echoes a 
finding in Chapter 3 that informational self-determination has a strong 
instrumentalist characteristic. Accordingly, it is imperative to keep in mind 
that informational self-determination serves autonomy, not the other way 
around. While full control over one’s personal data is crucial in many scenarios 
of life, this is in theory not always the case. As will be shown later in this 
chapter, unchecked individual control of personal data may sometimes run 
counter to a broadly understood notion of personal autonomy. 12  For the 
purpose of this section, however, it would suffice to take note of the crucial 
link between informational self-determination and autonomy. 
                                                 
9 Eoin Carolan and Alessandro Spina, ‘Behavioural Sciences and EU Data Protection Law: 
Challenges and Opportunities’ in Alberto Alemanno and Anne-Lise Sibony (eds), Nudge and 
the Law: A European Perspective (Hart Publishing 2015) 165-166. 
10 See Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Blueprint: The Battle to Control the Design of New 
Technologies (Harvard University Press 2018) 118-119. 
11 See Claudia Quelle, ‘Not just User Control in the General Data Protection Regulation: On 
the Problems with Choice and Paternalism, and on the Point of Data Protection’ in Anja 
Lehmann and others (eds), Privacy and Identity Management: Facing up to Next Steps (Springer 
2016) 144; Sophie C. Boerman, Sanne Kruikemeier and Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, 
‘Online Behavioral Advertising: A Literature Review and Research Agenda’ (2017) 46(3) 
Journal of Advertising 363, 374. 
12 Christophe Lazaro and Daniel Le Métayer, ‘Control over Personal Data: True Remedy or 
Fairy Tale?’ (2015) 12(1) SCRIPT-ed 3. 
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(b) Autonomy as the precondition of liberty and equality 
A key part of the discussion in Chapter 3 concerns human dignity, which ends 
up in two strands of enquiries: liberty and equality. By way of recapitulation, 
it was concluded that the ubiquitous collection of personal data, as 
demonstrated in the case of OBA, might pose a threat to one’s liberty in that 
the data subject is likely to become self-conscious about being monitored or 
discriminated, and thus refrain from certain behaviour. In a similar vein, the 
principle of equality that most progressive societies value would also be 
eroded because of unfair treatment based on the use of personal data. Such 
unfairness may on the one hand stem from incorrect information or over-
generalised categorisation, and may on the other stem from accurate but 
uncontested, opaque differentiation.13 All these potential adverse effects might 
present serious risks to the way data subjects act as autonomous agents. 
When personal data is now being utilised extensively, a helpful approach 
to maintaining human dignity would need to address what liberty and 
equality mean in the context of big data. To further explore what the law can 
and should do with human dignity, it would be helpful to draw a conceptual 
connection with the idea of autonomy. It is not hard to explain why autonomy 
lies at the heart of both liberty and equality. As Rawls interprets a Kantian 
concept of autonomy, ‘a person is acting autonomously when the principles of 
his action are chosen by him as the most adequate possible expression of his 
nature as a free and equal rational being.’14 The values of liberty and equality 
                                                 
13 For a thorough theory of both kinds of risks, see Jiahong Chen, ‘The Dangers of Accuracy: 
Exploring the Other Side of the Data Quality Principle’ (2018) 4(1) European Data Protection 
Law Review 36. 
14 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised edn, Harvard University Press 2009) 222 (emphasis 
added). 
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are inherently embedded in the very notion of autonomy. 15 One who acts 
under the unjustified external influence, whether unfavourable consequences 
or unfair biases, cannot be said to be acting with autonomy. 
(c) The realisation of autonomy 
There is a remarkably rich body of literature addressing the very idea of 
autonomy. Benn, for example, considers an autonomous man as someone 
‘whose life has a consistency that derives from a coherent set of beliefs, values, 
and principles, by which his actions are governed.’ 16  For him, choice and 
rational criticism are the necessary conditions for autonomy,17 although more 
emphasis has been placed on the latter part, with the statement that ‘[t]o be a 
chooser is not enough for autonomy’.18 
Raz, with a somewhat different approach, captures the essence of personal 
autonomy as ‘the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own 
destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives.’19 
For an agent to be autonomous, three conditions must be met: minimum 
mental capacities, adequacy of options and independence from coercion. 20 
Clearly, these conditions imply something more objective and external than 
those put forward by Benn. What matters to the achievement of autonomy, for 
Raz, is the ‘environment’ in which autonomous life may flourish. 21 
Accordingly, a desirable model of political freedom should be one that 
‘protects people pursuing different styles of life from the intolerance […], and 
                                                 
15 For a different theory about the relationship between liberty (or freedom) and autonomy – 
one that considers liberty as an important part but not all of autonomy – see Dworkin (n 5) 
12-20. 
16 S. I. Benn, ‘Freedom, Autonomy and the Concept of a Person’ (1975) 76 Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 109, 124. 
17 ibid 127. 
18 ibid 123. 
19 Raz (n 4) 369. 
20 ibid 369-378. 
21 ibid 391. 
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it calls for the provision of the conditions of autonomy without which 
autonomous life is impossible.’22 
Between these two approaches sits Dworkin’s theory of autonomy, which 
has a strong internal focus on individuals’ ability to reflect on decisions in life, 
and yet opens up an external avenue for critical assessment of political 
institutions. He considers autonomy as an intermediary between one’s specific 
(‘first-order’) preferences and the general, principled (‘higher-order’) values 
possessed by the person. For him, ‘autonomy is conceived of as a second-order 
capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, 
desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change 
these in light of higher-order preferences and values. By exercising such a 
capacity, persons define their nature, give meaning and coherence to their 
lives, and take responsibility for the kind of person they are.’23 Within the 
particular debate over freedom of expression, Dworkin spells out the practical 
implications of such a capacity: 
‘a state may be required to recognize political autonomy of its citizens. That 
is, it may not restrict the liberty of individuals unless it can justify such 
restrictions with arguments that the person himself can (given certain 
minimal rationality) see as correct.’24 
Apart from such classical theories about autonomy, there are also 
alternative theoretical frameworks applicable to particular contexts, including 
those concerning the use of personal data.25 Interesting as this could be, it is 
not the task of this chapter to delve into all these philosophical theories. With 
in mind the major objective of this chapter — a critical assessment of the GDPR 
— Raz’s theory is chosen as the analytical framework, for a number of reasons. 
                                                 
22 ibid 425. 
23 Dworkin (n 5) 20. 
24 ibid 40. 
25 See, for example, Paul Bernal, Internet Privacy Rights: Rights to Protect Autonomy 
(Cambridge University Press 2014); Quelle (n 11). 
Competence of Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data 224 
The theory has a generic nature that can by and large accommodate the 
common ground shared by alternative theories, which, for example, usually 
see autonomy as a matter of way of life instead of particular decisions. Also, 
as a political theory of law, Raz’s account — in particular his later works, as 
analysed below, provides a particularly useful approach to the evaluation of a 
legal instrument. Its emphasis on the role and limitations of the authority of 
law in promoting autonomy fits nicely into the ongoing debate over the 
regulatory model of data protection law. 
An important part of Raz’s work on theories of law concerns the seemingly 
contradictory normative requirements between human reason and authority. 
His question, in short, is that, if the very nature of the authority of law 
demands the obedience by its subjects without questioning the rationale, then 
how can this be compatible with the autonomy of mankind, which relies on 
the reasoning of oneself?26 
His answer is complex yet straightforward. In everyday life, it is not 
uncommon that we give up the right to make the final decision or limit our 
future choice by, for example, committing ourselves to a contract, setting a 
speed limit and so on.27 The point is that there are other ways to achieve the 
primary values of the ability to act by our own judgement in conformity with 
reasons.28 For Raz, subjecting oneself to an authority is ‘not a denial of people’s 
capacity for rational action, but simply one device’, if the authority enables its 
subjects to better conform to reason.29 
There are of course cases where such commitments cannot be considered a 
device for rationality. A promise to be a slave, for instance, would not count 
                                                 
26 Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason 
(Oxford University Press 2009) 135. 
27 ibid 140. 
28 ibid. 
29 ibid. 
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as an act of autonomy based on rationality.30 An analogy can be made in a data 
protection context: One who makes blanket promise to allow the use of all 
their data for all purposes would not be considered to have exercised their 
autonomy. To qualify as an enabling instrument, an act ‘must belong to a class 
of actions such that it enhances people’s control over their life’.31 Clearly, the 
essential element of a Razian version of autonomy consists in the ability to, 
through certain mechanisms, get hold of greater powers on future life. Such 
greater powers can be gained or protected by, for example, putting oneself in 
a position to be bound by certain restrictions in the future, or by alienating 
part of one’s freedoms to a collective enterprise in quest of greater potentials 
that cannot be achieved individually. The former can be exemplified by 
contractual arrangements, including promise and consent, and the latter by 
social or institutional schemes, such as legal regulation. These mechanisms are 
also readily available as part of a typical data protection legal framework. 
In short, the key idea of Raz’s autonomy-based theory of law is that, as a 
practical authority, the justification of law lies in its potential to facilitate 
people in achieving greater control over life, which is in line with, not contrary 
to, the essence of autonomy. Of course, such a general idea needs to be 
elaborated in more detail and put to the test with instances of legal systems. 
The ‘consent + necessity 2.0’ model of the GDPR will be evaluated along with 
the refined notion of autonomy in the following sections. 
5.2.2 Consent — What does control mean today? 
(a) The merits of consent 
If the degree of possible individual control over personal data forms an 
essential part of autonomy promoted by law, an assessment of a legal 
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framework would need to investigate the extent to which data subjects are 
entitled to determine how their data is processed. Consent as a mechanism to 
enable such a possibility has its own merits. Indeed, consent is closely related 
to the concept of autonomy. A theory of consent, known as ‘autonomous 
authorisation model’, elaborates the connection by stating that ‘[o]ur right as 
rational human beings to choose our course of action freely is reflected in our 
ability to consent.’32 Ideally, as a mechanism to authorise the performance of 
an action, consent gives the involved party an opportunity to contemplate the 
trade-offs and decide whether to accept or decline the offer. A properly 
designed consent-based system would represent an informed expression of 
one’s will, which involves ‘agency, volition, control deliberateness and 
making something happen.’ 33  Without all these conditions, the fact that 
somebody says ‘I agree’ might happen simply as a result of coercion. This is 
why meaningful consent would essentially entail the act of a positive 
confirmation, and also why the idea of ‘implied consent’ is intrinsically 
incompatible with the spirit of ‘unambiguous consent’. As pointed out in the 
previous chapter, the provisions in the GDPR concerning consent have been 
updated so as to specify what amounts to sufficient, valid consent. As a 
consequence, the argument of ‘implied’ or ‘opt-out’ consent is unlikely to be 
compatible with the GDPR. 
Therefore, the new changes regarding the concept of consent in the GDPR 
may probably help bring in new practices of obtaining better-informed 
consent that is in line with the purpose of protecting personal data. Having 
said that, such improvements, though helpful, are not necessarily sufficient in 
                                                 
32 Bart W. Schermer, Bart Custers and Simone van de Hof, ‘The Crisis of Consent: How 
Stronger Legal Protection May Lead to Weaker Consent in Data Protection’ (2014) 16 Ethics 
and Information Technology 171, 174. 
33 Andrew McStay, ‘I Consent: An Analysis of the Cookie Directive and Its Implications for 
UK Behavioral Advertising’ (2012) 15(4) New Media & Society 596, 600. 
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protecting individual autonomy. The effectiveness of consent is at least 
disputable from various angles, as will be shown in the remaining sections of 
this chapter. Here, even if we assume that the legal framework can in effect 
ensure all the conditions of consent are met — namely ‘freely given, specific, 
informed and unambiguous’34 — certain issues would nevertheless remain: 
the rigidity and flatness of consent. 
(b) Rigidity of consent 
To understand what rigidity means and why it matters in this context, it is 
useful to refer to some theories of contract law. Freedom of contract, as a 
general principle, allows contracting parties to freely decide what the rights 
and duties are under a valid contract.35 The implications of this principle are 
twofold. First, government should in principle refrain from imposing 
restrictions on the content of contracts; second, contrary to the principle of 
numerus clausus in property law, which prohibits the parties of a transaction to 
create new types of property rights other than those prescribed by law,36 the 
content of the clauses is not limited to the typical forms of contracts. Of course, 
contemporary theories and practices have evolved significantly and it is 
commonplace today for law to impose restrictions on, for instance, contracts 
of adhesion, and to provide certain standardised clauses for typical contracts 
in the case of ambiguity. 
                                                 
34 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1 (‘GDPR’), art 4(11). 
35 Richard A. Epstein, ‘Contracts Small and Contract Large: Contract Law through the Lens 
of Laissez-Faire’ in F. H. Buckley (ed), The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract (Duke 
University Press 1999) 28. 
36 Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, ‘Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
The Numerus Clausus Principle’ (2000) 110(1) The Yale Law Journal 1. 
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With regard to data processing, consent is no different from a contract in 
other areas — it creates rights and obligations in the form of mutual consensus. 
However, in practice, particularly in an online setting, consent almost always 
turns up as a contract of adhesion — the way Internet users give consent to 
processing of their online data is completely the same as concluding a take-it-
or-leave-it contract. It is not (only) to say that consent is not freely given, which 
is a separate issue to deal with. The problem being discussed here is rather the 
technological architecture of consent: inflexible and indivisible. Taking OBA 
as an example, it is quite conceivable that some Internet users would have no 
issue allowing first-party tracking but would rather stay away from third-
party tracking. Even for those who do not completely reject the idea of third-
party tracking, they might want to keep apart two categories of profiles. Of 
course, all these different uses of personal data can in theory be seen as 
separate operations on the same set of personal data, and thus each requires a 
separate confirmation by the data subject. However, these options are far from 
available in reality, and for an average user, consent works like a once-and-
for-all yes-or-no answer, despite the possibility of withdrawing consent. 
Consent essentially only indicates an overall acceptance or rejection of a 
package, and thus cannot fully realise the wide range of possibilities. 
The lack of opportunities for data subjects to precisely calibrate the use of 
their data was a lesser problem in the 1990s. Data technologies then were not 
sophisticated enough to exert an all-dimensional influence on people’s life. In 
today’s age of big data, however, as the impact of use of personal data has 
become omnipresent, the need for more subtle ways to exercise individual 
control over personal data has become more pressing. Autonomy is a fluid 
concept and depends on the socio-technical reality of the society. Selective 
disclosure of information to others has always been common in human 
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history.37 A piece of yes-or-no consent given to individual websites might have 
sufficed to protect autonomy two decades ago, given the state-of-the-art then. 
In the face of big data, however, this can no longer satisfy individuals’ need to 
exercise their autonomy in a more individualised manner. The possibility to 
individually ‘customise’ how personal data is collected, analysed and shared 
now should now be considered an indispensable part of informational self-
determination that deserves further protection. 
Of course, this would not solve the problem overnight. It is conceivable 
that when such measures are first introduced, many users would not be aware 
of their availability. Even if they are aware, chances are that they do not have 
the necessary skills, time and motivation to make the most of such 
functionalities. Even worse, this could give data controllers the excuse to 
introduce more intrusive default settings, as they may argue the users have 
been given sufficient choice. However, this can be at least partly prevented by 
setting down a robust set of rules for default settings (the criteria of which will 
be further discussed later in this chapter). Also, it is true that the adoption of 
such measures by Internet users might take time, but this does not mean that 
it should never happen. The popularity and ease of the use of such measures, 
as will be explored in Chapter 6, can be facilitated by certain technological, 
market and legal solutions. 
In fact, some service providers have already deployed what they call a 
‘privacy dashboard’ to allow users to indicate precisely how they want their 
data to be used in different settings.38 Powered by big data, providing such 
functionalities has become technically more feasible, and financially less costly. 
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Again, industrial initiatives like these are welcome but much more can be done. 
Presumably, a robust, holistic approach to lower costs for data subjects to 
effectively benefit from more nuanced control would entail not just legal 
solutions, but also those of technology and market. While it is true that the 
lawmakers of the GDPR seems to some extent aware of the potential of the 
non-legal approaches and have laid down such provisions as the ‘data 
protection by design’ requirement, it is entirely unclear how the rigidity of 
consent could be addressed.39 
(c) Flatness of consent 
Another limitation of consent, as it currently stands in the GDPR, is its ‘flat’ 
nature, which refers to its inability to signal the essentiality or triviality of the 
matters concerned. It is well proved in a good number of empirical studies that 
Internet users rarely read privacy policies provided by online service 
providers,40  and give consent to these services regardless of the content. 41 
There are a number of common accounts for the failure of consent in this 
regard. First, Internet users have been exposed to too much an amount of 
consent requests, causing what is called ‘consent fatigue’.42 Second, privacy 
policies are usually overloaded with excessive information and details, which 
would create tremendous burdens on the users had they read all these 
                                                 
39 See Bert-Jaap Koops and Ronald Leenes, ‘Privacy Regulation Cannot Be Harcoded. A 
Critical Comment on the “Privacy by Design” Provision in Data-Protection Law’ (2014) 28(2) 
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 159, 166. 
40 See, for instance, Carlos Jensen, Colin Potts and Christian Jensen, ‘Privacy Practices of 
Internet Users: Self-reports versus Observed Behavior’ (2005) 63 International Journal of 
Human-Computer Studies 203; Rainer Böhme and Stefan Köpsell, ‘Trained to Accept?: A 
Field Experiment on Consent Dialogs’ (Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human 
Factors in Computing Systems, Atlanta, 10-15 April 2010); Idris Adjerid and others, ‘Sleights 
of Privacy: Framing, Disclosures, and the Limits of Transparency’ (Proceedings of the Ninth 
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security Newcastle, 24-26 July 2013). 
41 Paul M. Schwartz, ‘Internet Privacy and the State’ (2000) 32 Connecticut Law Review 815, 
824. 
42 Schermer, Custers and Hof (n 32) 176. 
Competence of Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data 231 
notices.43 Third, there is usually a lack of genuine choice for individual users 
and thus they are virtually forced to agree to the use of their data.44 
This section will focus on the first two issues, namely overexposure to 
consent requests, and overcomplexity of consent specifications, while the next 
section will conduct a more detailed enquiry into the third. Neither of the two 
former scenarios is limited only to an online setting. We engage in all sorts of 
contractual agreements as part of daily routine. While it is unquestionably 
advisable to read terms carefully before signing a deed to transfer a real estate, 
very few people actually read the fine print on the back of a shipping receipt 
when dropping a parcel for delivery. Presumably, people are much less 
willing to read the lengthy legal terms in the latter cases for two main reasons. 
First, the consequences of ignorance of the terms and conditions of small 
transactions are too minimal compared to the time and efforts that reading 
them all would take. Second, most people trust that their basic rights as 
consumers are protected by statutory measures and cannot be excluded even 
by mutual consensus. Depending on the seriousness of a transaction, taking 
actions with different levels of caution is entirely reasonable. Such strategies 
can hardly be deemed as a compromise of one’s autonomy. To the contrary, 
within the constraints of time and resources, such behaviour can be an 
example of exercising autonomous rationality. This is because the actors in 
these scenarios may have in effect freed themselves from the time-consuming 
task of reading through everything, and thus, in Raz’s terms, have enhanced 
the control over their life. 
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The implications of such a philosophical reflection of consent and 
autonomy are two-fold for data protection. For one thing, maintaining 
autonomy does not always involve requiring people to make and carry out all 
the decisions themselves. Instead, autonomy can also be achieved by 
delegating decision-making to other agents. Certainly, that would need to be 
based on some kind of reasonable guarantee; otherwise, it would just be blind 
trust. For another, even under circumstances where the decision is to be made 
by the person concerned, the burden of precaution on the decision-maker 
should be proportionate to the potential consequences of the decision. The 
more important the decision is, the greater attention the person involved 
should pay. In the context of consenting to data processing online, the same 
principle holds true: A mixture of varying levels of priorities concerning data 
processing means that there should be a hybrid of different approaches to 
consent. 
Unlike handling most decisions offline, however, there are several 
problems with consent in an online environment. Average Internet users lack 
the ability to tell the important consent requests from the unimportant ones.45 
Worse still, even if they were able to make such a distinction, alternative 
mechanisms of giving consent would unlikely be available. That is why some 
researchers suggest that ‘implied consent’ be introduced as a new legal basis 
for low-risk transactions.46 A similar approach is also recommended by the US 
FTC, proposing that ‘affirmative express consent’ should be required only in 
such cases of material change to privacy policies or use of sensitive data.47 Of 
course, it would be highly challenging for the public (or their delegates) to 
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debate and decide what constitutes ‘low-risk’ activities. From a legislative 
point of view, this would be even more complicated when it comes to who to 
decide. Yet, there is a clear demand in today’s complex digital landscape to 
expand consent from one single measure to a spectrum of measures. 
Unfortunately, the GDPR seems to have only tried to strengthen a strictest 
sense of ‘unambiguous/explicit consent’ and have not considered the 
possibilities of the softer alternatives.  
Allowing a flexible scheme to tackle the flatness of consent would, again, 
certainly face with some (fair) scepticisms and even criticisms. The biggest 
practical issue, of course, would be how to define ‘low-risk’ and ‘high-risk’ 
activities, and how to avoid potential abuse of such flexibility. As mentioned 
above, what should be considered high- or low-risk, and who should decide, 
would almost inevitably be subject to constant debates. In the next chapter, 
one potential solution will be proposed, which outlines how legislative, 
judicial and supervisory bodies may co-create an environment where such 
norms can be developed and market actors can be motivated to adhere to these 
norms. Here, it would suffice to note that there should be room for the 
members of the society to discuss and decide how a range of regulatory 
possibilities can be utilised. In such a course, baseline safeguards should 
always be in place before consensus can be reached. In particular, it is essential 
to maintain trust by making sure the basic rights of individuals cannot be 
waived even by consent. Reaching social consensus would take time, but it 
pays to create an adaptive system to replace the flat model of consent, as the 
latter has been proved unhelpful in achieving the genuine autonomy. 
5.2.3 Necessity — How mandatory standards may help free choice 
If it is true that the authority of law is not necessarily contrary to what 
autonomy entails, and even that sometimes the achievement of autonomy 
Competence of Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data 234 
depends on the mandatory requirements of law, then the next question would 
be where the line should lie. Labour law, for example, is well-known for 
precluding the consensual discretion of the employers and employees on 
certain matters. These stipulations are often controversial as to whether they 
are in effect enabling or restricting the freedom of the employees. In a similar 
vein, data protection law sometimes imposes additional restrictions on certain 
categories of data processing irrespective of the existence of valid consent. The 
data protection framework in the EU, whether the DPD or the GDPR, has 
adopted a ‘double safety valve’ architecture: data processing must be carried 
out on at least one of the legal bases, and at the same time, in conformity with 
all of the legal principles. That means some processing on personal data, even 
warranted by fully valid consent, may nevertheless be held unlawful if it is 
found to have breached one of the principles. To such an extent, these 
principles altogether form a set of minimal requirements that cannot simply 
be waived by consent.48 
To further enable Internet users to effectively maintain their autonomous 
power, the minimum requirements set out by law should avoid two extremes: 
not to be too high for individuals to decide for themselves, and not to be too 
low for real choice to be meaningful. When it comes to the online environment, 
the scope should be such that the defects of consent can be overcome yet the 
restrictions do not go beyond that. Considering the problems of consent 
identified in the previous section, the mandatory safeguards should discharge 
two missions. First, to find out and prohibit those categories of data processing 
that would deprive individuals of their decision-making power on matters 
that might gravely endanger their fundamental autonomy. Data processing 
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with serious negative externalities, as analysed in the next sections, should 
also be on the blacklist. Second, in terms of other categories that are more or 
less permissible, to provide individuals with information about the 
seriousness of each category and implement proper consent mechanism 
accordingly. 
For the first task, the GDPR has put in place a number of strict prohibitions, 
some of which are reflected in the data protection principles. For example, the 
principle of purpose limitation sets forth a few restrictions on the purpose for 
which the processing is carried out. Pursuant to this principle, ‘blanket’ 
consent for all purposes would not be allowed as this can hardly be ‘specific’ 
and ‘explicit’.49 Also, it is required that the purpose must be ‘legitimate’.50 As 
such, processing of personal data for illegitimate purposes, such as 
implementing differential treatments forbidden by anti-discrimination laws, 
would not be lawful even if the data subject has expressly consented. Article 
9, though not laid down formally as a principle, stipulates that processing of 
sensitive data be prohibited in principle.51 There are of course other context-
specific types of data processing that are undesirable no matter if consent has 
been obtained. For example, use of personal data for political campaign, as 
will be discussed in Section 5.4, might be one of those types. It remains to be 
seen how effectively such safeguards will be enforce, but it seems that the 
GDPR has already taken note of some of the highest-risk activities and 
afforded certain safeguards accordingly. 
Regarding the second task — flagging up the level of importance to data 
subjects when they are to decide whether and how to give consent — the 
GDPR does not seem to live up to its job. The way, and the only way, consent 
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can be recognised as valid would be to ensure it is ‘freely given, specific, 
informed and unambiguous’.52 Of course, the data controller may rely on other 
legal bases, all of which are characterised by the one-size-fits-all necessity test. 
The distinction between consent and necessity, as it currently stands in the 
GDPR, is very clear-cut. Data controllers as well as data subjects have only two 
options to make a deal: either through fully compliant consent, or through 
passing the high legal bar of necessity. 
This echoes the ‘flatness’ criticism of consent in the GDPR — necessity is 
as flat as consent. As summarised in the preceding chapter, the strengthened 
necessity test underlies the entire GDPR in different forms: as a principle, as 
legal bases and as additional safeguards. Operating within the data 
minimisation principle, the necessity test precludes the possibility of data 
processing that is less ‘necessary’ but potentially beneficial. In other words, 
necessity is considered a matter of yes or no under the principle of data 
minimisation, not one of degree. Such flatness also manifests itself in legal 
bases other than consent. Whether ‘necessary for performance of contract’ or 
‘necessary for legitimate interest’, data processing is only allowed when such 
purposes are, according to the CJEU, ‘strictly necessary’.53 Moreover, when 
supporting other safeguards, such as the ‘freely given’ element of consent, the 
necessity test is likely to invalidate bundled consent for processing 
unnecessary for the provision of service. There are of course many cases where 
such a prohibition is crucial, in particular when the data controller exploits its 
market power to force data subjects to give consent as a condition for access to 
service. However, there could also be cases where the processing has very low 
risk and the potential benefits are high, and the data subject truly wishes to 
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accept bundled consent. In these cases, the data subject might lose the 
opportunity to engage in such a binding arrangement, since the data controller 
would not offer such a possibility in the first place knowing that such consent 
would not be enforceable. This way, the strengthened necessity element in the 
GDPR, as a principle and a benchmark, might end up compromising the 
autonomy of the data subject by restricting their choice. 
It bears repeating that using the necessity test to block unnecessary data 
processing is most of the time a precondition for the realisation of autonomy, 
but autonomy is also sometimes achievable only when certain unnecessary 
activities are permissible through mutual consensus. The lack of the second 
possibility under the GDPR will render it counterproductive in protecting 
autonomy. The ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ practice adopted by a lot of data controllers 
are often criticised for undermining individuals’ autonomy, 54  but when it 
comes to what vehicles the law can offer, hardly has this been considered as 
part of the data protection legal reform. 
5.3 Promoting choice through data protection 
5.3.1 Choice as an interpersonal interest in commercial contexts 
With an overview of the major business models in the OBA sector, Chapter 1 
has sketched out a rough picture of how the key players have grown 
remarkably in size, breadth and impact. One point highlighted in that chapter 
was that although the ecosystem in this field remains quite diverse, the most 
powerful giants, with their long-reaching arms, have in fact become 
increasingly powerful, and consumers are left with a decreasing level of choice. 
If consumer welfare constitutes an important consideration of data protection 
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law,55 the evaluation of a legal framework would inevitably have to assess the 
adequacy in protecting consumer interests. ‘Consumer choice’ is probably a 
good starting point here as it is a joint concern shared by consumer protection 
and data protection laws. 56  From the perspective of consumer protection, 
consumers benefit from a wider range of choice of goods or services, since 
intensified competition induces improvements in quality and reduction in 
price.57 With few competitors in an area, consumers would conceivably be 
subject to conditions less favourable than those were they able to switch from 
one provider to another. As for data protection law, choice matters in that the 
ability to prevent lock-in to a particular data controller constitutes an essential 
prerequisite for genuinely ‘freely given’ consent.58 
Here, choice represents a category of interest worth promoting through 
data protection law. It forms part of the bigger picture of individual autonomy 
since the adequacy of options constitutes a prerequisite for a true sense of 
autonomy.59 That said, the analysis in this chapter will take a slightly different 
approach due to the unique context and interest involved when individuals 
are engaged in commercial activities and protected as consumers. The context 
here entails a wider lens beyond the individualistic focus on the construction 
of one’s identity. It takes an alternative perspective through which individual 
interests are put in the light of interpersonal activities. When commercial 
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actors come into play, the values at stake would be better framed vis-à-vis 
business powers. 
According to the findings in Chapter 1, the possibility of real choice in an 
online setting is being jeopardised at the moment. In fact, the insufficiency of 
choice in the case of OBA, or even the broader one of the whole Internet, can 
be understood in three slightly different but interrelated senses: First, there is 
a lack of alternative services. In a number of the most used online service 
sectors, such as search engine and video streaming, some service providers are 
the only dominant ones. Internet users are then, in effect, left with no 
alternative choice as the most needed resources are likely to be available only 
on these services. Second, there is a lack of alternative data processing models. 
While a number of competing business models like ‘paid-for’ or ‘freemium’ 
are gaining popularity in some sectors,60 ‘free’ services supported solely by 
advertising remain the mainstream on the rest of the Internet. In the social 
media sector, for example, major service providers remain dominantly funded 
by marketing revenues.61 For consumers, that means even though they are free 
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to switch to another service, their data would remain to be treated in a largely 
same manner. Third, there is a lack of alternative data networks. Recalling a 
diagram in Section 1.3.3 (Figure 1.2) showing how Google has invested on each 
link of the OBA value chain, it is clear that switching to a different service at 
the front-end does not necessarily stop data processing within the same 
network, and thus by the same group of controllers. To be fair, not all of the 
issues raised here result solely from the use of data and can be fully addressed 
only by data protection. The intensive use of personal data, however, has 
indeed exacerbated the problems and to such an extent, a robust data 
protection framework should acknowledge such challenges and attempt to 
tackle them as far as possible. 
5.3.2 Consent — Simplified choice and complex networks 
The way Internet users exercise their choice is, supposedly, to retreat from a 
particular service, or to switch to a new one. The GDPR provides a mechanism 
for data subjects to stop their data from being used. As analysed in Chapter 4, 
data subjects have the right to withdraw their consent at any time.62 Once the 
consent is withdrawn, the data controller would not be allowed to process the 
personal data concerned any longer, and the data subject may also request the 
erasure of such data, if there is no alternative legal basis for the processing.63 
Also, under the newly-introduced ‘right to data portability’ provision, data 
subjects are entitled to have their data transferred directly to another data 
controller.64 It is believed that this right would further enable data subjects to 
realise their choice, as it reduces the switching costs and thus alleviates 
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consumer lock-in.65 These improvements are helpful in facilitating Internet 
users to retreat or switch from online services, but it remains to be further 
investigated whether the three ‘choice’ issues outlined above can be 
sufficiently addressed. 
(a) Lack of alternative services 
For the first issue concerning the absence of alternative services in certain 
sectors, it seems that regulatory instruments within the realm of data 
protection law has hardly an effective role to play. While the diversity of 
services is of significant importance, it seems to be more of a competition law 
issue, falling outside the scope of data protection law. In recent years, the 
interactions between competition and data protection laws have sparked 
increasing scholarly and regulatory discussion.66 It is suggested, for example, 
that when handling approval of acquisitions and mergers, the regulatory 
authority should consider not only the firm’s market share, but also its data 
power. 67  In Germany, for instance, the competition authority has found 
Facebook’s excessive collection of personal data an abuse of its market 
dominance.68 Also, the breach of commitment regarding the use of personal 
data may lead to penalties pursuant to competition law. In fact, in May 2017, 
Facebook was fined €110 million for integrating Facebook and WhatsApp user 
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data, contrary to their promise to keep those profiles apart prior to the 
merger.69 In this regard, data protection law may of course function as a useful 
assessment framework as well as compliance guidance to complement 
competition law. However, any regulatory efforts directly aimed at market 
structure would after all come down to a matter of competition law, and the 
role of data protection law would be very limited. 
(b) Lack of alternative data processing models 
Perhaps data protection law is better positioned to tackle the other two issues. 
For the second challenge, the lack of alternative data processing models, there 
is a lot more the legal framework can do. As mentioned above, in some 
homogeneous market, the only available business model, despite the co-
existence of competing services, is keeping their services free of charge but 
monetising user behavioural data. If the diversity of choice — in terms of how 
consumers may ‘trade’ their data — is something desirable or even vital to 
consumer interests, and if such diversity suffers market failure, the law should 
arguably encourage, or even impose it. Article 7(4) — which aims to ‘unbundle’ 
consent for processing unnecessary for the performance of contract — seems 
to have some potential on this matter, but does not hold enough promise. As 
analysed in the previous chapter, this provision has effectively ‘injected’ the 
necessity element into the consent requirement. More specifically, if the 
concerned processing proves unnecessary for the performance of contract, the 
‘freely given’ status could be challenged.70 The wording ‘utmost account’ does 
not say much about the consequences, although Recital 43 provides that such 
consent is ‘presumed not to be freely given’. 
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As pointed out before, it remains highly uncertain whether the necessity 
test here connotes technical or financial necessity, or anything else. Technically, 
OBA is not necessary for most online services, but financially, as many 
marketers might argue, OBA could be crucial for the operation of such services 
— although this is at least questionable, as will be shown in the next chapter. 
One possible interpretation of this provision, in the light of the aim to promote 
diversity of choice, can be that, where technically possible, the data controller 
should offer the option of paying (in pecuniary form or otherwise) for not 
being tracked on that service, as a substitute for allowing use of data for direct 
marketing purposes based on consent. A potential criticism can be those who 
can afford paying for tracking-free services would enjoy a higher degree of 
privacy, while those who cannot would end up with no choice but giving 
consent. The potential divide of the privacy haves and have-nots is indeed an 
authentic risk that should be taken seriously in the first place. Accordingly, 
personal data that is of sensitive nature or data processing that would impose 
a disproportionate high risk should always be either prohibited or at least 
unbundled from service provision. 
(c) Lack of alternative data network 
The last challenge, concerning the behind-the-scenes complex data network, 
involves the effective execution of withdrawal of consent and similar 
safeguards. Once the data subject withdraws the consent, the data controller 
has the duty to erase the data concerned without undue delay,71 unless there 
remains another legal ground for the processing or one of the exceptions 
applies.72 At the same time, if the data has already been made available to any 
third parties and the data subject requests the erasure by such third parties as 
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well, the data controller should ‘take reasonable steps, including technical 
measures,’ to inform them of the request. 73  More importantly, the data 
controller should ensure that withdrawing consent should be as easy as giving 
it. 74  These new stipulations will be helpful, at least in theory, in enabling 
Internet users to switch from a service belonging to an advertising network to 
another belonging to a different network. It is noteworthy that the GDPR has 
in particular underlined the approach of ‘technical measures’. Now that big 
data has made it much easier for data controllers to benefit from the use of 
data, it should also make it easier for data subjects to exercise their rights. In 
fact, there have already been initiatives within the online marketing sector to 
allow users to opt out of OBA in a ‘one-stop-shop’ manner.75 It clearly shows 
that there is no technical obstacle for data controllers to allow data subjects to 
withdraw consent network-wide in one go. However, if the two services are 
part of the same OBA network, as the case might well be, switching between 
them would make little if any difference. That is because by switching to a new 
service, the user is very likely to have given new consent to carrying on the 
processing. In the case of Google, for instance, unless a user terminates their 
account for all Google services (including Google Maps, YouTube, Gmail, etc.), 
simply switching from a third-party service to another within Google’s 
immense network would hardly reduce the amount of data Google holds 
about that user. 
In order to deal with such a problem, perhaps there should be legal barriers 
to make the integration of such advertising networks much harder, not just in 
terms of competition law, but also data protection law. If one recalls the ways 
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75 European Interactive Digital Advertising Alliance, ‘YourOnlineChoices.eu - About’ <http://
www.youronlinechoices.com/uk/about-behavioural-advertising> accessed 7 March 2017. 
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Google has expanded its empire, one such way is to merge various services 
into one single system. In 2012, Google announced the update of its uniform 
privacy policy that would cover all its major services, which allowed cross-
service sharing of user profile data. 76  This aroused concerns over the 
compatibility with the principle of purpose limitation,77 particularly due to the 
fact that users were not given the option to keep apart their profiles across 
those services. Data aggregation can be very powerful, especially when the 
datasets come from different contexts, and yet, there is no explicit regulation 
over such a practice in the GDPR. One point that might be relevant is hidden 
in Recital 43, which states that ‘[c]onsent is presumed not to be freely given if 
it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data 
processing operations’.78 Strangely enough, however, this requirement has no 
reflection in the corresponding main-text Article. To minimise the threat of the 
network effect of data use to consumer choice, it could be a solution to allow 
data subjects the right — or even by default to require data controllers — to 
‘unbundle’ the processing of data for multiple services, as well as their consent. 
5.3.3 Necessity — The multiple dimensions of the necessity test 
The last section on consent has touched upon an interesting point concerning 
the necessity test, which is worth a few more paragraphs here. As noted above, 
in the case of OBA, it is subject to constant debate whether certain practices of 
data processing are ‘necessary’ at all. The meaning or criteria of necessity are 
not given by the GDPR itself, and might be subject to change from context to 
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77 Judith Rauhofer, ‘Of Men and Mice: Should the EU Data Protection Authorities’ Reaction 
to Google’s New Privacy Policy Raise Concern for the Future of the Purpose Limitation 
Principle?’ (2015) 1(1) European Data Protection Law Review 5. 
78 GDPR, art 43. 
Competence of Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data 246 
context. This also echoes the discussion in Chapter 4 where different senses of 
the necessity question have been identified: Is advertising necessary? If so, is 
OBA necessary? If so, is real-time-bidding-based OBA necessary? Of course, 
from a purely doctrinal point of view, consent given to advertising-related 
activities can be separate from that for the main service, and depending on the 
wording of the stated purpose (‘optimised direct marketing’, for example), the 
answers might be ‘yes’ to all three questions. Still, from a consumer protection 
point of view, just because something is necessary for a particular purpose 
does not mean that it is necessarily in line with consumer welfare. 
That is not to say that ‘direct marketing’ is not a legitimate purpose itself. 
On the contrary, direct marketing is explicitly recognised as a legitimate 
purpose or interest by the GDPR. 79 However, while direct marketing may 
constitute a perfectly legitimate purpose, it is not necessarily as acceptable as 
other purposes. There are clearly some purposes that the GDPR considers 
more tolerable. Under Articles 5(1)(b) and 89, for example, processing for 
archiving, research or statistical purposes is generally not considered 
incompatible purposes, provided that appropriate safeguards are in place.80 
As for direct marketing, there are also provisions specifically dealing with data 
processing for this purpose. Article 21 provides that data subjects have the 
right to object to processing for direct marketing at any time, and the data 
controller may no longer process the data if such an objection is raised.81 In the 
context of OBA, however, the provisions specially designed for direct 
marketing would have very little significance. As illustrated in the preceding 
chapter, since consent is the only legal basis for the use of cookies or similar 
techniques, which are critical for the operation of an OBA system, data 
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controllers would certainly need to obtain consent from data subjects. In that 
case, data subjects may always withdraw their consent at any time to achieve 
the same effect as exercising the right to object. Either way, the data subject 
may stop the processing of data but at the cost of losing the service. 
Therefore, for Internet users, although direct marketing is treated as a 
special purpose of data processing, it does not make a difference in terms of 
the level of protection. Yet, that purpose is special for a reason. Direct 
marketing is among those purposes that benefit mostly — if not entirely — the 
data controller. As such, in cases where the data subject gives consent to 
processing for a purpose in the interest of the data controller, a higher level of 
protection — for example, by applying a stricter test of necessity — should be 
afforded. Furthermore, even within the spectrum of direct marketing, the 
degree of power asymmetries and level of intrusion may vary, depending on 
the technical scheme and business model. In this regard, the criterion of 
‘necessary’ in the GDPR — whether in the form of the data minimisation 
principle, the other legal bases other than consent, or the supportive 
complement to existing safeguards — fails to mirror such diversity. It neither 
distinguishes different purposes nor gives adequate consideration to other 
factors that might counterbalance the necessity element. What is imposed is a 
one-size-fits-all standard. The bottom line is that, a range of different 
combinations of safeguards, as will be explained in the next chapter, should 
be available in proportion to the sensitivity of the purpose.  
5.4 Guaranteeing meaningful participation and informed 
decision-making in political contexts 
5.4.1 The blurred line between private and public use of personal data 
The last decade has witnessed some dramatic changes in the field of use of 
personal data, and the line between the private and public sectors in terms of 
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data use has become much less distinctive. The vanishing boundaries between 
‘private’ and ‘public’ are evident in two slightly different senses: First, 
personal data now moves freely through a ‘revolving door’ between public 
and private bodies.82 Second, even with personal data utilised completely by 
private entities, there could be profound implications for a society’s public life. 
The political implications of the ubiquitous presence of OBA might represent 
a case in point. As summarised in Section 3.5, the potential adverse effects of 
OBA on democracy are three-fold: It might lead to the chilling effect; it might 
cause filter bubbles; and it might give political campaigns unfair advantage. 
The public implications of private use of OBA data are now even more 
evident, for example with the Cambridge Analytica scandal, where a 
privately-owned, non-political-party entity may exert political power. It is 
clear that personal data collected by players in the private sector can be easily 
used for political micro-targeting. Irrespective of the actual powerfulness of 
such practices in manipulating public opinions, the employment of such 
techniques itself is likely to be incompatible with the idea of democracy.83 In 
such a context, what is at stake is a special category of interpersonal interest: 
political interest. This interest represents a value that is unique in three 
dimensions. First, unlike the commercial interests discussed in the previous 
section, political interest concerns public affairs and public life. Second, and 
consequently, the interest may be claimed vis-à-vis not just a certain group of 
actors — whether private (businesses) or public (government) in natural — 
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but indeed the entire society. Third, this interest implies not only rights but 
also duties assigned to members of the community. 
In a progressive democracy, data subjects are regarded as important 
participants in the course of the governance of public affairs, or citizens. Since 
citizen is an important aspect of a data subject, an effective data protection 
legal framework cannot be considered sufficient without factoring in the 
political effects of use of personal data. Many specific points discussed in 
previous sections are applicable to this context. Individual autonomy, for 
example, certainly involves participation in political life, as ‘[d]enying one the 
ability to engage in [it] curtails to a significant degree one’s ability […] to feel 
a full member of a political community.’84 Also, the imbalance of power in an 
economic setting is largely applicable to the political one. However, this 
section will mainly focus on those issues that are specifically relevant to a 
political context. 
5.4.2 Consent — Individual decision vs common future 
The sensitivity of political use of personal data is not completely ignored by 
the data protection legal framework. Both the DPD and the GDPR categorise 
personal data revealing ‘political opinions’ as sensitive data and impose 
additional restrictions on the processing of such data. 85  For instance, 
processing of sensitive data is prohibited as a matter of principle, although a 
number of exceptions, including explicit consent, are also provided by both 
instruments. 86  Member States may also overrule the consent exception, 
deciding that the prohibition cannot be waived by means of consent.87 Such a 
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restriction on processing personal data with political implications is necessary 
but far from adequate. 
The problem is that while some activities of political targeting are based on 
data about personal political views,88 not all such targeting services require 
personal data revealing ‘political opinions’. Deutsche Post, for example, was 
revealed to have sold household data to two German political parties for 
targeting purpose.89 Although the company argued that the dataset did not 
contain sensitive data — and implied that it was integrated, not personal data 
at all — concerns over the ethics of such practices remained.90 The nature of 
online behavioural data, especially social media data, can be even more 
complicated in that, while not all data necessarily indicates the data subject’s 
political view, certain inclinations might well be inferred from such data. For 
example, in the case of Cambridge Analytica, while the demographic data, 
behavioural data and user-generated content is not necessarily associated with 
certain political opinions directly, a psychometric profile inferred from such 
data can be good indicators of certain categories of public attitudes.91 Arguably, 
these profiles constitute sensitive data that reveals data subjects’ political 
opinions. 
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More importantly, in theory, effective political targeting sometimes does 
not have to involve political data. As mentioned above, Facebook itself runs a 
service facilitating political campaigns,92 and this service, according to a study, 
is based on ‘location, age, education, gender, and other demographic feature’ 
only.93 However, just because political data is not involved does not mean that 
such activities have no political implications. The use of non-political data can 
nevertheless result in filter bubble effect and unjust competitive edge. In terms 
of the filter bubble effect, personalisation of news presenting does not have to 
be able to ascertain or predict the data subject’s political preference. Instead, 
this can be done solely based on demographic or online behavioural data. As 
for the unjust competitive edge that some political campaigners might gain, 
they do not have to know about people’s political attitudes. All they need to 
know is probably the voter’s neighbourhood, consumption pattern or lifestyle. 
This would nevertheless allow them to package their political message in a 
fashion appealing to individual voters. The problem here lies in that it is the 
political nature of the purpose, not the political nature of the data itself that 
should be addressed. In other words, political marketing could function 
perfectly well without political personal data at all, unless we redefine what 
‘political personal data’ is. Redefining political data, however, may well end 
up turning all data into political data as long as such data can be used for 
political targeting. It seems that it is not the nature of the data that matters as 
much as the nature of the purpose.94 
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A remark similar to the conclusion of the last section can be made here: Not 
all purposes are created equal. For those that would cause negative 
externalities 95  or pose threat to the public good of a society, 96  further 
restrictions should be imposed. Unfortunately, data processing for political 
purposes has no special status in the GDPR. It should be subject to a stricter 
approach to consent, or closer oversight by independent authorities. One 
might even take a further step to argue that the use of personal data for 
political campaigns cannot be based on consent, since ethically speaking, 
individuals have no moral right to consent to activities that would erode the 
collective democracy of the society.97 That is exactly why a large part of public 
discussion following the Cambridge Analytica revelations might have been 
misplaced. The focus is largely on the fact that Cambridge Analytica harvested 
massive amounts of data from a third-party app without user consent.98 While 
this is indeed an important legal point, what has been missed here is the 
following question: If valid consent had been secured, does that mean they 
should be allowed to do so? In any event, data protection law should lay down 
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certain restrictive safeguards with regard to consent in the context of political 
targeting, which, unfortunately, is nowhere to be found in the GDPR. 
5.4.3 Necessity — Or purpose desirability? 
This leads to a relevant question concerning the ethics of political targeting 
through OBA. To be precise, the question concerns whether political targeting 
should be allowed as a legitimate purpose itself.99 Again, the GDPR has not 
shed any light to this matter and in practice, OBA is actually being used by 
many political campaigns around the world. 100  Legally speaking, if such 
processing is held illegitimate as a purpose for data processing, then such 
practices will be entirely disallowed under the GDPR as it would be an 
infringement on the purpose limitation principle. 
Before the arrival of the big data trend, political targeting was possible but 
done in a much less effective, sophisticated manner. It is one thing to put flyers 
into the mailboxes in particular neighbourhoods, and quite another to use 
algorithms to personalise a campaigning video based on user profiles on social 
media and see how it is received across constituencies. Again, the extent to 
which online political targeting can be done is a matter for public debate, 
although it is unlikely that it would be considered entirely illegitimate. In any 
case, it should be acknowledged that political marketing is much more 
sensitive than a lot of other purposes. The GDPR, as it currently stands, offers 
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only two options for the fate of a political campaign: fully legitimate or fully 
illegitimate. Once again, data controllers and data subjects are left with only 
two options: either an overall prohibition of such processing, or permission to 
such data processing just like other purposes. In reality, the case might be that 
the purpose of political targeting is not illegitimate itself, but it is so risky that 
further safeguards are needed. The lack of something like a restricted zone 
makes it hard to allow at least some forms of political targeting where the risks 
are relatively low but additional safeguards are needed. 
The underlying problem here is the conceptual structure of the necessity 
test. The requirement of necessity has pervaded the entire GDPR, not just as a 
principle itself (data minimisation), but also underpinning all of the legal 
grounds for lawful data processing (including even consent). However, the 
necessity test cares only about the connection between the processing in 
question and its purpose. It does not take one step further to question the 
‘necessity’ of the purpose. The word ‘necessity’ is put in quotation marks here 
because maybe necessity is not the right question to ask. Of course, some 
purposes have their second-order purposes and would therefore be worth 
questioning whether such purposes are necessary for their second-order 
purposes. Yet, in many cases, the purpose concerned does not have an 
additional, clearly-defined purpose behind it. In that case, what needs to be 
further investigated would be the desirability or acceptability of these 
purposes. In other words, even if certain forms of data processing prove to be 
necessary for political targeting, what follows should be more questions 
concerning the necessity and desirability of political targeting itself. As 
underlined in Section 5.3 in the context of consumer protection, the GDPR has 
clearly distinguished certain types of purpose and has adopted special rules 
for them, with direct marketing being one of them. Even leaving aside the 
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practical utility of those special rules, the concept of direct marketing is such a 
broad one itself that it encompasses both benign and malign instances. If 
political direct marketing belongs to the latter category, data protection law 
should take additional care of it.  
5.5 Summary: Moving forward but lagging behind 
5.5.1 Policy choice and autonomous, interpersonal and political 
interests 
In this chapter, the effectiveness of the GDPR in protecting data subjects has 
been examined through three lenses: autonomous, interpersonal and political 
interests. These three categories of interest are not chosen arbitrarily; instead, 
they signify the subtle differences in a series of variables in several continuums. 
The first dimension to see the differences is the nature of such interests. 
Obviously, the discussion surrounding autonomy has more to do with 
individualist values, namely informational self-determination, liberty and 
equality. The commercial, interpersonal interest mirrors the economic welfare 
of a collective of individuals. The political interest signifies the democratic 
value, which is the constitutional legitimacy of the society. 
The distinction between these interests leads to a second dimension of 
observations: the role of social preferences in the course of identifying the 
appropriate approach to realising such interests — which entails further 
explanation here. There are many things in life to which the preference of the 
society does not matter at all. For instance, in a secular nation, just because the 
majority of the population shares strong piety to a particular religious faith 
would not justify the state’s attempt to force the non-believers to follow that 
religion. However, on other matters, it is reasonable to impose social 
consensus on individuals, irrespective of their own individual preferences. In 
many countries, for example, pension schemes are mandatory and the age at 
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which one may begin to receive pensions is provided by law. This is not the 
place to explain the different rationales behind such decisions, but the tension 
between personal and social choice is evident in almost all aspects of life. Such 
a tension exists between how different categories of interests are protected. For 
fundamental rights, in particular the individualistic ones, the exercise of them 
is usually considered a matter of personal choice, and thus personal preference 
often takes precedence. In the case of commercial interests, social preference 
might account for a larger part in decision-making, partly because economic 
efficiency often requires collective coordination, and also partly because 
individuals (like consumers) are often in a relatively weaker position if they 
do not take collective initiatives. As regards constitutional legitimacy, social 
preference would play a dominant role as individuals’ rights (and even 
obligations) to participate in public governance would affect all members of 
the society. 
The degree of the impact that a social preference has would largely 
determine the third dimension: policy choice. Where personal preference has 
the priority, individual choice should be given utmost respect. Accordingly, 
regulatory intervention should generally be minimised, and mutual 
agreement should be respected as far as possible. Where there is a compelling 
social preference, it would be justifiable to impose certain regulatory 
constraints, and even overriding any personal choice in the form of mutual 
agreement. 101  If there is a dominant social preference that would yield 
desirable outcomes, but without a compelling justification, the policy choice 
may be a hybrid of both individual choice and regulatory constraints. This can 
be achieved, for example, by re-arranging legal, social, technological or 
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economic configurations in which personal choice can be shaped, but not 
determined, towards a given direction. The case of organ donation serves as 
an interesting illustration of these possibilities. It is not surprising that organ 
donation is universally implemented on a voluntary basis, but the way 
potential donors express their will varies greatly from one culture to another. 
In some European countries, cadaveric organ procurement is carried out based 
on ‘presumed consent’, which means a deceased person is considered to have 
consented the donation, unless they have explicitly opposed before death.102 
Unsurprisingly, this has a positive effect on organ donation rates.103 In the 
context of data protection, the implication is that, depending on the interest 
that is meant to be protected, there are more policy options than what has been 
employed in the GDPR. 
Interest Personal/social preference  Policy choice 
Personal autonomy Compelling personal 
preference 
 Individual choice 
Commercial interests Dominant and desirable 
social preference 
 Hybrid 




Table 5.1: Various dimensions concerning the protection of data subjects 
Two points need to be stressed here: The relationship between the dominance 
of social preference and the appropriate policy choice is not absolute. In other 
words, the policy options should be kept open to various configurations of 
personal/social preference. Additional considerations, as will be further 
discussed in next chapter, could have impact on the final choice between 
policy options. Second, social preference here is an institutional, theoretical 
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concept, and is not necessarily identical to what the majority members of a 
community actually prefer. For instance, if the legislature of a jurisdiction 
conscientiously decides that a regulatory restriction is necessary for the 
fundamental interests of the people, their decision could be justifiable despite 
the fact that, say, opinion polls suggest otherwise. 
5.5.2 How the GDPR falls short of its objective 
By analysing the multi-dimensional characteristics of various types of interests, 
the shortcoming of the regulatory model of the GDPR can be better seen now: 
The protean roles that data subjects play today call for a more versatile, 
responsive legal framework. The problem of the ‘consent + necessity 2.0’ 
model is that both elements suffer a high degree of inflexibility in themselves, 
leaving no space for a potential third approach to develop. Without such a 
transitional territory between those two options, the data protection 
framework would neither satisfy the needs of data subjects nor those of data 
controllers — some would argue the minimum requirements are not broad 
enough, others would argue individual choice should be applied to more areas. 
The ‘consent + necessity 2.0’ model shows a perpetuated ‘libertarianism-
paternalism’ conceptual binary, and fails to realise the complex interests that 
data subjects enjoy may be achieved through a spectrum of regulatory 
measures. 
Apart from this general flaw, specific shortcomings regarding consent and 
necessity have also been identified. As alert readers might have noticed, what 
these distinctive roles demand is not always aligned, and sometimes even 
conflicting with one another. For instance, when data subjects are put in the 
light of individual autonomy, much more emphasis has been placed on the 
effective exertion of consent. However, when data subjects are considered 
citizens in a democratic society whose informed participation in public affairs 
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deserves protection, the significance of state interference has been stressed. 
These distinctive features, as pointed out above, stem from the different nature 
of the interests these capacities represent, and point to slightly different 
problems that the GDPR suffers. 
Interest Consent Necessity 
Autonomous Rigidity and flatness 




Failure to diversify choice 
Inability to capture the uniqueness 
of the ‘direct marketing’ purpose 
Political 
Misplacement of focus on 
the nature of data 
Insufficient categorisation of 
sensitivity of purpose 
Table 5.2: The shortcomings of the ‘consent + necessity 2.0’ model 
In terms of consent, the GDPR has largely retained the conceptual model 
developed in the age of the DPD. It has not mirrored the demands and the 
possibilities of a revolutionised concept of consent enabled by big data. A more 
delicate, customisable approach to consent may be what we need in the age of 
big data. As regards necessity, it is also crucial to bring in various levels of 
necessity as well as various levels of desirability. To tackle the ‘take-it-or-
leave-it’ challenge, a data protection regime could have done more to bridge 
the gap between the ‘take it’ and ‘leave it’ options. The point of such a bridge 
is to create incentives for those who give consent to everything to start 
realising that they have more alternative choices other than cutting off entirely 
from the Internet. A valid criticism, however, can be that it might also ‘lure’ 
those tough-minded on privacy into something much softer. It remains to be 
seen whether the majority of the society would actually move up or down the 
data protection ladder. 
Of course, there are a lot of other uncertainties surrounding these 
suggestions. Each of them marks most likely a beginning of a new strand of 
debate that is far from a conclusive answer. Still, it is important that we are 
able to spot both the strengths and weaknesses of the current data protection 
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framework. Even more importantly, we need to realise that, while big data has 
posed and will probably continue to pose more challenges to the values that 
we as a society cherish, it also offers new possibilities to strengthen existing 
safeguards and to develop new ones. All new proposals — technical, economic 
or legal — will undoubtedly have to be examined in greater depth both 
theoretically and practically. There is no guarantee that all new ideas will 
develop into concrete plans that are feasible and effective, but they should be 
included as part of the ongoing discussion of how to improve our data 
protection law. Some of such new concepts and possibilities have been 
brought up lightly throughout this chapter. In the light of the current legal 
framework’s weaknesses as exposed above, they will be further explored and 
elaborated in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6 Constructing a Big Regulatory Toolbox for 
Big Data: 
Exploring Alternative Approaches of Data 
Protection Law in the Context of Online 
Behavioural Advertising 
A key message conveyed in the last chapter is that, in a highly complex digital 
world where a diversity of technological and social conditions are reshaping 
the dynamics of interests and values, the ‘consent + necessity 2.0’ model 
featured in the current data protection paradigm is struggling to adapt to the 
techno-social realities. The GDPR represents a laudable milestone in that it has 
strengthened many dimensions of the DPD to make it harder to exploit the 
loopholes. However, as pointed out above, the binary model has neither fully 
captured the heterogeneous nature of the spectrum of issues at hand, nor has 
it fully realised the potential solutions enabled by a hybrid of legal, 
technological and economic mechanisms. 
There is therefore a pressing need to review the general regulatory 
approach to big data, which requires both a re-discovery of the regulatory 
measures already in place in the existing legal framework, and also a fresh 
perception of how new instruments may be introduced so as to equip 
regulators with a better toolbox. It might be overly ambitious, and premature, 
for this study to come to conclude whether and how specific tools should be 
utilised in a given context, but at least, it would be plausible to discover a range 
of such tools, and to locate where each of them fits into the broader picture of 
a holistic strategy to address the big data issues. 
As in previous chapters, the enquiry of this chapter will again be informed 
by the case study of OBA, based on the legal framework of the GDPR as 
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extracted in Chapter 4. Given the breadth of matters covered by the GDPR, it 
makes sense to keep the discussion on a relatively narrow perspective. In the 
course of revealing the possible instruments in the regulatory toolbox, the 
discussion in this chapter will only focus on the authorisation scheme for 
processing of personal data, namely the synthesised mechanisms whereby 
certain categories of data use are allowed or prohibited. This means that the 
more procedural or supportive roles of data protection law, such as 
enforcement, education and remedies, will be largely set aside. Such an 
approach resonates with the one taken in previous chapters as the discussions 
on the trade-offs made in the context of different data uses (Chapters 2-3) and 
the legal regime characterised by the ‘consent + necessity 2.0’ model (Chapters 
4-5) have been framed mostly with regard to the conditions under which data 
processing may be permitted. To such an extent, this chapter will also serve to 
recollect the findings offered in previous chapters, and connect all the dots 
throughout the journey of investigation. 
6.1 The black and white of data protection 
6.1.1 The black- and whitelist native to data protection law 
(a) Deconstructing the authorisation scheme as lists 
One of the core functions of data protection law is to lay down clear rules 
whereby it be can decided whether a given operation of data processing may 
take place or not. The entirety of such rules under a particular data protection 
regime operates as an authorisation scheme. Such a scheme provides a set of 
rules whereby one may determine, based on the circumstances surrounding 
the processing of personal data in question, whether the processing can be 
allowed or not. To the extent that it is possible to compile all the factors to be 
considered under a data protection regime into a permissive list and a 
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prohibitive list, an authorisation scheme can be viewed as made up of a 
whitelist and a blacklist. 
Deconstructing the authorisation scheme as lists is not just about the choice 
of a metaphorical presentation, but is also of epistemic importance as it 
provides a helpful angle to examine a data protection regime, both doctrinally 
and critically. In the rest of this chapter, it will be demonstrated that, first, data 
protection law can be conceptually viewed as functioning by specifying the 
realms and mechanisms of those permissive and prohibitive lists; second, data 
protection law should be viewed this way as it offers data protection 
policymakers and regulators a better handle on the possible regulatory 
initiatives; third, data protection policymakers and regulators may (and should) 
in practice consider codifying certain data processing practices into such lists, 
based on well-grounded justifications and subject to constitutional constraints. 
These ideas are hereinafter referred to as a ‘list-based’ approach to data 
protection law, which will be explained in greater detail along with the 
analysis that will extract the white- and blacklist from the GDPR. 
(b) The built-in whitelist in the GDPR 
The starting point of understanding EU data protection law, which may 
fundamentally differ from a regime in another jurisdiction, is that processing 
of personal data is generally forbidden unless specifically permitted by law. 
Having said that, the current legal framework has provided a rather broad 
scope of rules under which data processing is permitted. These rules, as will 
be shown below, are scattered over various parts of the GDPR and operate 
within a rather complex hierarchy. By mapping out all these permissive rules 
that have been readily built into the architecture of the GDPR, it is possible to 
draw up a data processing whitelist. 
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In the first place, there are certain exemptions to the material scope of the 
GDPR under which data processing of such kinds would not be subject to EU 
data protection law.1 These exemptions include, inter alia, purely personal or 
household activities2 and matters in criminal procedures.3 To the extent that 
those activities would not be restricted in the absence of further national 
regulation, they can be considered part of the whitelist. Apart from these 
generic exemptions, the most common whitelist scenarios take the form of 
legal grounds provided by Article 6 (for general personal data) and Article 9 
(for sensitive personal data). Points (a) to (f) of Article 6(1) — regarding 
consent, contract, legal obligation, vital interests of natural persons, public 
interests and legitimate interests — each essentially provide a whitelist 
measure. The same goes for Article 9(2), where the legal grounds for 
processing of sensitive data are provided for lawful processing of sensitive 
data. Another whitelist exemption is hidden in the principle of purpose 
limitation. As explained in Chapter 4, with the interpretation of Recital 50, 
purpose limitation in effect allows further processing of personal data for 
certain purposes that are deemed to be compatible with the original ones, with 
no need for a separate legal basis. 4  That means, such compatible further 
processing is allowed even in the absence of a legal basis (and thus 
‘whitelisted’), as long as the initial collection of data is justified on one of those 
bases. 
Despite all these whitelist exemptions by which data processing is allowed, 
most of them are hardly applicable to the case of OBA, or generally speaking, 
                                                 
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1 (‘GDPR’), Recital 112. 
2 ibid art 2(2)(c). 
3 ibid art 2(2)(d). 
4 ibid art 5(1)(b), Recital 50. 
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commercial use of big data. Apart from individual consent, these whitelist 
options mainly concern either highly public objectives, such as public interest5 
and public tasks 6 , or highly personal matters, such as purely household 
activities7 or vital individual interest8. It is almost impossible to reasonably 
invoke most of these legal bases to justify commercial uses of personal data. 
This is consistent with the observation in Chapter 4 that the only viable legal 
grounds for marketing purposes would be consent, contract and legitimate 
interest. It is however also concluded later in the same chapter that contract 
and legitimate interest would not form a practical basis for the typical 
operation of OBA systems as it is highly difficult to prove the activities 
involved are indeed necessary for the performance of the main contract or the 
legitimate interest of the marketers. 
(c) The built-in blacklist of the GDPR 
Even where allowed by a whitelist provision, it is possible that the 
authorisation of a data processing operation may be overridden by a 
prohibitive rule. Throughout the GDPR, an array of restrictions and exceptions 
have been set out to de-legitimise certain data processing activities under 
specific circumstances. These further restrictions, including those generally 
applicable to all legal bases and those specifically applicable to a particular 
legal basis, essentially function as a blacklist that prohibits certain types of data 
processing even where a legal ground exists. 
For example, the data protection principles can be largely seen as a general 
set of criteria to preclude data processing contrary to the fundamental 
consensus on how personal data should be treated, no matter whether and on 
                                                 
5 ibid art 6(1)(e). 
6 ibid Recital 112. 
7 ibid art 2(2)(c). 
8 ibid art 6(1)(d). 
Constructing a Big Regulatory Toolbox for Big Data 266 
which basis such processing is specifically justified. It bears repeating that the 
violation of any principle provided by Article 5, unless within the limited 
scope of exemptions, 9  would result in the processing in question being 
unlawful, even if a legitimate basis has been established. For example, if the 
data processing in question is found unfair under the principle of fairness,10 it 
would be prohibited regardless of the existence of a legal basis. Likewise, any 
processing that is not necessary for the purpose (thus against the data 
minimisation principle) 11  or serves an illegitimate purpose (against the 
purpose limitation principle) 12  would not be permitted. As such, these 
principles constitute the most abstract layer of the data protection blacklist. 
Additionally, some categories of data processing operations are subject to 
further restrictions, again, irrespective of the legal basis chosen. For instance, 
as analysed in Chapter 4, automated individual decision-making, including 
profiling, is generally prohibited under Article 22 unless one of the three 
exceptions (contract, explicit consent and authorisation by law) applies. 13 
Another example is the prohibition imposed by Article 44 on data transfers to 
territories or international organisations outside the EU/EEA (‘third 
countries’). 14  Such transfers may take place only if the third country is 
recognised by an adequacy decision,15 or appropriate safeguards are in place,16 
or one of the derogations applies. 17  Those derogations include, inter alia, 
explicit consent, contract, public interest, etc. 18  To the extent that data 
                                                 
9 ibid art 23. 
10 ibid art 5(1)(a). 
11 ibid art 5(1)(c). 
12 ibid art 5(1)(b). 
13 ibid art 22. 
14 ibid art 44. 
15 ibid art 45. 
16 ibid art 46. 
17 ibid art 49. 
18 ibid. 
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processing covered by either Article 22 or 44 is subject to a prohibition in 
principle, these two Articles have created an extra layer of blacklist for 
processing activities that would be otherwise allowed based on one of the 
grounds provided by Article 6. It should however be noted that the 
derogations included in Articles 22 and 44 mean that a further whitelist is also 
operational against this blacklist, thereby establishing a rather complex ‘rule—
exemption—exemption from exemption’ logical structure. Having said that, 
this does not change the general nature of these Articles being blacklist 
measures in that additional safeguards are required in either case,19 where a 
failure to comply with these safeguards would render the processing unlawful 
even if explicit consent has been obtained. 
There is a third layer of blacklist measures applicable to specific grounds 
covered by Article 6 (personal data of general nature) and Article 9 (sensitive 
data). These measures usually take the form of additional exceptions or 
conditions. The ‘legitimate interest’ ground provided by Article 6(1)(f), for 
example, applies ‘except where such interests are overridden by the interests 
or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject’.20 In other words, even 
where the processing concerned is proved necessary for a legitimate interest, 
it would nevertheless be prohibited if it fails the balancing test against the 
interests of the data subject. Similar thresholds can be found in, among others, 
Article 6(3) (the proportionality requirement applying to the grounds of legal 
obligation and public interest), Article 9(2)(d) (the conditions for processing of 
                                                 
19 In the case of automated individual decision-making, such safeguards include ‘at least the 
right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of 
view and to contest the decision’ (Article 22(3)), and in the case of data transfers to third 
countries, ‘activities carried out by public authorities in the exercise of their public powers’ 
(Article 49(4)) or ‘limits to the transfer of specific categories of personal data to a third 
country or an international organisation’ imposed by law (Article 49(5)) cannot be exempt by 
means of explicit consent. 
20 GDPR, art 6(1)(f). 
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sensitive data by political, philosophical, religious organisations or trade 
unions), Article 9(2)(g) (a proportionality requirement upon processing of 
sensitive data for the purpose of public interest), Article 9(2)(h) (professional 
secrecy requirement for processing of sensitive data for the purposes of 
preventive or occupational medicine, read together with Article 9(3)), Article 
9(2)(i) (suitable and specific measures for processing of sensitive data for 
reasons of public health), Article 9(2)(j) (the proportionality test for processing 
of sensitive data for archiving, research or statistical purposes), Article 9(4) 
(national limitations on processing of health-related data) and Article 21 
(cessation of processing on grounds of public interest and legitimate interest 
in the case of objection). 
A blacklist measure can also preclude the effect of a mutual agreement 
between the data subject and data controller. A typical preclusion of this kind 
can be found in Article 7(4): As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, consent 
bundled with the provision of service is presumed to be not freely given and 
hence invalid. Article 8 also imposes an age limitation on children’s consent in 
relation to information society services. As for sensitive data, Article 9(2)(a) 
contains a proviso whereby EU or national law may uphold the prohibition 
with regard to sensitive data regardless of explicit consent given by the data 
subject.21 This provision is a continuation of Article 8(2)(a) of the DPD but 
rarely have Member States invoked this article to create a national blacklist.22 
A similar specification is included in Article 49, which precludes consensual 
agreement as a legal basis for transfers of personal data to third countries 
where the processing is carried out by public authorities. 23  By explicitly 
                                                 
21 ibid art 9(2)(a). 
22 Douwe Korff, Data Protection Law in Practice in the European Union (Federation of European 
Direct and Interactive Marketing and The Direct Marketing Association 2005) 46. 
23 GDPR, art 49(3). 
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overriding individual decisions to authorise certain categories of data 
processing, these measures in effect already function as a blacklist that 
counteracts the individual decisions to authorise data uses by means of, say, 
their consent. The implications of this are twofold: On the one hand, consent 
is not a panacea for any form of data use; rather, certain restrictions have been 
imposed on the use of consent as a legal basis. On the other hand, such 
restrictions are limited to a very narrow scope. As will be shown below, the 
list of restrictions on individual consent may be, and sometimes even should 
be, expanded where certain individualistic, collective and public interests are 
gravely endangered. 
6.1.2 The expandability of the white- and blacklist 
(a) Expanding the whitelist 
The brief survey above of the white- and blacklist measures readily in place in 
the GDPR reveals that the authorisation scheme under the current data 
protection law largely operates between the whitelist and blacklist measures. 
The decision to include a particular category of data processing into a white- 
or blacklist reflects the policymakers’ value judgment on the nature of the kind 
of data processing in question. The problem is, on what basis can policymakers 
defend such decisions? What can they do if they have identified further types 
of data uses that they consider appropriate on the white- or blacklist? Are these 
further measures subject to any limitation or scrutiny? This section is intended 
to address these questions by exploring the potential mechanisms by which 
the white- and blacklist can be expanded, either by the policymakers or the 
regulators. Again, the enquiry will begin with the whitelist measures. 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, while most of the arguments advanced by the 
marketing sector in favour of uses of personal data for OBA purposes do not 
hold water, there remain certain valid points. The plausible arguments include 
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part of the ‘free content and services’ and ‘boosting the digital market’ 
arguments, although both are often exaggerated. The next question then is 
whether and how the legitimate parts of these potential benefits can be 
mirrored in certain types of data uses that can arguably be whitelisted. 
Perhaps drawing up such a whitelist would prove immensely challenging in 
the context of online marketing, because there do not seem to be any interests 
in this sector that are compelling enough to go beyond consent as it currently 
stands in the GDPR. If it is true that ‘free content and service’ is all about 
choice 24  and ‘boosting the digital market’ is all about trust, 25  it would be 
extremely unreasonable to force such policy goals on individuals by making 
some categories of data use lawful independent of individual choice — it 
simply runs counter to the nature of either goal. 
That said, the possibility to include a limited number of OBA activities into 
the whitelist cannot be fully ruled out at this point. Also, in the wider context 
of big data there may well be a multitude of reasons why certain data 
processing activities should be whitelisted. One potential claim supporting 
such an inclusion may, for instance, rest in the free-rider problem. It can be 
argued that, for example, Internet users who have chosen not to share any 
personal data to the service provider are actually taking a free-ride in 
particular when the service is fully financed by advertising. 26  For service 
providers who can hardly change to a paid-for or freemium model, one may 
                                                 
24 Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ (2015) Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM(2015) 192 final, 3. 
25 ibid 9. 
26 See Mike Hammock and Paul H. Rubin, ‘Applications Want to Be Free: Privacy Against 
Information’ (2011) 17-18 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1781906> accessed 3 May 2018; John 
Naughton, ‘The Rise of Ad-blocking Could Herald the End of the Free Internet’ The Guardian 
(27 September 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/27/ad-
blocking-herald-end-of-free-internet-ios9-apple> accessed 3 May 2018. 
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reasonably advocate keeping legitimate data uses on the whitelist. One of the 
ongoing discussions about the overhaul of the ePrivacy Directive concerns the 
introduction of ‘web audience measuring’ as a new exception to consent for 
use of cookies.27 Such techniques are usually considered useful and low-risk 
as it does not target individuals.28 Although the use of data for marketing 
purposes is significantly different from those merely for measuring purposes, 
the point here is that personal choice does not always defeat legitimate interest. 
The data protection whitelist is sometimes a useful regulatory tool in certain 
contexts where the use of data is beneficial to the majority of the society but 
vulnerable to individual decisions. 
(b) Expanding the blacklist 
The analysis above of the blacklist elements dispersed throughout the GDPR 
has shown that the prohibitive measures manifest themselves mainly on three 
threads in data protection law: (1) in the form of data protection principles; (2) 
in the form of restrictions on certain activities regardless of the legal basis; (3) 
in the form of additional conditions on specific legal grounds that would 
otherwise authorise the use of personal data. For data protection policymakers, 
such a perception leads to three major implications. First, one of — if not the 
most important of — the underlying logics of data protection law is to protect 
personal data by imposing prohibition on processing. Second, and as a result, 
a large part of the EU data protection regime is already substantially no 
different from drawing up a blacklist, or a number of blacklists, in that it 
                                                 
27 European Parliament, ‘Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data 
in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy 
and Electronic Communications)’ (2017) A8-0324/2017, 58; Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, ‘Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption’ (2012) 00879/12/EN WP 
194, 11. 
28 European Parliament (n 27) 24. 
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outlaws certain types of data uses including those based on the data subject’s 
consent, although formally those uses do not appear as a list. Third, and 
perhaps most importantly, given that the blacklist approach is already an 
option in the policymaker’s regulatory toolbox, there is no doctrinal reason 
why its use cannot be expanded where this is reasonable to adapt to the 
changing social, economic, political or technological circumstances. In short, 
blacklisting certain types of data processing is nothing new in data protection 
law. Moreover, this approach is also common in other areas of law that aim at 
the protection of individuals as citizens or consumers, often in an even more 
‘list-looking’ manner. In consumer protection law, for example, the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive includes an annex specifying the ‘commercial 
practices which are in all circumstances considered unfair’.29 A similar list of 
unfair contract terms is also annexed to the Unfair Contract Terms Directive,30 
under which the inclusion of those unfair terms would render a contract 
unenforceable.31 
In data protection law, with the three layers of blacklist measures in mind, 
there are a number of legislative strategies available to policymakers if they 
wish to expand the data protection blacklist. The first option is, of course, 
putting in place new data protection principles or making existing principles 
more restrictive. However, this is probably the most challenging option given 
the overarching effects as well as the pragmatic need to keep such principles 
                                                 
29 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 
concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and 
amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) [2005] OJ L149/22 
(‘UCPD’), Annex I. 
30 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] 
OJ L95/29 (‘UCTD’), Annex I. 
31 GDPR, art 6(1). 
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stable. A second option would be to identify those areas that are particularly 
high-risk and then impose a blanket prohibition on related data processing 
activities. This is a more precise and practical approach, which would 
probably target the risky scenarios better, but overriding all legitimatising 
grounds may well turn out controversial for its potential spillover effects on 
legitimate uses of personal data. Stability would of course be another issue 
depending on how frequently the expanded blacklist is subject to change. 
Perhaps the third option, namely laying down a list of scenarios where the 
reliance on a particular legal ground is prohibited or restricted, is the most 
practical solution in the current legal framework. This is in particular the case 
with regard to consent when it comes to sensitive data: Article 9(2)(a) has 
explicitly allowed Union or Member State law to stipulate the purposes for 
which processing of sensitive data cannot be justified by explicit consent.32 
Under this provision, EU and national policymakers can, in practice, draw up 
a data protection blacklist without amending the GDPR. As regards non-
sensitive personal data, it would be more difficult to work around the legal 
grounds without changing the law at EU level. As a matter of fact, it has been 
confirmed in CJEU case-law that the list of legitimising bases for processing of 
personal data is exhaustive and restrictive, meaning that no legal basis may be 
added, removed or amended by Member State laws.33 That said, given the 
advisory powers conferred to national and EU data protection authorities,34 
they may in practice issue opinions laying down a list of activities that they 
consider in violation of the principles or rules set out by the GDPR. 35 For 
                                                 
32 ibid art 9(2)(a). 
33 See Joined cases C-468/10 and C-469/10 ASNEF [2011] OJ C 25/18 paras 30-39; Case C-
582/14 Breyer [2016] OJ C 475/3 paras 56-58. 
34 GDPR, arts 58(3)(b), 70(1)(b) & (e). 
35 For example, with regard to online political advertising, a number of national data 
protection authorities have already issued guidelines on the lawfulness of such practices. See 
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example, such a list can be crafted based on the regulator’s interpretation of 
what data uses would count as ‘fair’ under the fairness principle,36 or what 
purposes would count as ‘legitimate’ under the purpose limitation principle.37 
While such opinions are not legally binding,38 they would serve as helpful 
clarification on the regulators’ position on the matters that should not be 
allowed even when consent or other legal bases are in place. 
The next question then would inevitably be what should be included in 
such a blacklist. It would go beyond the scope of this study to attempt to come 
up with a complete list of the blacklist scenarios. In any case, it would take a 
lot of further research and public contemplation before such decisions can be 
made. Restricting individual choice by means of a blacklist requires a 
compelling justification. Having said that, recalling the potential risks arising 
from the use of personal data (in Chapter 3) and the flaws of the regulatory 
model (in Chapter 5), it is still possible to sketch out a rough analytical 
framework for policymakers to locate the latent harms and to argue the case 
for excluding individual choice in the form of consent. Following the structure 
of Chapter 5, such a framework can be presented three-dimensionally with 
specific focus on autonomous interest, interpersonal (or commercial) interest 
and political interest. 
In terms of autonomous interest, it has been illustrated why sometimes 
individuals can be better protected by limiting their choice. Recent 
developments in technologies as well as commercial practices have shown an 
even more pressing need to introduce a blacklist for certain categories of data 
processing. For instance, it is already suggested that emotion detection on 
                                                 
European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Opinion 3/2018 on online manipulation and personal 
data’ (2018), 6. 
36 GDPR, art 5(1)(a). 
37 ibid art 5(1)(b). 
38 ibid Recital 143. 
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social media or for advertising purposes should be prohibited.39 It is believed 
that, given the power asymmetries in the data subject-controller relationship, 
‘practical realities belie the libertarian assumption of the capacity and 
rationality of the data subjects vis-à-vis decision-making and also the potential 
for market equalising effects.’40 Here, a blacklist approach might be justified 
on the basis that the activities involved are so sensitive to fundamental interest 
of the data subject and yet the imbalance of power is so severe that counting 
on individual choice would not sufficiently address the market failure. For 
sensitive data that would reveal the most intimate aspects of individuals, it 
can be argued that it should never be used for, say, advertising purposes, even 
if explicit consent has been obtained. The recent scandal concerning dating app 
Grindr sharing HIV status data to third-party advertisers41 also shows how 
critical it can be to have such prohibitive measures in place. 
As for interpersonal interests, an argument can be made for restrictions on 
consent for certain categories of processing where the consent may have an 
impact on other people, which may happen in three slightly different settings. 
The first one concerns a situation where the data subject’s consent is made to 
a set of data also pertaining to others. In fact, this is what happens when a social 
media user consents to the sharing of their friend list data to a third-party 
application.42 Although technically the disclosure of relational data concerning 
                                                 
39 Damian Clifford, ‘Citizen-consumers in a Personalised Galaxy: Emotion Influenced 
Decision-making, a True Path to the Dark Side?’ (2017) 31/2017 CiTiP Working Paper <http://
ssrn.com/abstract=3037425> accessed 21 February 2018. 
40 ibid 28. 
41 Maya Oppenheim, ‘Grindr to Stop Sharing HIV Status of Users with Third-party 
Companies after Fierce Criticism’ The Independent (3 April 2018) <https://www.independent.
co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/grindr-hiv-status-users-third-party-companies-stop-
sharing-criticism-gay-dating-app-a8286366.html> accessed 3 May 2018. 
42 See Laura Hautala, ‘Facebook Privacy Settings Make You Work to Stop the Data Sharing’ 
CNET (22 March 2018) <https://www.cnet.com/news/how-to-stop-sharing-facebook-data-
after-cambridge-analytica-mess/> accessed 3 May 2018; Josh Constine, ‘Facebook Is Shutting 
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more than one data subject would require consent from all concerned parties,43 
this could have been made clearer in a blacklist approach. The second scenario 
touches upon the lack of choice as highlighted in Chapter 5. In theory, one’s 
consent to a particular service, data processing model and data network would 
potentially cause psychological and economic effect that would exacerbate the 
concentration on these dimensions. 44  Such forms of lack of diversity in 
alternative options would in turn make ‘choice’ less meaningful in a 
commercial context. For example, an individual’s consent for the sharing of 
their social media data to an insurer, something that has actually been 
experimented by an insurance company with discounts offered to pilot users,45 
would increase the popularity of this practice and hence the bargaining power 
of the insurer. Such voluntary disclosure of personal data, once reaching 
critical mass, would place the insurer in such an advantageous position that it 
can practically refuse to provide a quote to those who do not consent, which 
in turn limits the alternative options available to future customers. In other 
words, individual consent may end up restricting choice to the collective. A 
third, and even more subtle account for the interpersonal effects of individual 
consent is manifest in the case where one’s disclosure of their own information 
may contribute to the data controller’s better knowledge of the entire group,46 
and therefore result in negative consequences on the members of the group. 
                                                 
Down Its API for Giving Your Friends’ Data to Apps’ TechCrunch (28 April 2015) <https://
techcrunch.com/2015/04/28/facebook-api-shut-down/> accessed 3 May 2018. 
43 See Data Protection Act 1998, s 7(4)-(6); Durant v FSA [2003] EWCA Civ 1746 paras 60-67; 
DB v GMC [2016] EWHC 2331 (QB) para 88; Information Commissioner’s Office, 
‘Determining What Is Personal Data’ (2012), 24-25. 
44 See Mark MacCarthy, ‘New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and Externalities’ 
(2011) 6(3) I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy 425, 459-461. 
45 Graham Ruddick, ‘Facebook Forces Admiral to Pull Plan to Price Car Insurance Based on 
Posts’ The Guardian (2 November 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/nov/02/
facebook-admiral-car-insurance-privacy-data> accessed 30 May 2018. 
46 Yoan Hermstrüwer, ‘Contracting Around Privacy: The (Behavioral) Law and Economics of 
Consent and Big Data’ (2017) 7(3) JIPITEC 9, 12. 
Constructing a Big Regulatory Toolbox for Big Data 277 
For example, sharing one’s own behavioural data as well as their shopping 
preferences to an advertiser may have a collective impact on the group of 
people sharing similar behavioural pattern with them. This has been explored 
by some researchers with the concept of ‘group privacy’ 47  or ‘collective 
privacy’.48 
The last possible justification for the blacklist approach concerns political 
interests. As underlined in Chapters 3 and 5, the use of personal data in an 
OBA context not just concerns individual or commercial interests, but can also 
involve political considerations. If the personal choice of a data subject — who 
is also a citizen — proves to contribute to a process that would jeopardise the 
societal or public good, then it is at least arguable that such choice should be 
restricted. It is for this reason that in the case of online tracking, an argument 
has been made that at least in some scenarios, the practice of making provision 
of service conditional on the consent to tracking should be prohibited.49 This 
argument can be extended to a wider context of the use of personal data for 
political purposes. The revelations of Cambridge Analytica show that there 
should be further restrictions on how personal data can be used for political 
campaigning. Compared to how common it is for states to impose complex 
regulatory regimes on how campaigners may use funding, 50  the legal 
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regulation on how they may use data is much less developed. The focus is 
usually on sharing of voter lists and the obligations are usually imposed on 
political parties.51 This means, for example, the use of behavioural data on 
social media by a third-party, as in the case of Cambridge Analytica, is still 
largely beyond the reach of traditional control over campaigning use of 
personal data. Therefore, the option of expressly blacklisting at least some of 
these uses should be kept open to future debates. 
The reflections on autonomous, interpersonal and political interests above 
are meant to provide a general framework for policymakers to consider the 
necessity and feasibility of adopting certain blacklist measures, although some 
of these theories might need to be further developed in future research. Again, 
it is not this study’s task to come up with an exhaustive blacklist of all types 
of data processing that should be prohibited. What is intended is merely to 
make it clear that the blacklist approach should remain on the table in future 
discussions and there can be good reasons to advocate this approach in 
specific contexts. 
(c) Limiting the expanding: Constraints on the expansion of white- and 
blacklist 
Both the white- and blacklist approaches are characterised by the fact that by 
means of setting out mandatory rules, the law already precludes individual 
choice on certain matters regarding the use of personal data. The theoretic 
connection between autonomy and choice when it comes to personal data 
forms an essential part in Chapter 5. It is concluded that, while personal 
decisions on whether and how one’s personal data may be used for a specific 
purpose play an important part in the actualisation of autonomy, such 
                                                 
51 Colin J. Bennett, ‘Voter Databases, Micro-targeting, and Data Protection Law: Can Political 
Parties Campaign in Europe as They Do in North America?’ (2016) 6(4) International Data 
Privacy Law, 265-267. 
Constructing a Big Regulatory Toolbox for Big Data 279 
decisions (in particular in the form of consent) are not the only way, and 
sometimes not even the best way, to achieve genuine autonomy. Collective 
decisions in the form of compulsory legal requirements may under some 
circumstances legitimately override individual choice on these matters. It is 
not uncommon for a social preference to override the individual preference on 
certain occassions. As regards white- or blacklist measures, it has been shown 
above that there can be justifications for the adoption of such social preferences. 
Those measures are defensible not just in the collective or public interest, but 
sometimes also with the aim to improve protection of individual interests. 
However, it should be borne in mind that, apart from consent, drawing up 
such a white- or blacklist represents a strong form of intervention of law on 
matters that are arguably better decided by the collective than by individuals. 
To the extent that data subjects are denied the possibility to exercise control 
over the fate of their data, the blacklist and whitelist approaches would create 
a strong sense of heavy-handed, paternalistic interventionism, which requires 
a compelling case for the adoption of such measures. In other words, 
policymakers must clearly articulate why leaving such decisions to 
individuals is likely to lead to some sort of failure that would cause harms to 
the individuals themselves, a group of individuals or public policy interests, 
either directly or indirectly. In addition, any decision to include a specific 
category of data use on the white- or blacklist should be subject to the general 
constitutional constraints so as to ensure the power of laying down such lists 
is not abused by the policymakers or regulators. 
One such constitutional constraint — indeed the most important one — 
derives from fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter. As with any acts 
by EU institutions, a legislative decision to authorise or prohibit certain types 
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of data use would be invalid if it is found in breach of the Charter.52 Since data 
protection has been officially recognised by the Charter as a fundamental right, 
the protection of and the restriction on this right are both subject to the general 
legal framework for fundamental rights. It has been repeatedly emphasised by 
the CJEU that the measures adopted by the EU concerning processing of 
personal data must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 53  The 
Court has consistently invoked Article 52(1) of the Charter to stress that 
limitations on fundamental rights may be allowed if and only if, ‘[s]ubject to 
the principle of proportionality, they are necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect 
the rights and freedoms of others.’54 It follows that, for the scrutiny of a specific 
measure, policymakers must determine whether the interest they claim (which 
could be one of those mentioned in the previous section) is balanced against 
the fundamental rights of the data subject or any third-parties.55 The principle 
of proportionality, in short, requires that the measures sought: a) ‘be 
appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives’; and b) ‘do not exceed the 
limits of what is appropriate and necessary’.56 Such an assessment would of 
course entail balancing against a variety of interests and rights. In fact, the 
GDPR itself has spelt out a series of the fundamental rights that should be 
taken into consideration, including, in particular and inter alia, ‘freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression and information, [and] 
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freedom to conduct a business’.57 If after a thorough evaluation it turns out 
that the measures are either inappropriate or unnecessary, policymakers 
should consider alternative approaches instead, some of which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
6.2 Beyond black and white: Diversification of the 
regulatory toolbox 
6.2.1 Lessons from behavioural economics and psychology 
While the previous section has covered most of the safeguards on the data 
protection white- and blacklist — both those already included in the GDPR 
and those potentially on an expanded list — one special category of measures 
should be discussed in more detail: consent. Consent deserves further analysis 
not just because it is less paternalistic in nature than other black- or whitelist 
measures, but also because it is the most commonly-used (and thus the most 
controversial) legal basis. In fact, as concluded in Chapter 4, the GDPR is 
essentially built on the regulatory model of ‘consent + necessity 2.0’. Voluntary 
mechanisms, such as consent, are actually more common throughout the 
GDPR as the means by which data processing is authorised. One of the reasons 
why consent is a popular regulatory option may be that it is closer to the idea 
of personal choice, and personal choice is conceptually connected to the idea 
of individual autonomy. However, most of the last chapter has been devoted 
to the discussion of why consent would not be an effective regulatory tool in 
the context of OBA: It is rigid and flat, and more importantly, it fails to 
diversify choice. The way choices are made available and framed matter 
significantly to individual decision-making in that it imposes not just the 
constraints on available options, but also the mental modality of choosing 
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between those options. This idea is captured by behavioural economists with 
the terminology of ‘choice architecture’. 
One of the most-cited discussions on choice architecture is the book Nudge 
by Thaler and Sunstein. In their book, they argue: ‘If you indirectly influence 
the choices other people make, you are a choice architect. And since the choices 
you are influencing are going to be made by Humans, you will want your 
architecture to reflect a good understanding of how humans behave.’ A classic 
demonstration of how choice architecture influences human behaviour is 
defaults, which makes a perfect point in the case of regulatory approaches for 
data protection policymakers. The entire debate surrounding the 
interpretation between ‘opt-in’ and ‘opt-out’ consent under the ePrivacy 
Directive is in essence all about setting a default. The default position of a 
choice architecture would have an effective impact on the outcome of 
individual choice, even when the options are the same under various 
architectures. 
Behavioural psychologists have offered a great deal of theoretical accounts 
for such phenomena. In his Nobel Prize-wining study of bounded rationality, 
Kahneman summarises the rules governing intuitive choices. 58  A striking 
conclusion is that individual choices consistently suffer from systematic 
biases. 59  Based on such ground-breaking works, further studies have been 
conducted to prove both theoretically and empirically how human decision-
making is subject to various forms of external influences, including choice 
architecture. Sunstein, for example, theorises such biases by outlining the 
situations where individual choices do not promote their own ends, or in his 
terms, where there are behavioural market failures: a) present bias and time 
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inconsistency; b) ignoring shrouded attributes; c) unrealistic optimism; and d) 
misestimating probability.60 Translated into the context of choice over uses of 
personal data, these theories may further explain the failure of consent as 
pointed out in the last chapter. 
However, it should be noted that the theory of choice architecture is subject 
to quite some scepticism.61 It is criticised both for being too tough and for being 
too soft. On the one hand, the legitimacy of regulation by means of adopting a 
particular choice architecture is challenged for its potential interference with 
autonomy. It is considered at best a pretentious or untransparent version of 
paternalism,62 and at worse a blatant manipulation on individual autonomy.63 
On the other hand, choice architecture is also believed to be less effective than 
mandates in protecting individuals from irrational decisions. 64  Certain 
responses are offered by advocates of the theory, including, inter alia, that 
while choice architecture can be manipulative where the architect is malicious, 
in certain areas it can promote autonomy and/or welfare.65 
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It should be made clear from the outset that this study does not advocate 
the notion of choice architecture — or its practical implementation, which 
includes the greylist approaches as will be discussed below — over or as a 
substitute for traditional ways of regulation. In fact, many opponents of the 
choice architecture theory do not object to the complementary potential of this 
approach;66 rather, what they oppose is the proposition of abandoning the 
mandatory rules.67 In this respect, the regulatory toolbox envisaged by this 
study does not have to be subject to these criticisms, because, for one thing, 
choice architecture is considered merely one of the options that is not 
necessarily superior to others, and for another, mandatory approaches, such 
as the white- and blacklist, are in fact equally supported by the findings of the 
previous section. More importantly, the promotion of a particular choice 
architecture model does not mean that a choice architecture model would not 
exist without such an approach. When regulation is absent, the choice 
architecture would be decided by private entities,68 and in some cases, choice 
architecture may even exist without an architect. 69  Taking consent as an 
example, when data protection law does not specify whether consent should 
be ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’, it would be up to the data controller to decide which 
solution to adopt; but in either case, the data subject would face a choice 
architecture and their decision may be conditioned accordingly. 
It is for this reason that the intention of this study is neither to dive into the 
rich literature of behavioural economics and psychology, nor to pick sides in 
                                                 
66 John (n 61) 106-107,121. 
67 Sabino Cassese, ‘Exploring the Legitimacy of Nudging’ in Alexandra Kemmerer and 
others (eds), Choice Architecture in Democracies : Exploring the Legitimacy of Nudging (Nomos 
2016); McCrudden and King (n 63). 
68 Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Blueprint: The Battle to Control the Design of New Technologies 
(Harvard University Press 2018) 52. 
69 See Robert Nozick, ‘Invisible-Hand Explanations’ (1994) 84(2) The American Economic 
Review 314. 
Constructing a Big Regulatory Toolbox for Big Data 285 
the debate over the superiority of the regulatory approaches based on the 
choice architecture theory. What is intended is simply to present such a 
possibility as an option among others, which has both its strengths but also 
limitations. Keeping this regulatory instrument in the toolbox does not mean 
that other instruments should be discarded or less-favoured. Depending on 
the social consensus and the judgment of the policymakers, the role of this 
approach can be merely additional or supportive to the existing authorisation-
consent-prohibition trichotomy. From such an open-ended perspective, the 
lessons from behavioural economics and psychology might sound less 
ambitious: Human choice is subject to behavioural rules and vulnerable to 
‘architectural manipulation’ by others, which may in practice counteract the 
assumption of rationality on which legislative and regulatory activity is based. 
Regulators should thus recognise such rules and, where necessary, either 
make use of them or defend individuals’ decision-making capabilities from 
undue influences. Leaving these opportunities unchecked and solely exploited 
by private entities would unfairly tip the balance in favour of those entities.70 
As Sunstein puts it, ‘choice architecture is inevitable and […] behavioral 
market failures do, in fact, justify certain forms of paternalism.’71 However, 
given the risks of manipulation even by public bodies, it is a common view 
that the use of such measures must be subject to strict substantive and 
procedural checks and balances, such as the proportionality test.72 
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6.2.2 Nudging and intervening: Libertarian paternalism and more 
(a) Nudges 
Paternalism has a bad reputation. It is sometimes associated with coercion73 
and hence the impression that individual choice is disrespected and even 
deprived. Such association is unnecessary and unhelpful,74 at least in some 
variations of paternalism. Libertarian paternalism, advanced by Thaler and 
Sunstein, is said to be one such variation that, on the one hand, promotes the 
idea that people should be free to choose, and on the other, argues for 
institutional efforts to steer their choices towards improvement of their lives.75 
Libertarian paternalism is essentially one of the approaches ‘that affect choices 
without coercion’.76 The way libertarian paternalism achieves the seemingly 
contradictory dual objectives is leaving the final decision open to individuals 
but at the same time tweaking around the choice architecture. 
In terms of the authorisation scheme for a data protection regime, the 
design of choice architecture may mean making decisions on a combination of 
a variety of influence approaches. The most straightforward pair of options 
are, of course, the so-called ‘opt-in’ and ‘opt-out’ consent. A general guiding 
principle for policymakers to decide on these approaches would be picking 
those rules that ‘reflect the likely choices of informed people’77 with a rational 
level of self and collective interest. One of the keywords here is ‘informed’, 
meaning that, considering the common cognitive fallacies that would impede 
individual choice, policymakers should exercise their judgment on what a 
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rational, informed person would most likely choose, instead of simply 
following the actual or predicted behaviour of the majority. Such a judgment 
may lead to a conclusion in favour of ‘opt-in’ consent, or one in favour of ‘opt-
out’ consent. Where a reasonable conclusion can be safely reached and it is 
technically possible to treat different scenarios differently, it would arguably 
be justifiable for the policymakers to assign the proper approach to the given 
set of scenarios. 
It should be noted that the binary of ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’ in the ongoing 
policy debates may have caused an impediment to governmental or industrial 
initiatives to develop a third path. The highly limited achievement, if any, of 
the browser-based solutions to use of cookies, as discussed in Chapter 4, has 
shown how potentially helpful innovations may be restrained due to the 
entrenchment of the policy choice between the ‘opt-in’ and ‘opt-out’ 
approaches. The development of technical standards for default browser 
settings or the ‘Do Not Track’ feature is largely seen by the industry as a 
technical solution to simplify the way meaningful consent is obtained, 
whereas European regulators are deeply concerned about the risk of 
exploitation by the industry to collect massive amounts of data. However, the 
unmet expectations are not necessarily irreconcilable. If the industry and 
regulators can come to an agreement that for certain types of low-risk cookie 
uses, a relaxed, streamlined regime may be allowed even though it might not 
fully satisfy the arguably harsh ‘opt-in’ consent requirement, then there would 
be a considerable scope where the gap of expectations can be bridged. For 
example, it can be argued that since first-party cookies without storing 
sensitive data are less dangerous, a browser-based implementation of opt-out 
consent may be allowed, which would not only free Internet users from a great 
deal of cookie consent, but also create incentives for service providers to 
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consider using first-party cookies only. However, for higher-risk uses of 
cookies, such as, say, third-party cookies for advertising purposes, it might be 
sensible to adhere to the regulators’ more restrictive interpretation of the 
conditions for valid consent. Nevertheless, it should be clear that applying 
either ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’ consent to all matters will not be a helpful approach. 
Apart from default rules, libertarian paternalism may take other forms in 
the regulatory toolbox. In fact, when explaining the potential diversity of 
nudges, Sunstein envisages a list of 13 strategies employable by a hypothetic 
cigarette regulator.78 For those that qualify as soft paternalist measures, the 
approaches mainly involve provision of information, displaying warnings and 
making purchase more difficult.79 All these measures can be transferred to a 
context of use of personal data for online advertising, or generally, commercial 
use of big data. 
For provision of information, the discussion may go all the way back to the 
theoretical significance and practical failure of the transparency principle. 
Mandatory disclosure of certain categories of information is essential in that it 
underlies informed decision-making. However, such transparency 
requirements are often criticised for their insufficiency in truly informing 
people’s choice.80 From a regulatory point of view, however, information does 
not always have to be truly informing, nor does it always have to be in place.81 
It can be an option for regulators to leverage. For instance, it is argued that 
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when making privacy-related decisions, individuals do not need to be fully 
informed; sometimes being sceptical is enough for discouraging certain 
behaviour.82 For this reason, disclosure of information can be seen as a tool, a 
regulatory tool designable by policymakers. They can design what 
information and how it should be conveyed to data subjects. One promising 
solution is standardised icons,83 which should function in a way similar to 
nutrition facts labels that give consumers a straightforward overview of the 
information they need most. 
Warnings are a similar category of nudges, except that it works by 
producing psychic costs to individuals.84 Such costs can be important signals 
of the potential risks of data processing concerned, which, as illustrated in 
Chapter 5, forms a dispensable part of the role of data protection law. 
Therefore, the quality and quantity of such warnings are crucial 85  in that 
proper implementation of this approach would enable data subjects to tell the 
important decisions from the trivial ones, so as to avoid the ‘warning fatigue’. 
Making consent harder to give would generate another form of transaction 
costs, which, again, can be a regulatory possibility that nudges individual 
behaviour towards a certain pattern or sends out signals of the importance of 
the decision being made. This may include, for example, a two-step 
confirmation or a compulsory periodic review of consent. The combination of 
all these regulatory options would allow policymakers or regulators to create 
a range of choice architecture applicable to different circumstances. 
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(b) Interventions 
While libertarian paternalism aims to nudge individuals into choosing the 
most informed option, sometimes neither of the options is close to an optimal 
solution. Choice architecture may effectively influence how people decide 
between the options offered, but it does not address the issues arising from the 
lack of the ideal option. The failure of data protection law in diversifying 
choice has been made clear in Chapter 5 in particular when the effectiveness 
of consent is examined in terms of protecting data subjects as consumers. If 
such diversity of choice proves to be crucial in protecting the interpersonal 
(commercial) interest of data subjects, regulators may consider adopting 
stronger forms of paternalism, including interventions in the scope of 
selections for key decisions. 
One potential instrument of this kind is to make alternative business 
models available to data subjects. This can be achieved through a hard version 
by, for instance, making it compulsory for service providers to offer a paid-for 
option if the user prefers not to have their data shared for advertising purposes. 
A soft version would be providing that the availability of the paid-for option 
may, in the course of the ‘freely given’ test, demonstrate the non-conditionality 
between the access to main services and the consent to use of personal data. 
Extra precaution is however needed for this approach to avoid the potential 
side-effect of creating the privacy-haves/-have-nots divide. As flagged up in 
the previous chapter, policymakers will need to decide carefully how not to 
compromise fundamental interests of data subjects. 
Another instrument in the toolbox is to make the option of opting out of 
certain types of data processing always available and accessible to data 
subjects. For instance, data protection or competition law may require that any 
merger of user accounts across services can be allowed only if the user has 
given additional consent and only if the refusal to consent would not affect 
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their continued use of either service.86 Policymakers may also decide that any 
material improvement in certain profiling techniques, even if compatible with 
the original purpose, must be justified by consent, the refusal of which, again, 
should not impact the access to the service. A dashboard-like control panel 
might be also helpful for users to keep part of the data use off or separate. In 
fact, these regulatory tools are more or less available if certain elements the 
GDPR are properly applied together, such as purpose limitation and the 
‘specific’ and ‘freely given’ requirements of consent, except that these 
mechanisms are more general and do not target specific contexts. As will be 
discussed below, list-based approaches with specific scenarios in mind are 
sometimes better policy choice than adhering only to the arguably blunt, one-
size-fits-all principle-based approaches. 
The discussion here will not go further in search of all possible forms of 
nudges and interventions, nor will I attempt to explore the strengths and 
weaknesses of each instrument to find out where they are best positioned to 
address particular circumstances. These tasks will have to be left to future 
research. The key point here, however, should be clear enough that there are 
more delicate, subtle tools in the data protection toolbox that can be useful for 
dealing with big data issues but are not fully realised by the GDPR. 
(c) Nudges and interventions as technology and market mechanisms 
For data protection policymakers, various forms of nudges and interventions 
are not isolated regulatory instruments. Instead, those specific measures 
should be mapped out within the overarching policy framework. This would 
allow policymakers not just to identify potentially useful approaches, but also 
to compare their strengths and weaknesses against alternative options. A 
helpful analytical framework where nudges and interventions can be located 
                                                 
86 Cohen (n 74) 6. 
Constructing a Big Regulatory Toolbox for Big Data 292 
would involve a holistic view of the interactions between different regulatory 
paradigms. The relationships between the parallel yet interrelated regulatory 
paradigms of technology, market and law have been discussed in great depth 
in Lessig’s book Code. He explains how law may affect behaviour by either 
regulating directly or indirectly through regulating technology (or, in his 
terms, architecture) and market.87 
To illustrate how indirect regulation through technology works, the 
promotion of the use of seatbelts is given as an example. If this is an objective 
pursued by a government, the government may regulate citizens’ behaviour 
directly by passing a law to require the wearing of seatbelts, or it may do it 
indirectly by regulating technology, such as mandating automatic seatbelts.88 
In the case of regulating online privacy, however, this is slightly different. The 
subjects of the regulation — namely the data controllers — are also the 
designers of an architecture that would have nudge effects on others — data 
subjects. As such, when discussing direct and indirect regulation in this 
context, it should be kept in mind that if it is the data subjects’ behaviour that 
is meant to be regulated, there are actually three entry points where legal 
regulation may exert influence. First, law may directly dictate that data 
subjects make a certain choice (through a whitelist or blacklist). Second, law 
may indirectly dictate that data controllers adopt a certain choice architecture 
that would influence individual choice (through imposing consent or necessity 
requirement). Third, and even more indirectly, law may impose a spectrum of 
choice architectures with different legal consequences that would influence 
the data controller’s choice of choice architecture (through offering a range of 
greylists, as will be discussed below). 
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The distinction between the second and third layers would become even 
more evident when they are respectively considered conduct-based and 
design-based regulation, a dichotomy advanced by Hartzog when calling for 
diversifying privacy law’s approach.89 Whereas regulating data controllers’ 
conduct is the traditional approach of data protection law, regulating the 
design/architecture that they create and the design/architecture that affects their 
behaviour may be a new approach that policymakers should arguably embrace, 
or at least consider. If data controllers are in effect choice architects, then it 
would make much sense for policymakers to act as an architect of architects, 
or meta-architect. By acting as meta-architects, policymakers would effectively 
create a two-layer market mechanism. On the direct level, policymakers create 
market incentives for data controllers to adopt choice architectures that are 
more privacy-friendly. On the indirect level, those choice architectures in turn 
create positive or negative incentives to individual decisions on various types 
of data uses. 
For the incentives to work, there needs to be a degree of uncertainty on the 
scope of each choice architecture. As Hartzog notes, ‘[a]ny privacy design 
agenda should adequately ensure the freedom for companies to take 
reasonable risks, learn from mistakes, and account for other regulatory 
pressures like social norms and market forces.’ 90  The same goes for data 
controllers’ decisions on choice architectures. A range of architectures with 
varying benefits but also varying price tags are provided to data controllers.91 
If they want a more relaxed authorisation approach, they would need to make 
sure their practices fall within a lighter-coloured list. They would make their 
decisions based on how much they value the benefits and costs of the use of 
                                                 
89 Hartzog (n 68) 82-84. 
90 ibid 85-86. 
91 Brown and Marsden (n 70) 165. 
Constructing a Big Regulatory Toolbox for Big Data 294 
data, and also on their own or others’ mistakes — regulators send out signals 
of the scope of a particular architecture by enforcing the authorisation scheme. 
The binary of consent and necessity offers a much narrower selection and thus 
will not achieve the same level of optimisation. The failure to effectively 
enforce the cookie rule is a case in point: When website operators want to use 
low-risk cookies to monitor web traffic, they simply cannot do it in a fully 
lawful way as few users will give opt-in consent. Therefore, even if they are 
aware that this might be legally questionable, they would probably do it 
anyway, and they would probably do it for other purposes as well, since it 
would be unlawful anyway. That is why such propositions as ‘treating all data 
as sensitive data’ would be unlikely to be helpful. In order for the market 
mechanisms to kick in and drive commercial practices towards a more 
desirable direction, a reasonable range of choices would be indispensable. 
Of course, a counter-argument can always be that this might as well lead 
to a slippery slope for online marketers to exploit the choice architectures. In 
fact, libertarian paternalists have anticipated the same challenge and they have 
given their own response.92 Drawing on some of their key ideas, I try to offer 
a defence along similar lines. First, the potential benefits of this approach as 
illustrated above cannot simply be dismissed by the fear of a hypothetical 
slippery slope. Second, the inclusion of alternative choice architectures (other 
than ‘consent’ as currently defined by the GDPR) has not changed the 
fundamental nature of the data protection regime underpinned by the 
prohibition-consent-permission trichotomy; it simply further supports it with 
additional choice architectures. Third, refraining from regulating choice 
architectures is pointless, as ‘[a] regulator’s choice to address design or to 
ignore it is also a kind of default, which comes with its own set of 
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consequences.’93 Some of the points made here may also find further support 
in the discussion about the list-based approach in the next section. 
6.3 Fifty shades of grey(lists)? Towards a strong list-based 
approach 
6.3.1 Greylists and the list-based approach 
All the paternalistic approaches discussed in the previous section, whether 
libertarian or interventionist, are based on the common ground that individual 
data subjects have the final say on such decisions. As such, these approaches 
are distinguishable from other white- or blacklist measures in that the decision 
of the data subject plays a key role in ascertaining whether a given use of 
personal data can be allowed. Under the current regulatory model, any data 
uses that are not blacklisted can be actually justified by consent. To such an 
extent, consent can be seen as a fallback (or ‘catch-all’) measure that does not 
need to come with a list of activities. However, with the nudges and 
interventions highlighted above, it is conceivable that policymakers may 
create multiple forms of consent, each with a particular choice architecture 
possibly featuring various combinations of such nudges and interventions. A 
simple example would be a data protection law that provides both ‘opt-in’ and 
‘opt-out’ consent as authorisation mechanisms for different categories of data 
uses. 
That would require data protection law to lay down the scenarios in which 
(or the conditions under which) a particular form of consent may be used as a 
valid legal basis. If policymakers put together a list of the activities on which 
individuals may consent in a specific way, such a list can be considered a 
greylist — neither completely white (permissive) nor completely black 
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(prohibitive). For the matters included on a greylist, data subjects are allowed 
to act as their own gatekeepers in the authorisation scheme although various 
mechanisms might exert their influence one way or another. Since it is possible 
to diversify data protection greylists with different optional combinations of 
nudges and interventions, paternalistic approaches should be understood as a 
continuum with gradual shades of darkness without sharp distinction 
between similar strategies.94 
The beginning of this chapter has picked up on the idea of a list-based 
approach to data protection law, characterised by the codification of groups of 
data uses into a number of lists representing various mechanisms within the 
authorisation scheme. Here, a further step is taken towards a strong version of 
the list-based approach, such that apart from a whitelist and a blacklist, the 
authorisation scheme also features a number of greylists. The theoretical 
justification for the adoption of a strong list-based approach will be given later 
in this section. For now, the discussion will be first focused on how 
policymakers may build up such greylists with the nudges and interventions 
explored above as the building blocks. In order to bring together the 
technological, market and legal tools and assign them to the greylists, it would 
in theory entail a three-step process as illustrated below. 
First, policymakers need to locate the available regulatory instruments in 
the full spectrum of their toolbox. As shown below in Figure 6.1, these 
instruments — some of which have been highlighted in the previous section 
— may include both nudges and interventions, and may exert influence either 
through code or through market. It should be made clear here that the 
measures included in the figure are merely demonstrative and are not meant 
to be exhaustive. 
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Figure 6.1 Potential policy instruments in the regulatory toolbox 
At this point, policymakers may be tempted to leave all these measures 
available to data controllers, who may determine, on a case-by-case basis, 
what would be the appropriate combination of these measures for a particular 
type of data processing, if they seek to rely on consent. Depending on the 
nature of the activities concerned, the processing in question might fall on a 
particular point within the spectrum of the shades of grey. With ex post 
oversight by regulators or courts, this would arguably have the advantage of 
keeping all the options open not just to data controllers but also regulators, 
who can in turn react to new technologies that would call for a particular form 
of choice architecture. However, in practice, this would also create a number 
of issues, such as the potential exploitation by the controller, the over-
complexity of the system, the lack of legal certainty, and the burden on 
regulators and data controllers to decide on the appropriate option. For these 
reasons, a strong version of the list-based approach, which simplifies the 
system by reconstructing the spectrum of the grey area into a number of 
greylists, might be a better regulatory solution. This might suffer from the 
lower level of flexibility and make the regulatory model less future-proof, but 
these concerns may be mitigated by the proper distribution of the list-drawing 
powers between policymakers and regulators, such as delegating certain 
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To turn the shades of grey into the greylists, two more steps will be needed. 
The next step would involve the possible combinations of some of those 
instruments that are compatible. An exemplary series of possible 
combinations are offered in Figure 6.2, which are arranged in a way that 
reflects the ‘darkness’ of each approach: The darker the colour of an approach 
is, the more prohibitive it tends to be. Again, the figure is merely illustrative 
in the sense that it does not reflect all possible approaches under an 
authorisation scheme, and the level of paternalism is not necessarily correctly 
ordered in the figure. The outcome will largely depend on the specific design 




















Figure 6.2 List-based approaches arranged in a gradual spectrum 
The spectrum of approaches included in Figure 6.2 are already heavily 
simplified for demonstrative purpose, but are still very complex. In practice, 
this would raise the issue of putting too much burden on regulators and data 
controllers to identify and manage different greylists, who might end up being 
lost in too many options. Another potential problem would be the lack of a 
catch-all measure in the event that the use of data in question does not fall 
within the scope of any of these greylists. To overcome these issues, a last step 
is needed for policymakers to finalise the greylists. As shown below in Figure 
6.3, two further improvements should be made to the lists. For one thing, 
depending on the desirable number of lists in an authorisation scheme and 
level of complexity of the scheme, policymakers may need to remove certain 
approaches or to merge some of them. For another, policymakers would also 
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need to designate a ‘baseline’ approach for data processing that is not covered 













Figure 6.3 A hypothetical set of finalised data protection lists 
With these final refinements, it is expected that the authorisation scheme 
would be less burdensome for both data controllers and data protection 
regulators. For data controllers, the complexity issue is lessened by the fact 
that the final scheme is supposed to be streamlined to some extent. Also, since 
the traditional approaches remain in place in this new scheme, data controllers 
can always fall back to the ‘consent + necessity 2.0’ model as it currently stands 
in the GDPR. Under this new scheme, however, they would be offered a wider 
range of selection, which, in theory, creates a higher chance for them to choose 
the most suitable solution. The market will steer the choice of the controllers 
towards the optimal approach, taking into account the administrative costs 
and the potential benefits of switching to a different solution. For 
policymakers, this will indeed increase their burden to scrutinise business 
practices and decide whether they have chosen the proper authorisation 
model. However, this will also enable regulators to release more subtle signals 
on what they consider appropriate safeguards in the given context, for similar 
data controllers to follow suit. Again, this is helped by the ex ante simplification 
of the authorisation scheme by the policymakers. 
Another practical consideration for policymakers would be the choice of 
an appropriate regulatory instrument to incorporate the greylists into the 
existing legal framework. This is not the place to expand on all the possible 
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policy solutions, let alone the pros and cons of each solution. Yet, a number of 
potential points of entry are briefly offered here for consideration: First, 
policymakers can of course codify the greylists into the current law, in the 
form of specific provisions or an annex, or as a new piece of legislation. Second, 
this can be achieved by granting delegated powers to regulators, who may lay 
down and maintain such greylists as they see fit.95 Third, if self-regulation 
proves effective, regulators may also consider approving the greylists in the 
form of codes of conduct proposed by representative industrial organisations, 
which should be legally binding and enforceable on the members of the 
organisations.96 Fourth, the greylists can be implemented on a voluntary basis 
that would create incentives for data controllers to improve the standards of 
data protection. This approach can possibly be linked to the ‘data protection 
by design’ (DPbD) requirement under the GDPR, which requires the data 
controller to take appropriate technical and organisational measures designed 
to better comply with the data protection principles and requirements.97 A 
greylist in this context may provide guidance on the design of certain nudges, 
which, when properly implemented, may demonstrate the compliance with 
the DPbD requirement. The specific conditions should be commensurate with 
the identified level of risk. 
Needless to say, the power of policymakers and regulators to lay down the 
greylists, just like the white- and blacklist, must be subject to constitutional 
constraints, including those provided by the human rights framework. On the 
one hand, a high level of data protection guaranteed by the Charter should not 
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be compromised but should always remain the policy objective of introducing 
such lists. On the other hand, various interests should be weighed and 
balanced against each other to ensure the chosen regulatory approach is 
proportionate. 
6.3.2 Overcoming ‘consent + necessity 2.0’ with a strong list-based 
approach 
The strengths of a strong list-based approach are even more evident with the 
shortcomings of the ‘consent + necessity 2.0’ regulatory model in mind. With 
the whitelist, blacklist and several greylists in a strong version of list-based 
authorisation scheme, the deficiencies of the ‘consent + necessity 2.0’ model 
highlighted in the previous chapter can be at least partly alleviated. 
To begin with, the rigidity and flatness of consent would be likely to be 
mitigated by the variety of choice architectures available in the toolbox. At the 
same time, the failure to diversify choice, especially in terms of diversity of 
business models and diversity of data networks can be to some extent 
addressed with the interventions by regulators. Political use of personal data, 
regardless of the nature of the data concerned, can be placed on the blacklist if 
that is considered severely detrimental to democracy. The priority and 
seriousness of the decisions to be made by individuals can also be signified by 
the appropriate choice of nudges. In the context of OBA, for example, different 
forms of direct marketing as well as different types of purposes, depending on 
their nature and risk, may also be treated differently with one of the greylists 
or blacklist. To sum up, the list-based approach holds great promise to 
strengthen the existing regulatory framework against the challenges arising 
from the widespread application of big data. Much more theoretical and 
empirical work will be needed to prove the extent to which these weaknesses 
can be overcome with the list-based approach. For now, the task of this study 
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is to draw attention to such possibilities, which should be open to future 
debates. 
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Table 6.1: Solutions to shortcomings of the ‘consent + necessity 2.0’ model 
Apart from addressing the existing issues in the current data protection legal 
framework, the regulatory toolbox also offers another advantage. The 
flexibility and limited uncertainty it offers will create the helpful tensions 
between policymakers, regulators, courts and the players in the market. As 
mentioned above, the way the white-/grey-/blacklists are drawn should allow 
for a degree of discretion. Such a discretion in effect represents a balanced 
power distribution in the course of decision-making on what counts as high- 
or low-risk, and what should be put on which list. Ideally, policymakers are 
supposed to lay down the whitelist, the blacklist and a number of greylists 
with particular sets of paternalistic elements. They should also decide on the 
types of data uses that should be put onto a particular list, which requires some 
room for interpretation. The regulators will then be able to enforce such lists 
by examining whether data controllers have chosen the appropriate list for 
their use of data. Where there is a dispute arising from the enforcement of such 
lists, a court may step in to decide whether the regulator has exercised their 
discretion in a proportionate manner. A number of such flexible lists would 
therefore not just ensure the list-drawing power is not exclusively vested in 
one decision-maker, but also permits the lists to be slightly stretched to cover 
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new technologies or new circumstances. Even more importantly, such 
flexibility creates incentives for technology and market forces to move towards 
more privacy-friendly direction. 
6.3.3 A brief response to potential principle-based criticisms 
The white-/grey-/blacklist spectrum may anticipate criticisms from advocates 
of principle-based approaches, in particular against a strong list-based 
approach characterised by a variety of greylists. For instance, Koops argues 
that, ‘[i]nstead of making data protection law broader and more detailed in 
how it is to be implemented and enforced, which makes it more complex and 
more rigid and therewith unrealistic for 21st-century data processing, data 
protection law should be simplified and focus more on the main underlying 
principles.’98 A supporting argument can be that ‘[t]he complexity of potential 
consequences and thus the risks are beyond comprehensive regulative 
instruments such as the law or political decision-making processes.’99 These 
arguments seem to oppose a more specific, list-based data protection 
framework that involves the drawing up of multiple lists. I will provide a 
number of brief points to explain why this does not have to be the case. 
First of all, the distinction between the list- and the principle-based 
approaches is largely a matter of relativity. Some researchers have classified 
privacy as a principle-based right whereas data protection is seen as a rule-
based right.100 This means despite the fact that the fundamental principles play 
a key part in the underlying structure of data protection law, specific rules 
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nevertheless form an indispensable component of the regime. The list-based 
approach may indeed require more detailed and targeted specifications, but 
considering its effectiveness in neighbouring areas of law,101 there is no reason 
to believe it would not work in data protection law. 
Second, the argument for an additional list-based approach does not mean 
that the principle-based approach is not necessary anymore. In fact, even when 
the white-/grey-/blacklists have been adopted, the ‘safety net’ woven by the 
principles will remain of paramount importance in the data protection 
framework to provide baseline protection where the situation is not covered 
by any of the lists. 
Third, the proper functioning of a list-based approach is actually 
dependent on a robust set of the existing principles. The quote above making 
reference to the complexity of potential consequences and risks has indeed 
made a strong case, which echoes Hartzog’s explanation on why standards are 
generally better than rules as guidelines for privacy design. The reasons 
include ‘the rapid pace of technological change, the contextual dependency of 
all privacy problems, and the wealth of common knowledge companies can 
draw from’.102 A similar claim can be made here with regard to the list-based 
approach: Taking into account all these constraints, the effective lists drawn 
up by policymakers would be those ‘articulating goals and erecting 
boundaries’ that reflect ‘flexible standards rather than rigid requirements’.103 
Such goals and standards will need to draw inspirations from the values 
embedded in the data protection principles. 
Fourth, both the principle- and the list-based approaches aim to introduce 
context-specific measures to supplement the principles, rather than to replace 
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them. The essence of a principle-based data protection law, as Koops argues, 
is to ‘provide a general framework in which the spirit of data protection is 
clearly visible, in contrast to the EU law’s tree-obscuring forest of rules.’104 This 
would require ‘going back to basics [and] playing other regulatory tunes on 
different instruments in other legal areas’. 105  Therefore, the fundamental 
difference between the answers provided by the principle- and the list-based 
approaches, if any, is that the former attempts to keep data protection purely 
principle-informed by looking for context-specific measures elsewhere, 
whereas the latter seeks to incorporate such measures into data protection law. 
6.4 Summary: Rebuilding the walls with regulatory tools  
In Chapter 3, it is argued that the data protection challenges we are facing 
today can be captured by the idea of the falling walls of the data world. Now 
that a potential list-based regulatory model has been outlined, it is time to 
return to those challenges to see how the proposed solution may possibly help 
individuals rebuild their own data walls. 
The metaphor of walls is a powerful one in that it bridges the gap between 
our physical experiences of preserving privacy by blocking the observation of 
others and our digital experiences of protecting data by preventing access by 
others. A wall represents an architectural barrier that by default prevents 
information from transferring from one side to the other. Peeking through a 
wall is not impossible but it would involve extremely high costs. Homes are 
almost always surrounded by walls, whereas parks rarely have any walls. 
Glass curtain walls are more common in office building but are much less so 
for residential buildings. Walls represent people’s expected visibility from 
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outside in a given space, or in Hartzog’s words, peoples’ obscurity.106 Our 
daily obscurity in the real world is maintained through different layout of 
walls or other forms of architecture, varying from public space to workplace, 
and to home. This is why obscurity should be considered a spectrum ranging 
from completely obscure to completely obvious.107 
In this context, the list-based approach to data protection is helpful in 
retaining a similar sort of obscurity in that it does not view the world simply 
as public and private. By promoting the idea of a diversity of greylists with 
distinct configurations of nudges and interventions, this approach shares a 
similar perception with obscurity theories. It also helps rebuilding the walls 
by making clear demarcation between different lists and giving out clear 
signals on what one can expect in a given space in terms of the use of their 
data. This works like when one is going through a door from one room to 
another, they can clearly see a label on the door specifying what the doors 
would look like in the next room. 
Throughout this chapter, a data protection toolbox has been sketched out, 
laying down a potentially promising authorisation scheme made up of a 
number of lists that control the use of personal data. It is suggested that for a 
data protection framework to function effectively in the age of big data, what 
we need is perhaps a series of alternative libertarian paternalistic approaches. 
They are mirrored in a continuum of choice architectures and serve to further 
strengthen the existing regime. It is believed that through this approach, the 
shortcomings of the ‘consent + necessity 2.0’ model can be effectively 
addressed. Another reason to support this regulatory model is that it can 
potentially leverage technological and market drivers to improve the 
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adherence to existing data protection principles. The bottom line is that in a 
big data world full of subtle influence and complex technologies, 
policymakers need to give regulators access to a better-equipped data 
protection toolbox. It remains subject to debates what exactly should be 
included in the toolbox, but realising such regulatory possibilities and 
beginning the discussion would be the first step.
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Conclusion 
It has been a long way here from the very beginning of this study, where the 
research question was set up, to the development of an improved regulatory 
toolbox. With six chapters each addressing one particular aspect of the debates 
surrounding big data and data protection law, the entire inquiry has yielded 
an answer to the overarching question posed at the outset. Nevertheless, after 
the in-depth and detailed discussion on such a complex and current issue, it is 
worth taking one step back to review the logical trajectory following which the 
investigation has led to the conclusion, as well as to relocate the research 
findings from the case study of OBA to the bigger picture of big data and data 
protection law. This conclusion chapter will therefore recapture the main 
arguments advanced in all previous chapters, and reiterate how such 
arguments connect to each other and contribute to the main theme of this 
study. This will be followed by further clarification of the boundaries of the 
research findings, and their potential transferability in order to inform 
research and policymaking in other wider contexts. The final section will then 
acknowledge the limitations of this study, and identify the adjacent fields that 
are not covered but should be addressed in future research. 
Review of research findings 
Before summarising the key messages of the main chapters above, it is 
important that the principal question of inquiry be borne in mind all the way 
through. The main title of this study — Data Protection in the Age of Big Data — 
should serve as a helpful reminder of the two major keywords: big data and 
data protection. The two-directional relationship between these two concepts 
constitutes the main theme of this study: How should data protection law respond 
to the challenges arising from the ever-increasing prevalence of big data? Of course, 
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given the immensely broad coverage of both concepts, they have each been 
pinned down to a more specific context. For big data, this means OBA has been 
employed as a case study throughout all chapters; for data protection, the EU’s 
GDPR has been chosen as the legal framework. Accordingly, the research 
question can be specified as: How should data protection law, represented by the 
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, respond better to the challenges arising 
from the ever-increasing prevalence of big data in the context of online behavioural 
advertising? 
In Chapter 1, the enquiry began with a brief introduction to the notion of 
big data, which, despite the variance in the precise definition, is defined by the 
high volume, velocity and variety of data. In this regard, OBA indeed 
represents a helpful instance for the investigation, since the operation of such 
a system involves the collection, transmission, aggregation, analysis, storage 
and reuse of massive amounts of data among interconnected data points 
across devices almost instantaneously. This becomes even more evident as the 
technical implementation of a typical OBA network was explained within the 
operational cycle of tracking, profiling and targeting. One example of the 
sophisticated techniques involved is real-time bidding, which shows the logic 
of optimisation behind such systems. The complexity and powerfulness of an 
OBA network is confirmed also from an economic perspective. It has been 
explained how the few key players in the ecosystem have secured enormous 
dominance by growing in size, breadth and impact. By means of vertical and 
horizontal integration, those powerful actors have ensured their involvement 
in almost all parts of the value chain, which makes their performance better, 
and in turn their dominance harder to resist. 
Such techno-economic realities of the OBA sector provide strong support 
to certain counter-arguments against some common theories in favour of the 
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use of big data in an online marketing context. Chapter 2 examined these 
claims with regard to three separate (though interrelated) aspects: the 
potential benefits for individuals, the economy and the society. As regards 
individuals, claims are often made either with reference to people’s preference 
of relevant ads, or to their actual access to free content or services. The former 
point is usually advocated with survey results suggesting that a large 
population of Internet users prefer tailored ads, which, as has been shown, is 
flawed in terms of both methodology and relevance. The latter point 
concerning the ‘free’ Internet is less problematic in that free access to online 
services is indeed of a certain degree of value, although the value has often 
been exaggerated by industry reports. As for the economy, it is argued that 
OBA has been making considerable contribution both as an emerging industry 
on its own, and as part of the bigger digital market. Again, neither of these 
points can fully justify the industry’s position. On the one hand, the 
development of an industry, whether domestically or internationally, does not 
automatically override other policy objectives. On the other hand, the statistics 
cited by industry reports are likely to be overestimated, and have not 
considered the potential benefits of alternative business models. In terms of 
the last strand of justifications regarding the potential societal benefits, it is 
claimed that OBA has been promoting innovation and democracy. The 
innovation argument is questionable if scrutinised in the light of theories of 
responsible innovation, which do not consider innovation as something 
intrinsically desirable. The democracy argument is equally challengeable in 
that it has largely ignored the threat that OBA may lead to the creation of new 
forms of bundling. Considering all these aspects, it can be concluded that 
while OBA, as an application of big data, indeed brings forth certain personal, 
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economic and social benefits, most of the arguments made by the marketing 
industry are at best exaggerated and at worst ill-founded. 
With some of the potential risks already foreshadowed in the previous 
chapter, Chapter 3 further identified the fundamental threats that OBA might 
cause, with a range of theories concerning the interests of individuals and the 
society. First, while a narrow, classical sense of privacy is often considered 
violated in the online environment, OBA presents a hard case for the privacy-
based risk theory, as the line between private and public space is highly 
ambiguous and protean. Second, and in a more contemporary vocabulary, 
informational self-determination is another fundamental value that is 
considered under threat. Theories of informational self-determination 
articulate the merits in terms of both individual development of identity and 
social preservation of pluralism, but in either case, it represents a highly 
instrumentalist value underpinned by something more fundamental. Third, 
and as a result, the genuine risks of OBA should be understood with reference 
to human dignity, which can be discussed in terms of liberty and equality. It 
is concluded that both values are at stake in the context of OBA as it is likely 
to create manipulative and discriminatory effects. Fourth, the risk of OBA can 
be also perceived from an economic perspective, which leads the discussion to 
the power imbalance between online marketers and Internet users. Such 
imbalance takes the form of asymmetries in architectural, informational, 
bargaining and manipulative power. Fifth, from a political point of view, the 
prevalence of OBA may also undermine the proper functioning of the 
democratic system by causing chilling effects, creating unfair advantage and 
generating filter bubbles. To better make sense of how big data has intensified 
all these risks, a metaphor of ‘the falling walls’ has been put forward, 
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explaining the ways in which big data has eliminated the boundaries between 
various domains of the data world. 
An effective data protection framework should be competent to address 
the risks identified above, but before evaluating the effectiveness of the 
framework, Chapter 4 provided a doctrinal analysis of some aspects of the 
current data protection regime that are most closely related to the operation of 
a typical OBA system. These include the definition of personal data, the legal 
bases for lawful processing of personal data, the data protection principles, 
and the restrictions on profiling. The legal analysis in this chapter leads to a 
number of practical implications: First, the behavioural data collected by OBA 
systems falls within the definition of personal data, and therefore data 
protection law applies to related activities. Second, the safest, if not the only, 
legal ground for OBA-related data uses is consent, which has been further 
strengthened by the GDPR, but the efficiency will depend on how certain 
provisions are enforced and how the future ePrivacy Regulation will 
complement the regime. Third, the current practices of the OBA sector are 
unlikely to be compliant with the principles of fairness, purpose limitation and 
data minimisation. Fourth, while some uncertainties remain, it is possible that 
the use of personal data in an OBA context is subject to the GDPR’s regulation 
on profiling, which would impose even more restrictions on those uses. 
Throughout the four parts of the analysis, it becomes clear that the GDPR has 
brought the DPD’s ‘consent + necessity’ regulatory model to a new level, 
bolstering both elements in different parts of the legal framework. 
Such a ‘consent + necessity 2.0’ model was then examined critically in 
Chapter 5. To allow for a meaningful evaluation that takes into account the 
potential threats of big data flagged up in previous chapters, it was suggested 
that data subjects should be seen and protected as autonomous individuals, 
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consumers and citizens. These roles signify the various areas where personal 
and social preferences are of varying degrees of importance. In addition to the 
specific issues in the contexts of protecting autonomous, interpersonal and 
political interests, this regulatory model also suffers from the general rigidity 
of the ‘libertarianism-paternalism’ conceptual binary, which prevents the 
development of the more flexible, interest-balanced approaches. 
In order to overcome these shortcomings, Chapter 6 suggested an 
alternative model that reconstructs the authorisation scheme of data 
protection law as a number of lists. By enumerating the permissive and 
prohibitive mechanisms that are already in place in the GDPR, this chapter 
shows that data protection law can be seen as comprised of a whitelist and a 
blacklist. Where policymakers have identified new categories of data 
processing that should be permitted or prohibited, they may and should 
consider expanding such white- or blacklists. As regards consent, there are 
more regulatory tools available whereby regulators may introduce different 
choice architectures featuring various forms of nudges and interventions. By 
laying down certain lists of activities that are subject to specific sets of consent 
requirements, policymakers are in effect creating a number of greylists of 
various shades. The realisation of all these regulatory possibilities by means of 
white-, black- and greylists will be helpful in addressing the defects of the 
current regime, but the adoption of such measures should be subject to the 
constitutional constraints in general terms. 
To sum it up, a brief answer to the overarching research question would 
be: Considering the techno-economic realities of data uses for OBA purposes 
and its potential benefits and risks, data protection law should respond to the 
new challenges, including those posed to the individualistic, collective and 
societal interests, by going beyond the somewhat binary ‘consent + necessity 
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2.0’ regulatory model as currently featured in the GDPR, and realising the 
available options in the regulatory toolbox. 
Applicability to wider contexts 
Of course, considering that the conclusion is drawn based on the investigation 
of a case study as well as the positive law of a specific jurisdiction, the extent 
to which the findings of this study can be applied to other contexts should be 
further clarified. To begin with, if OBA is considered one form of commercial 
use of big data, then the first question will naturally concern other forms of 
commercial use of big data. For example, it can imagined that big data is also 
highly valuable to the financial sector. Using sophisticated systems to analyse 
and predict customer behaviour for such purposes as credit scoring or 
insurance quoting would certainly prove efficient and accurate. Despite the 
slight differences in the nature of these contexts, there is no reason why the 
findings based on the observation of the OBA industry do not hold for the rest 
of the private sector. In fact, in cases where it is even clearer that personal data 
is involved and significant impacts are imposed on individuals, such as big 
data credit scoring, it would be even less disputable that the dangers are 
present and the legal regime is insufficient. The legal analysis would of course 
have to adapt to each use case of big data, but the general analytical framework 
should be by and large applicable to other scenarios. 
Zooming out to an even greater extent, one may make further comparison 
with the application of big data in the public sector. While it has been 
highlighted in the beginning of this study that the boundaries between private 
and public use of data have been blurred, and that OBA as an instance of 
private use of big data may have public implications, it would be inadvisable 
to apply the findings of this study without careful adjustment to use cases that 
are intended for public purposes in the first place. For example, big data 
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surveillance has been discussed both as a possible governmental measure and 
as a potential threat to fundamental rights.1 Big data for healthcare purposes, 
including research and development of new medicine 2  and prevention of 
epidemics 3 , is another field where further debates will take place. These 
contexts, while sharing certain similarities in common, are considerably 
different from the case of OBA for two reasons. First, in cases of public use of 
big data, public interests would make a much more compelling case. It follows 
that, on the one hand, the legal basis of public interest, among others, would 
be more likely to be relied on, and on the other, policymakers would need to 
allocate a greater weight to this consideration when balancing against other 
interests. Second, commercial interests are of lesser concern in those cases, or 
in other words, data subjects would not be considered consumers as much as 
they would in the case of OBA. Therefore, the regulatory approach would face 
situations that have less to do with ‘real choices’ or ‘power asymmetries’, but 
more with ‘checks and balances’ or ‘constitutional legitimacy’. Having said 
that, the general theoretical framework taking into account personal, collective 
and social interests will remain sound as long as the significant differences are 
factored in. 
In an even bigger picture, it would be reasonable to discuss the 
transferability of the findings to emerging technologies other than big data. In 
fact, as highlighted in the very beginning of this study, big data has already 
become an integral part of many other technologies, such as the internet of 
things or machine learning. To the extent that the functioning of these 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive coverage of the literature on this topic, see David Lyon, ‘Big Data 
Surveillance: Snowden Everyday Practices and Digital Futures’ in Tugba Basaran and others 
(eds), International Political Sociology: Transversal Lines (Routledge 2017). 
2 Doug Howe and others, ‘The Future of Biocuration’ (2008) 455(4) Nature 47. 
3 Stephen J. Mooney, Daniel J. Westreich and Abdulrahman M. El-Sayed, ‘Epidemiology in 
the Era of Big Data’ (2015) 26(3) Epidemiology. 
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technologies is dependent on powerful analysis of large amounts of personal 
data, the doctrinal and theoretical frameworks employed in this study would 
likely be able to accommodate such technologies as well. 
In terms of jurisdiction, while the legal analysis throughout the previous 
chapters has been overwhelmingly focused on the EU’s GDPR, most of the 
non-doctrinal observations would nevertheless go for other jurisdictions both 
intra- and extra-EU. For Member States of the EU, while the GDPR has 
achieved a greater level of harmonisation, a number of issues remain at the 
discretion of national laws.4 For example, and as has been highlighted in the 
previous chapter, national legislation may blacklist certain uses of sensitive 
data. This would leave a role, though limited, for the policymakers or 
regulators of Member States to continue to play. The policymaking of Member 
States would be subject to the general analytical framework here, as well as 
the constitutional constraints suggested. For non-EU jurisdictions, the ‘black-
letter’ part of this study would of course not apply, but apart from that, the big 
data risks they are facing will be largely similar, and thus the general approach, 
at least regarding the various possibilities in the regulatory toolbox, should be 
equally applicable to these jurisdictions. The specific implementation may 
vary from one country to another, depending on their legal system and legal 
culture, but the overarching ideas advanced by this study should be able to 
more or less inform policymakers across jurisdictions. 
Limitations and future research 
The conclusion of this study should not be seen as only the end of an inquiry, 
but rather the beginning of longer-term academic and public debates. There 
                                                 
4 For a full list of these derogations, see Jiahong Chen, ‘How the Best-Laid Plans Go Awry: 
The (Unsolved) Issues of Applicable Law in the General Data Protection Regulation’ (2016) 
6(4) International Data Privacy Law 310. 
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are many interesting areas regarding big data and data protection law that 
cannot be covered by this study, but should be addressed in future research. 
It is impossible to name all the potentially relevant research topics 
exhaustively here, but highlighting some of the unexplored fields should be 
helpful in sparkling ideas about further research initiatives. 
Some of the interesting topics are not covered mainly due to the choice of 
methodologies within this study. Empirical evidence is needed to further 
uncover the industrial practices, as well as the inferred ramifications, such as 
the hypothetical network effects of the dominant players in the ecosystem, as 
suggested in Chapter 1. Impartial, well-designed surveys on the overall 
attitudes to and preferences of certain categories of use of personal data, as 
informed by the discussion in Chapter 2, are also needed, in particular after 
the recent disclosures of how Internet users’ online data might have been 
misused. 
The theories about the risks arising from big data also need further support, 
both empirically and theoretically. Certain ideas about the non-commercial 
collective interests, for instance, have been lightly touched upon in Chapter 3, 
but will need to be fleshed out with more in-depth discussions. Also, while the 
choice of a ‘risk-based’ framework to conceptualise the impact of big data is 
useful for the purpose of this study, it is also possible to explore how big data 
affects certain public goods in ways that do not necessarily involve any short-
term or long-term risks. If we consider the control over the use of personal 
data as a collective decision on how we govern a society at present and in the 
future, the idea of ‘good (or better) governance’ itself would not have to have 
recourse to the establishment of any harm. 
As regards the legal part of the research, it has been well acknowledged 
that there are many aspects of the GDPR that have not been addressed by 
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Chapter 4. Some new provisions (especially the procedural ones) that might 
actually make a difference, such as data protection by design 5  and data 
protection impact assessments6, are yet to be fully discussed in the context of 
OBA. The limitations of the current legal framework, as the subject matter of 
Chapter 5, have been highlighted, but are not considered in detail with regard 
to the potential interactions with other areas of law, including consumer 
protection law, competition law, media law or even election law. 
Much work will also be needed to further theorise the list-based approach 
as proposed in Chapter 6, where a general framework is provided but it has to 
be filled up with more substance. The activities that should be put on the 
white-/grey-/blacklists would of course be the most important issues to 
consider if that is the approach taken by the policymakers. Equally important 
are the procedural and substantive constraints that should be imposed on 
policymakers and regulators in the course of codifying and enforcing such lists. 
In more general terms, since both big data and data protection law are 
developing and interacting with each other, further research on policy 
learning in this context is also needed. 
The list of potential research topics can go on and on. The scope of the 
relevant yet unsolved issues shows how much it would take to fully address 
the intractable problems surrounding data protection law and big data — 
which can be an ambitious, lifetime project. We have been, and will probably 
continue to be, in a time where big data exerts great influence on personal, 
communal and public life. Perhaps the good news is that regulatory and public 
awareness of the latent impact of big data seems to be on the rise. While the 
                                                 
5 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1 (‘GDPR’), art 25. 
6 ibid art 35. 
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aim of this study is not to provide a comprehensive design of a model data 
protection statute, it is hoped that the discussions here offer a helpful 
conceptual framework for policymakers to consider, and for the whole society 
to debate, on how our data protection law should respond to the looming 
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